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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This research argues that the information security governance objectives should be 
grounded in the values of organizational members. Research literature in decision sciences 
suggest that individual values play an important role in developing decision objectives. 
Information security governance objectives, based on values of the stakeholders, are 
essential for a comprehensive security control program. The study uses Value Theory as a 
theoretical basis and value focused thinking as a methodology to develop 23 objectives for 
information security governance. A case study was conducted to reexamine and interpret 
the significance of the proposed objectives in an organizational context. The results 
suggest three emergent dimensions of information security governance for effective control 
structure in organizations: resource allocation, user involvement and process integrity. The 
synthesis of data suggests eight principles of information security governance which 
guides organizations in achieving a comprehensive security environment. We also present 
a means-end model of ISG which proposes the interrelationships of the developed 
objectives. Contributions are noted and future research directions suggested. 
  1 
 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
  This research is about designing internal control objectives for maximizing 
Information Security Governance (ISG) in organizations. Adequate internal controls are an 
essential part of the governance structure in an organization. The creation and 
implementation of these controls are essential in order to streamline organizational 
processes.  
Security controls in the context of information security governance are primarily aimed at 
achieving three things: managing the business process integrity, ensuring business 
continuity and aligning organizational objectives with those of the security program 
(COSO, 2004). A poorly designed control structure is incapable of communicating top 
management‘s objectives and philosophy to the employees. Information security 
governance objectives convey the management‘s goals for the security program and its 
expectations from the organizational members for the achievement of these objectives. 
Lack of proper security governance objectives can lead to faulty design of controls, which 
result in information security problems. Hence, an understanding of the process of 
designing internal control objectives is imperative.    
There is evidence in extant literature which points to a lack of understanding about the 
process of designing internal control objectives. Most of the prevalent internal control 
models are atheoretical and do not provide insight into the design process of such 
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objectives. This research also makes a contribution towards the design of internal control 
objectives for information security governance from a value-focused perspective.  
The overall aim of this research is to develop information security governance objectives 
for organizations which are theoretically grounded and based on the values of the 
stakeholders. In pursuance of this aim, this study elicits individual values for internal 
controls in information security governance context, creates a means-end framework of 
fundamental objectives of internal control objectives, examines the theoretical framework 
through an in-depth case study and proposes ISG principles for implementation.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the nature of the 
research and section 1.3 establishes the importance of the research problem. Section 1.4 
presents the scope of the research and section 1.5 presents the structure and description of 
the whole dissertation. 
1.2 Nature of the research  
 There is a surfeit of reported security breaches which have resulted in huge losses 
to organizations resulting from inadequate security controls. According to the Global 
Security Survey by Deloitte (2006), many financial institutions still have not felt the need 
to measure the effectiveness of their information security controls, leading to serious 
organizational vulnerability. Cases of serious insider breaches suggest two things:  
First, the internal control objectives are incapable of checking and preventing such 
incidents proactively. Second, the control objectives are either inadequately conveyed to 
the organizational members or the objectives fail to motivate the members to align their 
personal objectives with security control objectives.  The ―tone at the top‖ is ineffective in 
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conveying the right message to the employees. When the individuals are unable to identify 
with the control objectives and the lack of alignment between individual and corporate 
goals is palpable, then this lacuna becomes evident through internal breaches.  
This research argues that information security governance objectives of an organization 
should be grounded in the individual values of organizational members to provide a better 
control structure. Designing and implementing internal controls is an important part of 
effective information security programs. This study focuses on eliciting individual values 
for designing  internal controls for information security governance. Studying the value 
propositions of employees for information security governance would identify the deep-
seated values of people within organizations. This would facilitate a ―bottoms up‖ 
approach for designing of control objectives and governance.     
The basic research question that guides this research is ―What are the information security 
governance objectives to be followed to keep organizations secure?‖ In pursuit of a 
comprehensive addressal of this question, the sub questions that need to be answered are: 
1. What should be the nature and scope of ISG objectives for defining and 
developing internal controls such that information security can be maintained?  
2.  What are the principles to be adhered to in order to ensure good information 
security governance in an organization?  
3. How can organizations improve their information security governance 
practices?   
1.3 Importance of the research problem  
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 Organizations face a major problem in the rampant lack of proper information 
security governance. Due to inadequate information security governance, security incidents 
are on the rise, making managers nervous about their ability to minimize risks and 
vulnerabilities in information systems. The concerns about security breaches in 
organizations are steadily increasing and can mainly be divided into four types (Parker, 
2006): 
 Increasing security incidents: The number of security threats is increasing, as 
evidenced by numerous surveys and research. According to CERT sources, security 
incidents have risen 2099 % from 1998- 2002- an average annual growth rate of 
116 % (CERT, 2006).   
 Sophisticated nature of security breaches: It is no longer a secret that most security 
breaches are caused by insiders. The new threats are becoming increasingly 
complex and sophisticated in nature. Currently rampaging viruses have the 
capability of shutting down the entire IT network in the organization.   
 Increasing regulatory pressure: Many governmental regulations have acknowledged 
the importance of information security in the knowledge economy. Regulations 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide a lot of 
institutional pressure for better security preparedness. There are strict requirements 
in the form of internal control management processes, which are pushing up the 
strategic importance of security in organizations.     
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 Dynamic security needs: Reactive and ad hoc security measures can only provide 
temporary relief from particular kinds of security threats. Security management has 
to be proactive to enable flexibility on the part of management to combat unseen 
threats. This needs to be inbuilt in the system and adaptive modular approaches 
need to be installed.  
So how do organizations deal with the situation? Global security surveys conducted by 
four major consulting firms (Deloitte, KPMG, PWC and E&Y, 2006) to understand 
organizational responses to security problems show: more awareness of security as a 
strategic issue in organizations, more investments in security programs, increased 
acceptance of the reality of internal threats and more security issues in boardrooms, as 
compared to any other year. Even though there is an increase in security awareness of 
organizations, the numbers of security attacks and resulting breaches have recorded a 
corresponding rise to reach an unprecedented level. It is an indicator of the fact that 
organizations are unable to generate fundamental and effective responses to security issues 
in general. 
The lack of effective information security governance in organizations is a result of 
security governance objectives being inadequately defined and implemented. If the 
objectives are not in place, it naturally follows that there cannot be adequate controls to 
achieve them. This is made evident by the fact that most security breaches are not technical 
but socio-organizational in nature. A study on security breaches in finance industry 
reported that most security incidents were not technically sophisticated. These incidents 
typically involved exploitation of vulnerabilities such as business rules or organizational 
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policies (CERT 2004). The lack of proper information security governance objectives in 
organizations are manifested in two ways: inadequate internal control structure and 
increased insider threats. Most of the recent security failures can be traced to either of these 
two consequences of inadequate ISG.  
There is a plethora of reported security breaches resulting in huge losses to organizations, 
which are a direct result of inadequate controls. The recent 2008 episode at Societe 
Generale where more than 4 billion Euro were wiped out of the banks assets by an insider 
is a pertinent example. The organization has blamed employee Jerome Kerviel for the 
colossal loss. He has been charged with hacking into the bank‘s computers, falsifying 
documents and breach of trust (Forte and Power, 2008). Kerviel circumvented obsolete 
procedures about reporting transactions in the bank and exposed it to exceptionally high 
risks in the futures trading market. The banks losses were in the region of $7 billion and it 
is speculated that this breakdown fueled the U.S. Federal Reserve‘s emergency 0.75% rate 
cut in interests. The bank also confirmed that it has instituted "additional control 
procedures" to prevent a reoccurrence of similar rogue trading in the future (Forte and 
Power, 2008).  
Some of the most glaring examples of security failures of catastrophic proportions can be 
attributed to inadequate control structures in organizations. Fiascos such as the demise of 
the Barings Bank, Kidder Peabody and the above mentioned Societe Generale case reflect 
on the inability to institute adequate internal controls and Enron‘s failure to ensure 
integrity of business processes clearly point to the increasing need for effective control 
structures.   
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Cases of lack of integrity leading to lapses in information security governance abound. 
Recently the office of Ohio Secretary of State posted SSNs, date of births and personal 
information of citizens on a state website as part of Standard Security Practices (Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse 2006). The Department of Social Services in Los Angeles reported 
boxes of files containing personal identifiable information such as W-2, medical 
information and SSN being left unattended and unshredded, which exposed more than 
2,000,000 individuals to security risks (Rutgers Identity Theft Center, 2006). These 
breaches are a glaring example of the lack of adequate internal controls and poor 
implementation of controls that do exist. It is not surprising that the argument to ―make 
information security a boardroom issue‖ (Coviello and Swindle 2006) is being repeated 
and is gaining validity. Cyber Security Industry Alliance, in its National Agenda for 
Information Security for 2006 has urged the Federal Government to encourage private 
sector to apply information security governance to business operations (p.6). There is 
clearly a gap between management‘s objectives for information security governance and 
employees‘ understanding of the same. There remains a palpable lack of proper written 
security policies in organizations, especially in industries which are not extensively IT 
dependent such as financial sector, education and government (Leyden, 2004). Many well 
known episodes of business infidelity are an example of the vulnerability of state of the art 
information security governance to break-ins and exploitation of the existing 
vulnerabilities in the business process (Forte and Power, 2008).   
Information security governance encompasses various aspects of organizational functions. 
The design and development of applications to support the infrastructure for business 
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process and mechanisms for deploying these applications are under the purview of security 
management. Also, policy development and implementation, internal control design and 
implementation, management of technology and people; all of these constitute part and 
parcel of the information security governance in an organization.    
Another indicator of the lack of adequate ISG objectives, which is the internal threat from 
employees, has always been acknowledged as a major source of security breaches in 
organizations. 96% of the respondents in global security survey conducted by Deloitte 
indicate that they are concerned about employee misconduct involving their information 
systems (Deloitte, 2006). The survey identifies the majority of threats as being due to 
errors and omissions (human error: 42%; operational error: 37%), rather than malicious 
intent. It is important to note that, of those institutions that experienced a successful 
internal breach, 28% were the result of experienced and intentional fraud and 18% were 
due to the intentional leaking of customer data (Deloitte, 2006).  
The numerous cases of serious insider breaches suggest two things as already mentioned: 
First, the ISG objectives are incapable of checking and preventing such incidents 
proactively. Second, the control objectives are either inadequately conveyed to the 
organizational members or are not aligned with their personal objectives in an effective 
way.  The ―powers that be‖ are ineffective in conveying the right message to the 
employees, resulting in the employee‘s isolation and alienation from the control objectives. 
The apparent lack of alignment between individual and corporate goals is manifested in 
internal breaches.  
This leads to a significant question: What are the businesses doing about this situation?  
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It is not clear how organizations plan to combat these issues in security governance.  The 
global security survey conducted by Price Waterhouse Coppers (PWC) shows that most 
executives with security responsibilities in organizations worldwide have made little 
progress in implementing strategic security measures that could have acted as a 
fundamental inhibitor for various security incidents (PWC, 2006). Since, security 
governance objectives are not being developed at the corporate level and are not being 
integrated in the business processes, the risks in form of increased insider threats and 
failure of controls still remain. Also, the lack of planning in governance objectives 
obviously results in more reactive than proactive measures for dealing with security 
threats. 
 Security is still perceived as a cost driver and not a value creator. Majority of the 
organizations reported that their security is not in compliance with major regulations, such 
as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), Sarbanes Oxley Act or 
non-U.S laws such as European Union Data Privacy Directive, which have been around for 
years (PWC, 2006). Thus mandating internal control assessment through regulations is 
obviously not serving the purpose.  
Information security governance practices depend on strong internal control management 
techniques and a supportive control environment in an organization. Organizations that 
reported their security polices and spending are more aligned with their business processes 
experienced fewer financial losses and less network downtime than those that did not 
(PWC, 2006). This is an indicator of the dire need for effective information security 
governance programs in organizations. Correct information security governance objectives 
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are required to assure proactive and encompassing security measures which protect 
organizations from threats. It is crucial to develop the right controls objectives and the 
requisite controls to compliment these objectives along with their periodic assessment. The 
overall security status of the organization is determined through an adequate assessment of 
the controls (NIST special publication 800-53A, 2006). The selection and implementation 
of security controls have major implications on the operations and assets of an 
organization. Security controls are the safeguards that maintain the integrity of the 
organizational information systems. The effectiveness of security controls must be 
assessed to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, their 
operation as per intention and requirement, and their effectiveness in producing the desired 
outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for the system (NIST special 
publication 800-53A, 2006).  
1.4 Scope of the research   
 Three categories of definitions are required for anchoring the basic concepts in this 
research. This section explicitly defines what we mean by information security, internal 
controls, information security governance and individual values in this research. A cogent 
definition of the basic constructs that guide this research will help the reader gauge the 
conceptual foundation of this work.  
Information security: Information security means protecting all information assets from 
misuse, harm or any other unintended result. This includes securing information in 
computers, maintaining integrity of business processes, retaining skilled knowledge 
workers with their implicit knowledge and also encouraging employees to claim ownership 
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of their share of information assets (Dhillon 2006).  Information is a shared asset, which 
has to be protected from all possible distortions by everyone sharing it. This definition 
adopts a holistic view of information systems security where information is secured 
through technical, organizational and normative means.  
Internal controls: Internal controls are a means to provide reasonable assurance that an 
organization will achieve its business objectives while avoiding undesired risks (ISACA, 
2004). Internal controls are policies, procedures, practices, and organizational structures 
put in place to reduce risks. These also attempt to rationalize the organizational processes. 
They operate at all levels in an organization and help in reducing risks involved at various 
stages of the operation, thus helping the organization reach its business objectives (Dhillon 
and Mishra, 2006).  
Information security governance: ISG can be defined as ―a way of establishing and 
maintaining a control environment to manage risks that relate to confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information and its supporting processes and systems (Moultan and 
Cole, 2003)‖. This conceptualization suggests a technical orientation for security. Certified 
Information Systems Auditor (CISA) Review Manual (2004) defines information security 
governance as a ―focused activity with specific value drivers: integrity of information, 
continuity of services and protection of information assets (pp.385)‖. This definition 
suggests that due to global integration of organizations via networks, security has become 
a significant governance issue and the end product of information security governance 
process is the safety and security of data.  
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Values: Value refers to the preferred or what is conceived as preferable to human mind 
(Catton, 1954). An individual‘s preferential behavior shows certain regularities and this 
pattern can be attributed to some standard or code, which persists through time providing a 
basis by which people order their intensities of desiring various desiderata (something 
desirable). Keeney (1992) conceptualizes value as ―what we care about and should be the 
driving force for our decision making (pp. 3)‖. Values are more fundamental to a decision 
context than the available alternatives. But in common practice, decision-making usually 
focuses on the choice among existing alternatives.  
Information systems security research has witnessed limited theory-developing efforts 
(Weber, 2006). Specifically in the area of internal controls design and implementation for 
security, there have been limited attempts to create or use existing theories. In this 
research, a theory building exercise is performed. By analyzing individual values about 
internal controls in organizations, we create a framework of means and fundamental 
objectives. The conceptual framework thus developed provides a set of high-level 
principles for internal controls design and implementation in the context of information 
security. The interrelations between various objectives also provide an insight into 
complex relationships and multipurpose roles that such objectives play.  
This study is conducted using value theory as the theoretical basis and value focused 
assessment as a methodology. Catton (1954) proposed value theory, which states that the 
choices made by individuals over a period of time, shows a definite pattern and is guided 
by the values internal to such people. The values, deep rooted in people‘s minds, are 
manifested by the choices people make in complex situations. This theory provides an 
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appropriate basis for understanding the reasons for behavior of individuals in groups. 
Keeney (1992) suggests a methodology to create decision objectives by studying 
individual values in a decision context. This methodology- namely value focused thinking, 
provides a way to elicit individual values and creates decision objectives about a problem. 
A means-end framework can be created through this methodology, which provides high-
level guidance in decision-making.  
The framework developed is used to explain ISG conceptualizations and practices through 
an in-depth case study. This case study was conducted in the information technology 
department of a state agency in Virginia, USA. The results from the interviews and 
secondary data from the organization were used to reexamine the preliminary theoretical 
model.  
1.5 Dissertation Structure  
 Chapter two presents a review of the extant research literature. In this research, we 
have primarily looked at three streams of research: information security research, 
management controls or organizational design research literature and internal controls 
research in information systems discipline.  
Chapter three describes the theoretical basis and research methodology that this particular 
research adopts. A discussion about value theory as a theoretical basis and value focused 
thinking as a methodology is provided to conceptually ground the work.  
Chapter four describes the creation of a means-end framework through the process of 
interviewing information security professionals across industries. Using Keeney‘s value 
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focused approach, a theoretical framework with means and fundamental objectives about 
internal controls for information systems security is created from the interview data.  
Chapter five describes a case study that was conducted to create an initial conceptual 
framework about means and fundamental objectives regarding internal controls. In this 
theory building exercise, this chapter also presents a validation of the theoretical model.   
Chapter six describes data analysis results and their implications for information security 
governance research in particular and information security research in general. The 
synthesis of the results is presented and an answer to the ―so what‖ question of this 
research is provided.  
Chapter seven presents a mapping of our initial research questions to our findings. The 
research contributions and limitations are suggested. Future research directions stemming 
from this work are also suggested.  
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CHAPTER 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The focus of this research is to develop internal control objectives for information 
security governance. There is little research in the area of information security governance 
(McFadzean et al., 2006; von Solms, 2006) and the available models have different 
conceptualizations about the topic. For this research, as described in the previous chapter, 
Information security governance is defining, implementing and monitoring security 
controls (ITGI, 2004). Since it is a subset of information systems security research, it is 
natural that research perspectives and trends in information systems security would 
influence this research. Therefore, to gain an insight into the research in information 
systems security governance, it is important to understand the prevalent research issues in 
information systems security domain.  Information systems security places more emphasis 
on technical aspects of security than on its non-technical aspects in an organization 
(Baskerville, 1993; Dhillon, 2001; Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001). Information systems 
security research has traditionally been mechanistic in approach with a narrow focus on 
ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data in the computer systems 
(Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Baskerville and Sipponen, 2002). The narrow technical 
approach overlooks other major organizational security vulnerabilities to information 
systems in the form of lack of segregation of roles, disgruntled employees and inadequate 
security policies (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that a review of 
information systems security governance research shows similar trends and biases to be 
inherited from the superset i.e. information security.  
  16 
Two broad orientations dominate the literature in information systems security governance 
area: These are technical and socio-organizational orientation. Technically oriented 
security governance research places a greater emphasis on using technical controls (such as 
access controls and security architecture) to manage enterprise security. Socio-
organizationally oriented security governance literature revolves more around formal and 
informal controls (such as responsibility and accountability and control culture) to ensure 
comprehensive security programs. A critical review of information systems security 
governance models from research and industry standards for governance is presented.  The 
two perspectives described above are used to traverse the extant literature in information 
systems security governance.   
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. Following the introduction, the 
first section discusses the technically oriented information systems security governance 
literature. The second section discusses socio-organizationally oriented information 
systems security governance literature. The third section discusses the current state of 
extant literature in information systems security governance and analyzes its implications. 
This discussion also presents the gaps in the literature as identified in the review. Finally, 
the concluding section presents the assertions as these related to ISG practices.   
2.2 Information Systems Security Governance: A Technical Orientation  
 As conceptualized by Moulton and Coles (2003), information systems security 
governance from a technical perspective can be defined as ―a way of establishing and 
maintaining a control environment to manage risks that relate to confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information and its supporting processes and systems.‖ Along similar 
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lines, Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) Review Manual (2004) defines 
information security governance as a ―focused activity with specific value drivers: integrity 
of information, continuity of services and protection of information assets (pp.385)‖. This 
definition suggests that due to global integration of organizations via networks, security 
has emerged as a significant governance issue and the end product of information security 
governance process is the surety of safe and secure data.  
As mentioned above, research from this perspective is premised on the belief that security 
governance is about managing the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data in 
information systems. The emphasis is greater on data management than systems 
management. With a technical scope, control objectives developed and controls deployed 
focus on securing critical information in computer systems. The motivation being that 
technical safeguards are the most important component of a security program and if 
technical controls are in place, the organization is automatically more secure. Not only 
some research models but also some of the prevalent security governance standards have 
had technical focus. 
ISO 17799, renamed as ISO/IEC 27002, is a prominent information security governance 
framework with a technical orientation to security management. International Standards 
Organization joined hands with International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) for 
developing a series of standards for Information Security Management (ISM). These 
standards are the best practices for security management and are also known as ISO/IEC 
27000 (ISO27K) series of standards. As per the new release on security management, 
ISO27k ―provides the means to implement effective information security management in 
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compliance with organizational objectives and business requirements‖. Although 
preliminarily released in 2006, ISO27k is far from complete. Currently only three 
standards have been officially published (27001, 27002, and 27006) covering 
implementation and maintenance of an ISM system, guidelines for conducting ISM in an 
organization, and guidance for bodies that provide audit and certification of ISM systems. 
There is a future expectation about many more such security standards.  
ISO/IEC 27002 is a widely used information security management framework in North 
America and Europe.  The framework provides guidance about security in 11 different 
areas (see table 2.1). ISO/IEC 27002 is exclusive to information security, and only 
addresses that issue. It is divided into 10 sections, with 36 objectives. Each objective is 
again divided into sub-objectives (ISO, 2005) 
The framework provides the range of controls needed for securing information systems. It 
is based on security risks assessment and provides the basis for cost justification and 
improved productivity of security staff.  
The major benefit of using ISO/IEC 27002 for information security governance is that it is 
detailed and is targeted at people responsible for technical information security. The 
framework provides much more guidance on precisely ‗how‘ things must be done (von 
Solms, 2005). For example it gives guidance on what an information security policy should 
look like in terms of structure and content. ISO/IEC 27002 is, in many cases, the 
framework of choice of IT and information security managers because of its technical 
superiority (von Solms, 2005).  
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Table 2.1. Control Objectives from ISO/ IEC 27002 
 
Control objectives from ISO 17799 
1. Business continuity planning 
2. Systems access control 
3. System development and maintenance 
4. Physical and environmental security 
5. Compliance 
6. Personnel security 
7. Security organization 
8. Computer and Network management 
9. Asset classification and control 
10. Security policy  
11. Incident management 
 
There are some shortcomings of using this framework. It provides ‗stand alone‘ guidance 
with a narrow focus on security management and cannot be integrated easily into a wider 
framework for information technology governance (von Solms, 2005; Brown and Nasuti, 
2005). The framework does have a list of proposed controls but fails to suggest how these 
controls can be synchronized to achieve the maximum benefit (Eloff and Eloff, 2005). A 
marked emphasis on just the technical aspects of security management makes it incomplete 
as a framework for security governance area.  With similar orientation, Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a widely used framework for referencing  
security management principles. The framework was developed in UK by the Office of 
Commerce. It identifies a broad range of processes that are considered as best practices for 
information technology service management (see table 2.2).  
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ITIL provides security from the service provider perspective, identifying the relationship 
between security management and IT security officer (ITIL, 2007). It describes the role of 
best practices for IT services. There are several guidelines in ITIL libraries about the 
technical management of security. Targeted at people responsible for IT service 
management, ITIL is a collection of books referred as best practices for IT service 
management (Heschl, 2004).  
The key to the growing success of ITIL is its flexibility. ITIL, unlike other process-focused 
strategies for business improvement is not a methodology per se. ITIL consists of several 
libraries of advice and guidance on how to deliver and support IT services. However, there 
are many challenges which emerge while implementing ITIL in organizations. 
Implementing ITIL brings about sweeping changes in an organization in the form of 
changed processes and culture (Lange, 2007). It is difficult to assess the ―value‖ that is 
added by implementing these changes. Also, ITIL is perceived as difficult to implement 
considering the huge volume of advice that it offers. The framework currently offers a 
library of 10 books on various IT service management topics. Organizations find it hard to 
fully comprehend the meaning of the framework (Lange, 2007). In summary, ITIL is high 
level, nonspecific and concentrates mainly on service of IT.  
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Table 2.2. Service processes as identified by ITIL 
 
Service processes from ITIL 
1.  Incident management 
2.  Change management  
3.  Problem management  
4.  Configuration management 
5.  Release management 
6.  Service level management 
7.  Continuity management 
8.  Capacity management 
9.  Financial management 
10.  Availability management 
11.  Security management 
12.  Help desk management 
 
Managing security risks from the Internet is a challenge from the information systems 
security governance perspective. Occurrence of business risks is becoming more imminent 
as the corporate network, processes and critical business data are vulnerable to attacks 
from the Internet (Segev et al., 1998). Denial of service attack is one of the big threats to 
organizational security. Abouzakhar and Manson (2002) suggest innovative ways to 
address different types of distributed denial of service attacks which have the ability to 
respond quickly. The authors acknowledge the attacks on networks as a significant security 
breach and in their suggestions to deal with these attacks they propose a model, with 
intelligent fuzzy agents, which allocate resources dynamically to ensure availability of the 
network for legitimate users without blocking useful protocols. This model is useful for 
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managing security from specialized external threats, although it does not provide any 
inputs for managing network breakdown threats from inside the organization.  
Acknowledging the importance of managing Internet security threats, Qiang and Hua-ying 
(2007) argue that Internet security governance is an iterative and continuously evolving 
process. The authors propose a systematic model for the Internet security governance 
based on the complexity theory and systems dynamics. The authors analyze the topology 
characters of host objects and message spreading rules in the model. According to the 
model, Internet security governance has four stages; Nodes identification (identify the 
nodes which can carry viruses or messages that disrupt the system), topology structure 
analysis (typology affects the spreading trends of the diseases or viruses depending on the 
content on the web page), disease spreading analysis (describes the spreading speed of the 
disease, its coverage, duration and so on) and security governance (suggests measures to 
control the spreading of the disease in the network and verifies the measures through 
systems simulations and case studies). The above model treats the Internet as a technical 
system and does not acknowledge the importance of social and behavioral factors in 
managing risks. The model forwards too simplistic a representation of the real threats to 
the organizational networks on the Internet. 
Along similar lines, with emphasis on technical supremacy to deal with information 
security problems, Finne (1996) proposes an information security chain model for security 
management in an organization. The model comprises twelve modules and eighty sub 
modules, each emphasizing an area of security management. The model has a heavy 
technical emphasis with modules such as computer security, distributed systems, operation 
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security, protection against theft, protection against fire and water, electricity distribution, 
internal and external threats, communication, external contact, contingency planning, 
personnel security, contract employees and visitors, attitude towards security issues, 
security questions and the environment. The model is comprehensive and touches upon the 
various sources and aspects of a security breach. But a model of this nature is too broad in 
scope and does not take into account the contextual security governance challenges that an 
organization faces.  
In technically oriented security governance research, information security architecture is 
considered a crucial aspect of governance. From this perspective, researchers use security 
objectives as overarching access control and authentication rules for a computer system 
(e.g. Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). Sherwood (1996) argues that enterprise security 
architecture is extremely important to adequately comprehend and manage the security 
needs of the organization. Sherwood (1996) proposes a security governance model namely 
Sherwood Associates Limited Security Architecture (SALSA). In this multi-layered model, 
the top layer is the business requirements definition stage and at each subsequent lower 
layer, a new level of abstraction is developed. The lower layers define major security 
strategies, security services and security mechanisms. The last layer suggests ways of 
selecting technologies and products. This process approach to security management 
encourages everyone to participate in the security development program. The model helps 
in developing a participative security architecture which provides technical capabilities to 
meet the business requirements. For this reason, the model is more anecdotal and 
conceptual in nature rather than being driven by a theory or rigorous research.  The 
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inconsistent implementation of security management controls is considered a major risk in 
today‘s networked environments. This is a significant security issue as there is no benefit 
in installing sophisticated access controls on one system to create a ―trusted environment‖ 
when those controls can be simply bypassed by an unauthorized user gaining access to that 
―trusted environment‖ through a gateway connected system which has inadequate controls 
installed (Ward and Smith, 2002). Lack of proper controls results in exposing 
organizations to new vulnerabilities and compromising the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information systems. Development of access control policies to protect all 
systems is essential while implementing effective internal control processes consistently 
across all systems (Stoupa and Vakali, 2007).  
Ward and Smith (2002) articulate the need for access control policies for information 
systems. The authors argue that is important to have governance guidelines and risk 
management strategies to protect information assets of an organization. Access control 
policies help the management in mitigating risks within the organization and allow 
effective segregation of roles for overall enterprise security. The paper proposes a high 
level approach to implementing security governance objectives through information 
security responsibilities, management accountability policy, and other access control 
security policies in individual and distributed systems. The proposed model adequately 
emphasizes the importance of access controls for networked environment. The model is 
limited in its application at an enterprise level as there is asymmetrical emphasis on access 
control policies compared to other technical requirements for governance. The proposed 
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model has not been tested in real organizational setting, thus its applicability is 
questionable.   
Booker (2006) emphasizes the importance of maintaining a database of critical network 
and information assets for effective information systems security governance. It is a 
challenge to proactively manage security programs and minimize costs of the security 
initiatives. To overcome the above problem, a security management model is suggested. 
The model consists of five components (see table 2.3): 
Table 2.3: Security management model (Booker, 2006) 
 
Stages  Objectives 
1.  Understanding disruptive forces 
2.  Implementing a holistic approach 
3.  Measuring and communicating value 
4.  Aligning key security initiatives with business strategy 
5.  Managing the program globally while allowing regional control 
 
In understanding disruptive forces component, the author emphasizes the importance of 
governance and compliance, mobile workforce, business justification requirement and 
reactivity of businesses and suggests measures to deal with these issues. Implementing a 
holistic approach suggests that it is important to map security requirements into a simple 
taxonomy that provides a comprehensive security framework. For measuring and 
communicating value, it is suggested that calculation of Total Economic Impact (TEI) is 
used as it provides a better foundation for communicating the investment profile required 
for information security. Under aligning key security initiatives with business strategy, the 
author suggests that network security, communications security, identity management and 
operational risk management are necessary. And finally under managing the program 
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globally while allowing regional control component, alignment of global practices based 
on proven and acknowledged security standards, such as ISO17799, is recommended. This 
helps the business to document its security practices both internally and to the customers 
and trading partners. The model suggests that professional security operations must deliver 
security for the IT environment with appropriate value, service levels and accountability to 
the top management of the enterprise. This model is technically oriented and undermines 
the importance of social and behavioral influences on security management. The proposed 
model is generalized and lacks focus on ―how‖ to operationalize the above ideas.   
 
The research in information systems security governance area with a technical focus can be 
summarized as follows:  
Security governance is viewed as managing confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
data. Hence emphasis on technological infrastructure is more in order to prevent the 
presence of technical loop holes in the systems.  
1. Information systems security governance models are primarily focused on 
information systems security architecture, authentication, access control, Internet 
security and network management. 
2. Security control objectives are derived from the technical requirements of the 
organization. It is assumed that if security is managed on the technical front, it 
would automatically make the overall organization secure.  
3. Strong technical solutions to ensure security are adequately understood, 
implemented and used by the end users as intended by the management.    
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4.  It is believed that for a governance model to be successful, organizations require 
coordinated incident response as well as a comprehensive knowledge framework of 
network, applications and business requirements.  
Use of such technically oriented models is more popular as businesses are eager to grasp 
the idea of implementing complex technological controls to protect the information held in 
their computer systems (Dhillon, 2006). The governance models reviewed in this section 
encourage competent technical capabilities to support the entire security portfolio.  
2.3 Information Systems Security Governance: A Socio-Organizational Orientation  
 Socio-organizationally grounded research in information systems security 
governance is premised upon the belief that management of formal and informal 
environment in an organization is more important than the management of the technical 
requirements. The research in this area emphasizes the importance of formalized 
procedures and individual inputs in the governance process. Researchers in this domain 
highlight the management‘s role in security governance. The management requires control 
objectives to define the goal of implementing policies, procedures, organizational 
structures and responsibilities to ensure that business objectives are met and undesirable 
events prevented. There are several existing frameworks for information systems security 
governance, in research and in practice, that advocate the socio-organizational approach to 
security management.   
Grounded in socio-organizational perspective, Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (CobiT) provides guidance on management‘s role in security 
management. It is the most widely used information technology (IT) governance standard 
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in United States. The framework provides ―good practices‖ across a domain and a process 
framework that presents activities in a manageable and logical structure (ITGI, 2007). 
CobiT helps an organization align its business goals with IT goals. It emphasizes the 
importance of business needs that are satisfied by each of its objectives (Ridley et al, 
2004).  
CobiT provides seven criteria that generally define what business requires of IT (see figure 
2.1). CobiT requires IT to deliver the information that an organization needs to meet its 
objectives. The framework divides IT processes into 34 types and categorizes these into 
four domains: Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Delivery and Support, and 
Monitor and Evaluate. These domains contain 34 high level control objectives and 215 sub 
control objectives. These objectives are implemented through the use of control practices. 
 
Figure 2.1. Interrelationships of COBIT components (source: COBIT 4.1, ITGI 2007, pp. 8) 
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CobiT is continuously kept up to date and harmonized with other standards and guidelines. 
There are several benefits of using CobiT as a governance framework for IT. Some of 
these are: better alignment with business, a simplistic view of IT‘s role in the organization, 
process orientation allowing ownership and responsibilities and CobiT popularity with 
third parties and regulators. CobiT is designed to provide more focus on aligning IT 
control objectives with the business processes of an organization and allows management 
to benchmark its control environment to standards of policy and good practices 
implemented worldwide (Ward and Smith, 2002). 
Use of CobiT for information systems governance is not without criticisms. The 
framework represents the consensus of experts on good practices but it is not theory driven 
or empirically validated in research. The model is strongly focused on control and less on 
execution. The control objectives are very high level and generic and are not specifically 
tailored for security purposes. There is only one control objective that talks about security 
in any detail. DS5 is a high level control objective which says ―Ensure System Security‖ 
and has 21 sub objectives to it. But these are not the only objectives relevant for 
information security governance (von Solms, 2005).  
Along similar lines, Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) framework also describes a unified approach for evaluation of the internal control 
system that a management designs with the objective of achieving reasonable assurance of 
the fundamental business objectives. COSO was developed to provide consistent platform 
for developing and measuring effective internal controls across industries. The COSO 
framework suggests five control components (see table 2.4). These are: 
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Table 2.4. COSO components 
 
 
1. Control Environment  
2. Risk Assessment  
3. Control Activities 
4. Information and Communication 
5. Monitoring 
 
The control environment defines the tone of an organization and the way it operates, 
providing both discipline and structure. Organizations with effective control environments 
set a positive example from ―top management‖ and try to create integrity and control 
consciousness.  This objective primarily provides the ethics, direction and philosophy to 
the organization (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006).  Ramos (2004) argues that control 
environment is the foundation for all other components of internal controls. The risk 
assessment component suggests a process through which the management identifies the 
potential threats that can prevent the organization from meeting its business objectives. 
The controls activities include the operationalization of policies and procedures that are 
created and established to show management‘s intention of securing its assets. There could 
be several controls such as access control, physical controls, verifications and segregation 
of duties. The nature of the activities creates awareness and responsibility among the 
people who undertake the tasks. The information and communication component 
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emphasizes on reports containing operational information. Organizations need tools to 
capture and communicate relevant information to ensure the integrity of controls. 
Information thus obtained is critical to the processes of conducting, managing and 
controlling the operations of the organization. The monitoring component ensures that 
systems that are performing as intended controls are delivering the desired results. 
Monitoring can be accomplished by continuous checks and balances that occur during 
normal operations or also through separate evaluations by management, with the assistance 
of the internal auditors.  The extent of ongoing monitoring usually determines the need for 
separate evaluations. The latest version of the COSO consists of eight components as three 
more controls have been added to the existing five controls. These are: objective setting, 
event identification and risk response. 
The popular model COSO is not without its criticism. The set of objectives suggested in 
this model are all from the management perspective and the importance of maintaining a 
technical infrastructure is not emphasized. Risk assessment component suffers from a 
myopic view of security threats and is more concerned with data security than formal or 
informal level of organizational vulnerabilities. Measuring the effectiveness of internal 
controls is a difficult and an ongoing process (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006) and COSO does 
not provide any feedback mechanism for the improvement of the control objectives.   
A review of the research literature in information systems security governance from socio-
organizational perspective suggests four emergent themes which are influencing the 
majority of research initiatives. These themes are a) security policy approach b) life-cycle 
development approach c) unified approach d) and end user participation approach. Each of 
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the themes with examples of research being conducted in the particular area are discussed 
below.  
Development and use of security polices for effective governance is heavily researched 
from socio-organizational perspective of information systems security governance. There 
have been several calls in information systems security research literature to aid 
information security policy formulation (Von Solms, 1996; Straub and Nance, 1990). 
Straub and Nance (1990) use general deterrence theory to facilitate security policy 
formulation. The objectives of the theory hinge on maximizing prevention and minimizing 
undetected and unpunished abuse (Straub and Welke, 1998). Moultan and Cole (2003) 
emphasize the importance of sound security policies as being vital for a security program 
and provide guidelines for development of internal controls (Cockcroft, 2002, Straub and 
Welke, 1998). The authors categorize security governance on the following dimensions 
(see table 2.5): responsibilities in practices, strategies and objectives, management, 
resource management, regulatory compliance, policies and procedures and external 
communication. The authors present a comprehensive set of governance principles which 
have been emphasized in the literature emerging from various quarters over the years.  
Table 2.5. Governance objectives (source: Moultan and Cole, 2003) 
 
Dimensions Objectives 
1.  Responsibility in practices  
2.  Strategies  
3.  Management‘s role 
4.  Resources  
5.  Regulatory compliance  
6.  Policies and procedures  
7.  External communications 
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The objectives suggested in Moultan and Cole (2003) model are socio organizationally 
grounded and provide good reference point for developing a governance framework. 
Inversely, the authors underplay the role of technical expertise required for security 
governance. Also, the suggested objectives are based on the conceptual understanding of 
the authors and have no empirical support.  
Along the same lines, Eloff and Eloff (2005) suggest a comprehensive approach towards 
information systems security governance with well managed controls to minimize risk and 
ensure effectiveness and efficiency. The authors propose a framework called PROTECT, 
an acronym for the seven components in the model. The components are: Policy includes 
security policies, procedures and standards. It also includes well documented guidelines for 
implementation. Risk component suggests the use of methodologies such as CRAM and 
Octave for identifying vulnerabilities in the system. Objective refers to the main objective 
of the framework, which is the intention to minimize risk exposure by maximizing security 
through implementation and review of set of controls. Technology refers to the systems 
component (hardware, software) of the IT infrastructure. Execute component refers to 
proper infrastructure of security controls from maintenance and management. Compliance 
component refers to both internal as well as external compliance with polices and 
regulations. It comprises codes of practice, legal requirement and international standards. 
Team component refers to the employees‘ responsibility towards security and aims at 
creating a work culture with improved security. The model presents both technical and 
people‘s ―perspective‖. This model is very high level. The drawback of the model is that 
there is obvious lack of guidance on how and when to use these objectives.  
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Security policies, standards and procedures are also highlighted in Information Security 
Architecture (ISA) model proposed by Tudor (2000). The author defines information 
security architecture as the process of developing risk awareness through assessment of 
current controls. ISA also includes the alignment of existing controls to meet the 
organization‘s information security requirements. 
 
Figure 2.2 Information security architecture model (source: Tudor 2000) 
ISA has been conceived as a management process intertwined with day to day operations. 
In this approach, five key principles are highlighted (see figure 2.2): Security organization 
and infrastructure, Security policies, standards and procedures, Security program, Security 
culture awareness and training and Monitoring compliance. The model proposes that all 
individuals should know their responsibilities with regard to protecting the organization‘s 
resources. The architecture is based on a holistic mix of organizational and technical 
aspects of security governance. The biggest drawback of the model is that it is very high 
  35 
level, basic, non-iterative and difficult to apply for developing specific measurable security 
controls.   
McCarthy and Campbell (2001) also emphasize the role of security policies in their 
proposed Capability Maturity Model approach for security governance. The model 
provides a set of security controls which can be used to protect information assets against 
harm. The model encompasses seven main control levels (see table 2.6): 
Table 2.6. Capability Maturity Model (source: McCarthy and Campbell, 2001) 
 
 Control Levels  
1. Security Leadership 
2. Security Program 
3. Security Policies  
4. Security Management  
5. User Management 
6. Information Asset Security 
7. Technology Protection and Continuity 
 
In the model, Security leadership stresses the importance of executive level security 
representatives within an information security strategy. In the next level, Security program 
provide defined roles and responsibilities for security tasks. Security policies which 
comprise the third level emphasize the use of security standards, policies, and guidelines 
for technical, procedural and human aspects of information systems security. Security 
management component deals with monitoring people and technology in daily operations. 
User management deals with managing user profiles and ensuring that users are made 
aware that they are being watched. Information asset security encompasses the technology 
aspects of security i.e. maintain firewall, network and database. Technology protection and 
continuity component maintains the IT environment and its continuity including disaster 
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recovery aspects. The objective of the Capability Maturity Model approach is to start at a 
strategic level and work down to the technology level, guided by the direction provided at 
the top level. The uniqueness of this model lies in its assessment of the current information 
security capabilities to architect an appropriate security solution. The main criticism lies in 
the anecdotal nature of the model and lack of theory or empirical validation to lend it 
credibility.  
Security polices are an important component of the information security governance model 
proposed by Da Veiga and Eloff (2007). The authors propose an integrated information 
security governance framework which is a result of triangulation of components of many 
of the above mentioned models. The framework is partitioned into 4 levels namely A, B, C 
and D. Level A comprises strategic, managerial and technical protection components. 
Level B consists of six main categories that are grouped according to three levels A 
categories. Level C is a comprehensive list of information security components categorized 
under level B components. All the main categories are influenced by change depicted at 
Level D.   
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Figure 2.3. Information security governance framework (source: Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007) 
The six main categories of this model are (see figure 2.3): Leadership and Governance, 
Security management and organization, Security policies, Security program management, 
User security management, Technology protection and Operations. The framework can be 
deployed as a single point of reference for governing information security. The control 
objectives listed in the framework provide a wide range of options to protect the 
organization. The information security management system proposed is based on a 
common security standard namely BS 17799.  The model aims to ensure that best practices 
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of an organization are documented, reinforced and improved over time.  The main benefit 
of the model is that it could also be used as an information security culture assessment tool 
to measure the acceptable level of controls consciousness. Action plans can then be 
employed for areas of development. The model‘s criticism is that it is based on personal 
intellectual understanding of the researchers and a thorough review of the literature. There 
is no empirical work to support or dismiss the importance of the above framework. 
The main problem of governance models with a policy focus is the little or no emphasis 
placed on feedback and modification with changing business requirements. Security 
polices should be aligned with the security governance objectives. These in turn should be 
reviewed with changing technological developments (Lindup, 1996).  
Rees et al (2003) have criticized current approaches to policy development and propose the 
use of Policy Framework for Interpreting Risk in E-Business Security (PFIRES) model.  
Initially developed for e-commerce activities, the PFIRES model addresses the needs of 
security polices for any organization with IT and Internet operations. The framework 
consists of four stages: assess, plan, deliver and operate. The assess stage includes policy 
and risk assessment whereas plan stage involves requirement definition and development 
of security policy in alignment with business objectives. In delivery stage, controls are 
defined and implemented where as in operate stage all control processes are monitored and 
reviewed. This model emphasizes the importance of feedback in all stages. The main 
drawback of the model is that it is entirely focused on security policies as a governance 
mechanism. Security policies are a required but not a self sufficient condition for good 
information systems security governance.   
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In the life-cycle approach, the underlying assumption is that information systems security 
governance is an ongoing process and needs to be viewed from a business process 
perspective. The models suggested in this stream of research are process based and the 
stages defined are similar to those of software life-cycle development. The security 
governance models with requirement analysis, design, implementation and testing have a 
solid foundation in the systems approach underlying many IS development and 
management approaches. Some of the examples of process models are presented below:  
Kolokotronis et al (2002) propose a multi-dimensional model with following objectives:   
business needs or requirement analysis; risk and cost assessment; security strategy 
implementation and monitoring. The authors suggest that security should be managed at a 
corporate level and not at the local level to solve specific technical problems. Moultan and 
Cole (2003) present a similar argument in support of treating security governance as an 
enterprise issue to establish an adequate control environment. It is important to identify 
risks so that management can assign responsibility to the right people to develop and 
implement appropriate controls to mitigate the risk.  
Table 2.7 Information  security governance objectives (source: Kolokotronis et al, 2002) 
 
Number of 
dimensions  
Objectives  
1.  Requirements analysis  
2.  Risk and cost assessment  
3.  Security strategy  
4.  Monitoring  
 
Using a similar approach, Straub and Welke (1998) present a security risk planning model 
that comprises four stages: security problem definition, risk analysis, alternative 
generation, and planning decision. The authors argue that very little is available in 
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literature of the present to describe an overall approach to security planning and evaluation 
process (Straub and Welke, 1998). Both the models discussed above (Kolokotronis et al, 
2002; Straub and Welke, 1998) have a process orientation to security governance. The 
models provide high level objectives for defining specific security objectives. The 
objectives are vague, difficult to implement and not helpful in developing specific 
information systems security governance objectives and their related controls. The main 
limitation of the studies is a lack of scientific evidence concerning the practical usability of 
the results. 
In the unified approach of information systems security research, the central premise is that 
both organizational and technical aspects of security governance should be combined for 
increasing overall security. The base assumption here is that managerial focus for security 
governance is required for the technological solutions to work efficiently. Dutta and 
McCrohan (2002) argue that sophisticated security technologies can be rendered 
ineffective by the failure to differentiate among critical information assets, poorly designed 
operating procedures or lax attitudes towards security within the organization. 
Poole (2006) argues for an information security framework established by combining the 
best of ISO 17799 and COBIT into an information security benchmarking model. This 
model meets the corporate governance requirements by focusing on both the control and 
accountability framework. The author argues that these benchmarking models are being 
successfully deployed in UK and across Europe.  Dutta and McCrohan (2002) present a 
security governance model which comprises three dimensions: organization, critical 
infrastructure and technology. The role of management in this model is to assess the 
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criticality of data sources and develop controls for the organization. The authors argue that 
holistic security management requires interplay of technological, organizational and 
critical infrastructure elements. Hence, awareness and commitment of the senior 
management is required to develop a control environment that balances the costs and 
benefits of security controls, keeping in mind the level of risk faced by the organization 
(Dutta and McCrohan (2002). The model proposed is comprehensive and deals with both 
technological as well as socio-organizational elements. The drawback of this model is that 
is based purely on authors‘ conceptualization. The model is subjective at best and lacks 
empirical validation.  
Along the same lines, Lindup (1996) also argues that the management in the organization 
does not operate in isolation. The effectiveness of the security governance is dependent on 
many factors (see figure 2.4) that include: business processes, application systems, 
technical security, procedures and human factors.  
 
Figure 2.4 information security management model: Lindup (1996) 
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The emphasis again is on socio-organizational as well as technical issues in governance 
and on challenges that arise in managing the human capital. The author argues that 
technology can impact organizational security in unexpected ways. Technology can make 
existing controls in the higher layers ineffective or make new control mechanisms possible. 
It can impact security and control in three different ways: creating new security 
vulnerabilities, changing the way business is done and changing the way the workplace is 
organized (Lindup, 1996). The pervasive presence of technology in businesses makes it 
difficult to isolate the technical aspects from managerial aspects of governance. More than 
the technology, it is ―the way a technology is used‖ that has the greatest impact on the 
security of the information systems (Lindup, 1996). However, this model too is based on 
conceptual understanding of the author and not on a solid theoretical platform. 
From end user participation perspective of information systems security governance 
research, control objectives should convey the value and beliefs of the employees actually 
implementing the controls. The central assumption is that a ―bottom-up‖ approach to 
development of security governance objectives increases the alignment between individual 
objectives and organizational security objectives, resulting in organizations which are more 
secure. The researchers in this domain of security governance research encourage 
employee participation in governance.  
The advocates of this school of thought argue that very few organizations involve end 
users in development of information security strategy and policy making (Warman, 1992). 
This might result in making the security objectives too complex and weak controls which 
would lead to a break down in security (Angell, 1996). Also ignorance or incorrect 
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procedures can lead to potential disasters (Warman, 1992). In a study in 2002 advocating 
use of meta policy for security in emergent organizations, Baskerville and Siponen argue 
that changed security measures should not spark conflict between management and the 
employees in an organization. When the values of the employees do not match the values 
embedded in the security measures, there are chances of discrepancies in implementation 
of such measures (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). Values are a key determinant of how 
people come to evaluate other people and organizations (Jones and George, 1998). Schein 
(1996) claims that organizations do not learn from its experience but tend to repeat the 
same mistakes made in the past due to a continued lack of alignment between various 
occupational communities within themselves. This might result in operational and mid-
level managers having different shared assumptions and objectives. These will be far 
removed from the objectives preached and practiced by senior managers. The alignment of 
personal and organizational objectives for information systems security governance is 
important for the success of the controls. Technology used is influenced by the values and 
goals imposed by the executive culture in the organization (Schein, 1996). Taylor (2006) 
argues that it is management‘s mistaken perception of risk causing behavior which leads to 
an implementation of a technology based approach that ignores human factors. 
De Haes and Grembergen (2008) argue that IT governance can be deployed using a 
mixture of various structures, processes and relational mechanisms. Anderson (2001) 
argues that within IT governance, information security governance becomes a much 
focused activity, with specific value drivers including integrity of information, continuity 
of services and protection of information assets. Thus the relational mechanism which 
  44 
ensures the active participation and collaboration of the IT managers and business 
managers is equally important for information systems security governance too. The 
authors argue that relational mechanisms are crucial in the governance framework and 
paramount for attaining and sustaining business/IT alignment, even when the appropriate 
structures and processes are in place. Research in management controls has historically 
emphasized the role of senior management in the success of internal control programs. 
This trend is now changing. Controls research has shown an increase in interest in 
employee empowerment (Simons, 1995). It is becoming common for lower level 
employees to be actively involved not only in day-to-day processes but also in activities of 
strategic significance.  
In conclusion, research in information systems security governance area with a socio-
organizational focus can be summarized as follows: 
1. Security governance is viewed as an all encompassing process which involves 
managing formalized structures and informal environment. Hence emphasis is 
placed on formal as well as informal controls.  
2. Security governance models are primarily focused on factors like policy 
development, management and end user participation, user values and beliefs, life-
cycle or process orientation and complimentary nature of various controls or the 
unified approach.     
3. Security controls are based on ‗formal administrative‘ management requirements 
and ‗informal peoples‘ management requirement. It is assumed that management, 
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formal procedures and informal people management mechanisms would ensure the 
overall security of the organization. 
4. It is assumed that management understands the need for appropriate socio-
organizational controls and that implementing these controls would enhance the 
security environment.   
5. Information systems security governance models that emphasize on the 
management‘s role in creating and developing security governance objectives 
embedded in the contextual factors of the organization are successful in protecting 
the organization from any harm.  
Since most of the IS security breaches occur because someone within the organization 
subverts the controls (Dhillon and Silva 2001), researchers in this domain argue that it is 
prudent to focus on the socio-organizational aspect (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006) of 
security to provide overall better governance.  
 2.4 Discussion 
 The purpose of this chapter is to thoroughly review the extant literature in 
information security governance research. The research in information security governance 
can basically be classified as per two dimensions: technically oriented research and socio-
organizationally oriented research. It is to be noted that this classification does not convey 
that proponents of either streams of research are not sympathetic to each other‘s premises. 
Researchers do acknowledge the need for both these dimensions. The classification is 
based on implicit assumptions of the research and the dominance of one orientation over 
the other.  
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The fundamental difference between these two streams of research (see table 2.8) lies in 
the nature of assumptions, nature of controls developed, end user role and the results of 
using the particular approach for the organization.  
Technically oriented security governance research perceives security as managing data in 
computers. Hence the nature of controls implemented is technical in nature which includes 
passwords, access control, sniffers etc. The end-users are expected to have the technical 
expertise to implement the artifact in a way that delivers the intended benefit from the 
technology used. The final goal of implementing such controls is to build a strong IT 
infrastructure that protects the network from outsiders. The efficiency also improves as 
technology related failures are minimized.  
Table 2.8. Research in information systems security governance 
Technical Vs. Socio-organizational 
 
Dimensions  Technical orientation  Socio-organizational orientation  
Assumptions Security governance is ―managing 
confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data‖ 
Security governance is managing formal 
structures and the informal environment.  
Nature of controls  Technical  Formal and informal  
End- user role  Technical solutions are well understood  
Implementation would give intended 
benefit  
Need to understand and participate in 
control development process  
Understand responsibility and control 
culture 
Result Strong IT infrastructure 
Better protection from outsiders 
Reduced technology related incidents  
Strong management and people 
interaction 
Better protection from insiders  
Greater acceptability of controls    
 
Research in socio-organizational orientation conceptualizes governance as a process of 
involving all stakeholders and assigning responsibilities in a way which makes information 
systems secure at the formal and informal levels of the organization. The nature of controls 
suggested are both formal and informal. End-users in the organization are required to 
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participate in the control development process and understand both their responsibility and 
the control culture of the organization. The ultimate goal of such measures is to make 
controls more acceptable, improve management and end-user interaction and protect the 
information systems from insiders. 
A review of research from both the perspectives reveals various facets of using these 
approaches. A summary of the findings from the review of both perspectives is presented 
in table 2.9. Before each body of work is discussed separately, an overall critique of 
industry wide standards or best practices utilization is presented. As we have seen in the 
discussions above, COBIT, COSO, ISO 17799 and ITIL are some of the common 
standards used extensively in the industry and supported by different groups of researchers. 
Standards provide a set of best practices across industries and are helpful in getting the 
work done efficiently in real organizations. But these standards are not without drawbacks. 
Several issues arise when the general standards are used ―as it is‖ by the organization. 
First, security standards are generic in nature and do not reflect the unique security 
requirements of an organization (Baskerville, 1993). Second, standards do not take into 
account the social nature of governance problems (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Third, 
the standards are not adaptive in nature and do not suggest courses of actions in the event 
of changing business requirements of an organization initiating ad hoc managerial 
decision-making and judgment (Ferris, 1994). Standards are not based on any theoretical 
platform or developed using rigorous research standards. These standards do not add to the 
body of knowledge in research.  
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In technically oriented information systems security governance research, bulk of the 
research has been done in systems dominated requirements such as information security 
architecture, access controls, Internet usage, network protection and database controls. 
Majority of work in this domain (Abouzakhar and Manson, 2002; Qiang and Hua-ying, 
2007; Finne, 1996; Booker, 2006) argues for a solid technical foundation for security of 
information systems by developing capabilities for strong IT infrastructures. These will 
facilitate the management of technical controls as a centralized function. The drawbacks of 
research from this perspective are based on the fact that it does not adequately address 
vulnerabilities from the ―inside‖ i.e. formal and informal issues with security management. 
Also, security management frameworks with technical emphasis are ―standalone‖ in nature 
and cannot be easily combined with other frameworks for enterprise wide governance of 
security.  
Technically orientated information systems security governance models are unable to fully 
comprehend several behavioral complexities that may need to be resolved to enact security 
solutions. Research in information systems security area is predominantly technically 
oriented (Dhillon, 2001). It is not surprising that many of the security governance models 
too are rooted in technical foundations. But having a predominant technical orientation 
does not lend itself well to incorporation of in-depth feelings, emotions, attitudes and 
perceptions toward security. A sympathetic understanding of the contextual formal and 
informal issues is required for an overall successful governance program. Information 
security is not just a technical problem but has several other facets to it just like leadership, 
culture and structure (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002; Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Similarly 
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information systems security governance objectives can not be just technically oriented to 
provide a comprehensive security program. In socio-organizationally oriented information 
systems security governance research, majority of the work is confined to the area of 
development of policies, end-user participation, iterative process orientation and unified 
approach combining formal and informal with technical controls. Research in this domain 
(Ward and Smith, 2003; Moultan and Cole, 2003; Eloff and Eloff,  2005; Tudor,  2000; 
McCarthy and Campbell, 2001;  Da Veiga and Eloff,  2007; Rees et al., 2003) argues for 
aligning individual and organizational security goals and combining formal and informal 
controls with technical controls for a comprehensive security program. There are several 
benefits of using governance models rooted in this perspective. Vulnerabilities from 
―inside‖ are addressed and the organizational environment becomes more conducive to 
security practices. Incorporating values from end-users or using a ―bottom up‖ approach to 
governance suggests better implementation and success of these controls. There are some 
drawbacks as well of using these models. Most of the frameworks suggested are 
―anecdotal‖ in nature i.e. based on practices, experience and understanding of the 
researchers. There is hardly any model with security governance objectives which has been 
empirically tested for its applicability and usability in real organizations. Also different 
proposals and examples of security governance objectives do not provide guidance with 
respect to the process of objective development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  50 
Table 2.9. Summary from literature in information systems security governance 
 
Perspective 
 
Exemplar work  Implications for security 
governance  
Pros & Cons 
Technically oriented 
research  
-ISO 17799 
(2007) 
-ITIL (2007) 
-Abouzakhar and 
Manson (2002) 
-Qiang and Hua-
ying (2007) 
-Finne (1996) 
-Booker (2006) 
- develop infrastructure to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of data 
-establish information systems 
security architecture 
-develop stringent access  
control models 
-establish means to protect 
networks 
- emphasize Internet security 
- emphasize database security 
-ensure identity management 
-ensure incident management 
- solid technical 
foundation for securing 
information 
- develops capabilities to 
maintain efficient IT 
infrastructure 
-integrates enterprise wide  
technical security controls 
into a superior centralized 
function 
- ―standalone‖ in nature, 
not easily integrated in 
governance framework 
-develops vulnerability in 
organization‘s formal 
procedures and informal 
people management aspect 
Socio-
organizationally 
oriented research 
-COBIT (2007) 
-COSO (2007) 
-Ward and Smith 
(2003) 
-Moultan and 
Cole (2003) 
-Eloff and Eloff 
(2005) 
-Tudor (2000) 
-McCarthy and 
Campbell (2001) 
- Da Veiga and 
Eloff (2007) 
Rees et al. (2003) 
- Kolokotronis et 
al (2002) 
- Dutta and 
McCrohan 
(2002) 
- Lindup (1996) 
-Anderson 
(2001) 
- formal controls at management 
level and informal controls for 
people management are more 
important than technical controls 
for security governance  
-develop sound security policies  
-perceive security governance as 
a process of system development 
and develop iterative approach to 
improve it  
- develop a unified approach to 
governance combining technical 
as well as socio-organizational 
controls  
-incorporate individual‘s values 
and encourage end user 
participation for security 
governance  
-vulnerabilities in form of 
management lapses and 
people management issues 
can be avoided 
-continuous feedback to 
improve control objectives 
improves governance 
results   
-  incorporating technical 
and non-technical controls 
in governance models 
improves overall security 
-better alignment of 
individual and 
organizational goals 
-high level, generic 
objectives are difficult to 
implement 
-―anecdotal‖ models based 
on conceptual 
understanding. Lack 
empirical support 
 
Socio-organizationally oriented information systems security governance research 
emphasizes the importance of formal procedures and informal aspects of the organizational 
environment. Interactions between stakeholders have also been discussed at the level of 
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information security governance.  Security governance models in this domain emphasize 
the management‘s role in creating and developing security governance objectives 
embedded in the contextual factors of the organization. As Dhillon and Torkzedeh (2006, 
p. 17) observe: 
Part of the problem related to our inability to manage and ensure IS security has been our 
over-reliance on the confidentiality, integrity and availability issues, thereby ignoring the 
more organizationally based measures. Even most of the risk management approaches take 
for granted that confidentiality, integrity and availability are the cornerstones of IS security 
and hence develop complete methodologies around these concepts. When organizations 
begin to over rely on risk analysis as a means to ensure IS security, they tend to ignore all 
the other organizationally grounded IS security vulnerabilities and problems.  
Managing security is also problematic because employees are unaware of the appropriate 
security policies and standards (Ward and Smith, 2002). Understanding perceptions of an 
organization‘s board members and other stakeholders with regard to risks and market 
expectations is crucial to improving Information Security Governance (Ezingeard et al, 
2003). Since most of the IS security breaches occur because someone within the 
organization subverts the controls (Dhillon and Silva 2001), it is prudent to focus on the 
socio-organizational aspect (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006) to manage security in a better 
way.  
A review of information systems security governance research shows many apparent gaps 
in the literature. First, research from technical perspective provides good technical basis for 
managing security but is not sufficient by itself to provide comprehensive security. 
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Second, research from socio-organizational perspective undermines technical perspective 
and most of the models suggested have not been empirically validated in real settings. 
Third, participative approach of governance which proposes involving the values of end-
users in governance is discussed in the research but there is hardly any work done in this 
area. There is a dearth of models that incorporates end-user inputs into governance 
objectives. Fourth, there is hardly any research that suggests how to develop the security 
governance objectives i.e. what process to use or what methodology to follow. Fifth, there 
is very little work based on theoretical foundations. Most of the models are based on 
conceptual understanding and experience of researchers. More research is required to 
address the gaps identified in information systems security governance research. This 
research addresses some of these gaps by developing organizationally grounded value 
driven information systems security governance objectives that are theoretically sound and 
empirically validated.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 Technical and organizational perspectives of information systems security 
governance offer different prescriptions for implementing security controls. The 
technically oriented models emphasize specific problem selection, tool selection and 
knowledge acquisition about the tool to solve any problem. A review of the research shows 
over-dependency of the organizations on the availability of technical tools to manage 
security problems. The socio-organizationally oriented models, on the other hand, 
emphasize the need for managing formal security policies development processes, 
management of individuals and creating an environment to facilitate the security 
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management. Both organizational and technical orientation is required for overall security 
of the organization. The challenge lies in prioritizing the objectives and allocating adequate 
resources for the fulfillment of both types of objectives.  
The goal of this chapter was to present an in-depth review of various information systems 
security governance approaches in literature. In the beginning of the chapter, the research 
literature was divided into two distinct streams: technically oriented governance models 
and socio-organizationally oriented governance models. The assumptions and differences 
between the two approaches have been established. Having identified the potential benefits 
and drawbacks of using governance models from both the perspectives, this chapter 
discussed various noticeable gaps in the research of information systems security 
governance. The discussion section suggested a gap in the research in the area of 
developing theoretically grounded value based information systems security governance 
objectives. This gap will be addressed in this research. The following chapter outlines a 
theoretical basis that helps in developing value based governance objectives for 
information systems security. The assumptions of the theory will be explained followed by 
a brief review of use of values in information systems research and information systems 
security research. The methodology to develop the objectives would be discussed and 
substantiated.  
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CHAPTER 3 Theory and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter describes the theoretical and methodological foundations of this 
research. The theoretical and methodological position of a study must be consistent from a 
philosophical perspective. The ontology, epistemology, methodology and the methods 
used in a study should be consistent to qualify as a valid research design.  Since this study 
uses individual values to develop ISG objectives, an introduction about research in 
individual values is warranted. Rest of this chapter is organized as follows: 
The following section presents a synopsis of the existing research in individual values in IS 
and the pertinent lessons which have emerged for studying values in ISG. After 
establishing the importance of values for ISG, the following section presents a discussion 
on ‗Value Theory as a theoretical platform‘ with reference to this research. The 
methodological position of the study is explained in section three of the chapter. Section 
four outlines the research design for the study. The last section presents the conclusions.  
3.2 Study of values in research  
 This section presents a discussion on the use of ―values‖ in information systems 
research. The discussion is presented in three parts. First part presents a holistic preview of 
how values have been studied in information systems security research. Second part 
presents a discussion on how values have been used in research in the management 
discipline. Third part presents the lessons derived from using values in information 
security governance research.   
Concept of values in IS Security Research 
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Research in information systems security recognizes the importance of individual values in 
successful security programs. Solms (2001) specifically mentions the fact that information 
systems security policies and controls in general do not have human considerations. 
Successful implementation of the controls and polices is facilitated when individuals are 
able to align their value system with that of the management. Researchers argue that if 
there is a misalignment between individual and organizational goals, there will be greater 
security threats to information systems from the insiders in the organization (Loch and 
Conger, 1996; Solms, 2001; Magklaras and Furnell, 2005; Stanton, 2005). Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh (2006) study the significance of values of employees for information systems 
security in organizations. The employees should be treated as owners of information assets 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999) to ensure that responsibility and accountability, on the 
employee‘s part is enhanced.  
Concept of values in organizational research 
Organizational research has long emphasized the importance of studying personal and 
group values in organizational settings.  Davis (1958) calls management philosophy as the 
philosophy of individualism and claims, ―Management philosophy emphasizes the 
concepts of delegation, decentralization, individual initiative and individual accountability 
(p. 39)‘. In a study to understand the impact of personal values on organizational decisions, 
Senger (1971) measured personal value orientations by using a value scale. The values 
provided the structure for the scale and a semantic differential technique was used as a 
scaling device. Senger‘s study suggests that ―Personal value structures and systems of 
preference ordering used by decision-makers could lead to more useful decision models 
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which are better able to predict choice behavior (p. 422).‖ Research in authority of 
management in organizations also studies value systems of individuals. Authority depends 
on its acceptance by those it intends to direct. Hence any emerging pattern of authority 
must be consistent with the values of individuals it is directed at and address the emerging 
ideals, purposes and values of these individuals (Albanese, 1973). A manager‘s 
effectiveness is determined by his ability to synchronize the values of his associates and 
the pattern of authority he attempt to implement (Albanese, 1973).   
Lessons for studying ISG  
Information systems security research fully acknowledges the importance of individual 
values in security posture of organizations. Individual beliefs of employees shape the 
interpretation and hence the success of all security measures in an organization (Magklaras 
and Furnell, 2005; McHugh and Deek, 2005). Importance of normative controls in an 
organization has been emphasized in information systems security literature. The informal 
controls help in effectively reaching out to people and conveying management‘s ideas 
(Adams and Sasse, 1999; Schultz, 2002). Assessment of individual values, beliefs and 
attitudes could be used for predicting employee‘s attitude and behavior (Stanton and Stam, 
2005). Employee‘s behavior, especially for security issues, is critical for an organization. 
User sophistication, social engineering and end user behavior are well-researched 
constructs in security literature (Loch and Conger, 1996) and the findings emphasize the 
importance of individual belief systems in security management.  
A thorough review of research in the previous chapter suggests that the designing of ISG 
lacks appropriate theoretical basis and there is a need for more investigation of issues in 
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this area. Weber (1997) argues for more theory building efforts in information systems is 
needed to increase legitimacy of research in the discipline. Taking phenomenon that are 
purportedly forwarded and accounted for by theories from other disciplines and building 
novel theories on their basis to explain information systems issues helps the information 
systems discipline (Weber 1997). Value theory, borrowed from sociology, provides an 
appropriate theoretical basis to incorporate individual values into the designing of internal 
controls for security. Studying individual values in the context of information security 
governance, helps in creating more effective security programs for organizations. Internal 
controls depend on the information security objectives of an organization (Haara and von 
Solms 2003) and should be designed keeping in mind the specific security needs of a 
particular organization. Internal values of employees can be elicited to establish the 
security objectives of an organization. Employee‘s security behavior depends on his 
personal values and standards of conduct (Leach 2003). Information security governance 
objectives, which are rooted in personal values of employees, would lead to more robust 
and proactive design of internal controls. This would bring the security behavior of the 
employees in accordance with management‘s expectation, conveyed through internal 
controls. Employees can relate to the controls (being a reflection of their own core values) 
and information systems security program can be better governed and implemented.  
The benefit of using individual values to develop control objectives is twofold: First, there 
will be a better alignment between individual and organizational goals if the control 
objectives are created in a ―bottom up‖ manner. This way of communication can reduce 
the gap between management expectations and employee interpretations about the 
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controls. Second, it will facilitate the creation of an environment of shared goals amongst 
employees, which has beneficial long-term implications for an organization‘s information 
systems security. In this chapter we posit that value theory and value focused approach 
provide an appropriate theoretical and methodological basis to design internal control 
objectives for information systems security in organizations.  
3.3 Theoretical basis: Value Theory 
Catton (1952) proposed a theory of value which essentially suggests that the core values of 
individuals guide their decision making process. According to Catton (1952), an 
individual‘s preferential behaviour shows certain regularities and this pattern can be 
attributed to some standard or code, which persists through time. Values provide a basis by 
which people can control their intensities of desiring various desiderata (something 
desirable). Based on available choices, people make preferences or choices which are 
grounded in their values. In the organizational context, knowledge of such preferences of 
individuals provides a context for managerial decision-making.  
Value is not a property of an object but is a quality of relationship (Catton, 1952, pp. 108). 
A person‘s desire for something under a given situation depends upon the ―selective 
perception‖ of that person. Selective perception directs valuation by interspersing final 
goals with other intermediary goals i.e. a goal may be pursued in order to attain some 
higher ultimate goal. Thus the nature of the major goals accepted by individuals is 
complimented by their notions of ways in which these goals might be affected by future 
events. These in turn are the determinants of values of people. Value Theory provides a 
theoretical platform to affirm that values are important for decision making and 
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incorporating values in developing decision objectives significantly helps individuals 
accept the results of such decisions.  
Catton adopts a field concept of values for understanding and predicting human behavior 
from studying of values. In this approach, the concept of value is perceived as somatic (in 
brain) which surround the value object (Catton, 1952). It is assumed to have a 
correspondence to some postulated external field. The nature of this value field is multi-
dimensional. Psychologists have studied values extensively but more in terms of 
―motivations‖ (Catton, 1952). However, there is an intrinsic difference in what sociologists 
call ―values‖ and the psychologists call ―motivations‖. The idea behind studying 
motivations in management, both internal as well as external, has been the same as in the 
field of sociology i.e. predicting the human behavior from the study of these concepts. 
Psychologists argue that human nature does not allow the valuation of anything that is 
readily available and indispensable to their survival (Catton, 1952). Maslow (1943 in 
Catton 1952) shares similar views and argues that a readily satisfied need can never 
motivate human behavior.  
Catton conceptualizes valuing as field of forces. He argues that when we observe a person 
valuing something, certain things become apparent from the behavior of that person. This 
is true even for various persons at different times in relation to various objects. Based on 
extant literature, Catton created a comprehensive list of various dimensions of values. The 
seventeen dimensions of values as studied by Catton (1952) are descriptive of the vast field 
of valuation: Intensity, Duration, Probability, Permanence, Continuity, Proximity (spatial, 
temporal, social), Conduciveness to survival, Inclusiveness (of persons, of other values), 
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Irrevocability, Congruency with other values, Cognitive completeness, Free selectibility, 
Infinitude and Subsidization. 
A multiplicative combination of these measures or some function of each one of these 
would help in specifying the ―worth‖ of its desideratum to the subject (Catton, 1952).  
Catton hypothesized the relationship of these dimensions, which impact the values of 
individuals and empirically studied the hypotheses. According to this theory, the value of a 
particular object to a particular person, under particular conditions of time and place is 
specified by the product of the above-mentioned seventeen dimensions raised to some 
power. Catton (1952) defines behavior valuing as ―willingness to give or do something in 
order to get or keep something else (p. 172)‖.  
The importance of societal conditioning in shaping one‘s value-attitudes has been amply 
researched in the field of sociology. Hobson (in Catton, 1952) suggests that ―man is made 
and sustained by association and the process of civilization is nothing else than the 
progress of the arts of association. In any estimate of human welfare it is, therefore 
necessary to take our stand firmly on the principle of the social determination of values (In 
Catton, 1952)‖. Catton (1952) suggests that any study of a theory of value is meant to 
persuade people that certain norms or? code of conducts are more acceptable than the 
others. Values are merely products of some code of behavior, which the advocate of the 
code wants to propagate. Theories about values enunciate some broader values to which 
other values might be subordinated. Cooley (in Catton, 1952) defines values as ―a special 
attribute awarded to those objects and ideals capable of serving purposes arising out of 
needs…that is to say, value is instrumentality (p. 98)‖. The social nature of the 
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determinants of value is studied by psychoanalysts as well. Morton observes that time is an 
important determinant of values and immediacy of interests clouds the judgment of 
humans in many instances. Extending this time perspective about values, Frank (in Catton, 
1952) suggests that individuals, as they mature with time in a social setting, tend to get 
socialized and start understanding the values of the particular setting. Values are arranged 
according to different rank orders for different people and this differentiation impacts the 
sociological analysis of inter-group relations (Catton, 1952). In management science, this 
concept of values guiding the decision making process was taken forward by Keeney 
(1992) who argues that values are guiding principles to evaluate the desirability of a 
particular consequence. ―Values are what we care about and they should be the driving 
force for our decision making (Keeney, 1992, pp. 3)‖. Values are principles of evaluation, 
which we use to evaluate the actual or potential consequences of action and inaction of 
decisions (Keeney, 1992). Focus on values guiding the decision situation makes the search 
for alternatives a creative process and produces unique alternatives. It expands the horizon 
of options available to a decision maker by basically answering the question ―what is 
important to me‖ rather than the constrained thinking of ―what can be done‖ under given 
constraints. This research uses Value Theory as a platform to guide the study of values in 
the context of information security governance.  
3.4 Methodology  
This is a two phased study. Phase 1 of the study uses value focused assessment as the 
methodology. The second phase of the research uses interpretive case study as the basis for  
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the research study as the basis for the research. This section provides a discussion on both 
the methodologies.   
3.4.1 Value focused thinking 
Research in decision sciences essentially suggests two broad approaches to decision 
making (Keeney, 1992): Alternative Focused Thinking (AFT) and Value Focused 
Thinking (VFT).  Values are more fundamental to a decision context than the available 
alternatives. But in common practice, decision-making usually focuses on the choice most 
desirable among existing alternatives. The relative desirability of the consequences can be 
best understood if the values of the decision maker are reflected in the decision. Ideally, 
values should be fundamental to a decision problem, and not the alternatives. Alternatives 
should be used as a means to achieve the fundamental values. Value focused thinking 
approaches a decision problem by looking for the best possible solution and working 
towards making it a reality. Alternative focused thinking considers what is readily 
available and takes the best alternative from available options (Keeney, 1992).  
Keeney (1992) suggests that VFT is a preferable way of taking decisions especially if there 
are lots of subjective interpretations involved. Alterative focus thinking, even though very 
popular for decision making in day-to-day life, has several shortcomings (Keeney, 1992). 
AFT has a narrower focus than VFT. The former aims to solve decision problems whereas 
the latter is concerned with the identification of decision opportunities, which is more of 
problem finding (Keeney, 1992). Alternative focused thinking is more reactive in nature. 
Value focused approach leads to best possible consequence that helps in identification of 
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decision opportunities. It is proactive in nature, affirmative and helps in developing 
decision objectives for the problem context.  
An objective is a statement of something that one desires and is characterized by three 
features (Keeney, 1992): a decision context, an object and a direction of preference.  To be 
more specific, if the decision context is the development of information security 
governance objectives, the object would be effective information security governance and 
the directional preference would be positive i.e. more information security governance is 
preferred over information systems security.   
Fundamental objectives are useful for the purpose of creating and evaluating alternatives, 
identifying decision opportunities and guiding the decision making process (Keeney, 
1992). Desired properties of fundamental objectives include (Keeney, 1992): 
 Essential: The objectives should be able to indicate consequences in accordance 
with the basic reasons for interest in the decision situation. Depending on how 
essential the objectives are, decision context is influenced greatly by these 
objectives.  
 Controllable: The objectives should be able to adequately address the 
consequences that are influenced only by the choice of alternatives in the decision 
context and not by other confound variables beyond the decision context. It 
requires a balancing act to reach the right degree of essential and controllable mix 
in the objectives chosen.  
 Complete: The objectives should include all possible aspects of the consequences 
of the decision alternatives. The knowledge of the possible consequences with 
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respect to each alternative provides a list of all the implications of interest when a 
particular alternative is selected.  
 Measurable: The objectives should be defined in such a precise way that even the 
degree to which an objective can be achieved could be measured.  
 Operational: The objectives should be operationlizable for an analysis in 
conjunction with the time and effort available.  It should fully address whether it is 
possible to obtain the relevant information useful for thinking and analyzing the 
consequences.   
 Decomposable: The objectives should be such that a separate treatment of each of 
the objectives should be possible. Aspects of consequences relating to one attribute 
can be treated independently from aspects of consequences of other attributes.  
 Non-redundant: The objectives should reflect unique alternatives for different 
possible consequences. Double counting can occur in two ways: possible impacts 
of the alternatives and values of those impacts.  
 Concise: The number of objectives should not be too many. This can help in crating 
a parsimonious model. This requires omitting any objective that is not deemed 
useful. An objective should be omitted from the list if various alternatives can be 
differentiated in terms of that objective. If including the objective has no impact on 
the relative desirability of the alternatives, it should not be included.   
 Understandable: The objectives should be able to facilitate generation and 
communication of insights for guiding decision-making process. It should be 
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adequately understood by individuals who are in positions to make or influence 
decisions. 
The decision context and fundamental objectives together provide the decision frame 
(Keeney, 1992). The decision context defines a set of alternatives necessary for a specific 
decision situation. The fundamental objectives explicitly identify the core values of a 
decision context and define the consequences which are of concern. It also identifies the 
essential reason for interest in decision situation. Thus fundamental objectives are the end 
objectives and the means objectives help in achieving these fundamental objectives. Means 
objectives have implications and aid in achieving the fundamental objectives.  It is 
important that decision context and fundamental objectives are compatible as they are 
interdependent (Keeney, 1992). In the figure 3.1, these concepts are shown.  
VFT provides a method to elicit the individual values necessary for creating a common 
denominator of a multi criteria decision-making context.   Keeney (1992) proposes semi 
structured interviews as one appropriate method of collecting data in this methodology. 
According to the value focused approach, the best way to understand underlying values 
about any issue is to ask people what is important to them in a particular context and the 
reasons why they deem it important (Keeney, 1999). For a particular research problem, 
personal values of people regarding the research question are elicited. Keeney suggests a 
three-step process for using value-focused approach in an inquiry. These steps are: 
Elicit and create a comprehensive list of personal values underlying the problem: The aim 
of the researcher at this stage is to elicit the underlying values of respondents through 
probing. The process of identifying the values begins with interviewing people. An 
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explanatory definition is provided about the research context, scenarios are projected and 
interviewees are asked to provide examples to demonstrate their choices. Direct questions 
about values might not be useful as values are difficult to bring to surface and are more 
difficult to express explicitly.  The personal values which are projected during the 
interview session are listed.   
Obtain a common denominator or common objectives: a list of objectives corresponding to 
the values of respondents is generated at this stage. The data collected (transcripts of the 
interviews) are converted into a common form at this stage. These common denominators 
give rise to values. The values thus generated need a verb to generate the objectives.  The 
values that are listed are objects and ways to achieve this object becomes the objective. 
The verb form of the values thus created could be termed as the objective of that object.   
Classify the objectives as fundamental for decision context or as means objectives: this is 
the final step in value-focused approach which leads to the end result of a network of 
means and fundamental objectives.  Classification of all the objectives formed is done and 
the objectives clusters are divided into two categories, ―means‖ or ―fundamental‖. 
Depending on the role of a category in a decision context, a category can be relegated as 
―means‖ to the decision or an ―end‖ to the decision objective for the particular problem 
context. An objective that leads to another objective being considered in decision-making 
is a means objective whereas an objective which is fundamental and important in its own 
right in a decision making process is called fundamental objective. Differentiation between 
means and fundamental objectives is primarily done through performing a Why Is This 
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Important (WITI) test for each of the objectives (Keeney, 1992). The entire process 
depicting the development of control objectives from the values is shown in figure 3.1: 
 
 
Figure 3.1 An overview of using VFT to generate decision objectives 
3.4.2 Case study 
This research adopts an in-depth case study approach. This qualitative in-depth case study 
is performed to interpret the meanings of the objectives in an organizational context.   
The choice of case study as a methodology in the second phase of the study is based on the 
reasons suggested by Benbasat et al (1987). The authors argue that a field case study helps 
in presenting a rich picture of the phenomenon under study without disturbing the natural 
state of entities. The relevance of the developed objectives needs to be studied in a real 
organizational setting to bring out their meaning fully. In a natural setting, events unfold in 
relation to the focus on contemporary issues and this makes a realistic picture of the 
relevance of the constructs under study emerge.  
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For establishing the rigor criteria, this study uses the seven principles of Klein and Myers. 
Klein and Myers (1999) propose seven principles for conducting interpretive field work.  
The interpretive field studies in information systems research have repeatedly referred to 
these guidelines for conducting the research. The first principle, the fundamental principle 
of the hermeneutic circle suggests that human understanding is developed by iterating 
between the interdependent meaning of parts and the whole they form. This process of 
constituting the whole picture from constituent parts is fundamental to all the principles 
proposed. An illustration of the principle is evident in Lee‘s (1994) study of information 
richness in email communications. Lee constructed the global context of the email 
exchanged in the organization and interpreted the meanings of the fragments of the 
messages exchanged through email. The principle of contextualization needs incorporation 
of the critical reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting. This 
helps in presenting a coherent picture about how the current situation under investigation 
emerged. The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects requires a 
clear projection so as to bring out how the research materials were socially constructed 
through the interaction between the researchers and the participants. For example, Trauth 
(1997) explains how her understanding improved as she became self-aware and started to 
question her own assumptions. 
The fourth principle is of abstraction and generalization. This principle is about relating 
the idiographic details revealed by the data interpretation through the application of 
hermeneutic circle and contextualization of the data, to theoretical concepts that describe 
the nature of human understanding and social action. The principle of dialogical reasoning 
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needs openness towards possible contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions and 
actual findings at the case site to be adopted. This reasoning process leads to subsequent 
cycles of revision and a modified interpretation emerges. The principle of multiple 
interpretations is about the possibility of differences in interpretation of the participants 
responses as expressed in multiple narratives or stories of the same sequence of events 
under the study. The seventh principle is about suspicion that requires sensitivity to 
possible biases or other distortions in the narratives taken from the respondents.  
In literature, choice of case studies for empirical research is criticized for lack of statistical 
generalizability. This criticism is unfair. There have been several responses in literature to 
counter argue this perception. The choice of methodology should be based on the 
ontological and epistemological stance of the research. If one views the social world 
objectively, then the methodological choice should be quantitative techniques. But in this 
research, social world is viewed as a subjective reality. Hence a qualitative and interpretive 
approach to research is advocated and in-depth case study is an optimal choice here. As 
Walsham (1993) argues: 
 From interpretive position, the validity of an extrapolation from an individual case 
 of cases depends not on representativeness of such cases in statistical senses, 
 but on plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used in describing  the 
 results from the cases, and in drawing conclusions from them (p.15). 
 
There is a common misconception that qualitative case studies‘ results lack usefulness due 
to the results being statistically generalized from a sample to a population.  The argument 
is that since the sample size is very small in case studies (in a single case study it is one) 
hence no meaningful statistical technique can be applied to the data. But this criticism 
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seems unwarranted given the nature the case studies. According to Yin (2003), cases are 
not sampling units and should not be chosen for this reason. If they are not sampling units, 
then they should not be analyzed or generalized in a statistical manner.   
Lee and Baskerville (2003) argue against statistical generalizability, claiming that it is 
actually a form of inductive logic. The authors argue that to establish statistical 
generalizability, we need to follow an additional premise. This is the ‗uniformity of nature‘ 
assumption which forwards the view that the future would be like the past. Since the 
principle of uniformity of nature cannot be satisfactorily established, the relevance of 
statistical generalizability is questionable. One would have to continually regress through 
the circular logic of the Uniformity of Nature in a vain attempt to validate inductive logic 
(Lee and Baskerville, 2003). This problem of induction is credited to an 18
th
 century 
philosopher Hume, and is sometimes called Hume’s Truism. 
Yin (2003) argues that generalization of results, from either single or multiple designs, is 
made in reference to theory and not to populations. He contends that multiple cases do 
strengthen the results of the research by replicating the pattern matching. Replication can 
increase the confidence in the robustness of the theory but by no means does it increase the 
generalization of the results to entire populations. There are examples of cases studies 
which go beyond the statistical results and explain the situation from the perspective of 
human actors involved. These case study evaluations cover both process and outcomes as 
this methodology can include both quantitative as well as qualitative data.   
There are several examples of the use of case methodology in the literature. Yin (2003) has 
listed several examples of case studies along with the appropriate research design in each 
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case. Yin (2003) suggests three types of case studies: exploratory, explanatory, and 
descriptive case studies. According to Yin, each of those three approaches can be either 
single or multiple-case study, where multiple-case studies are replicatory in nature and not 
sampled cases. In exploratory case studies, fieldwork, and data collection may be 
undertaken prior to definition of the research questions and hypotheses. This type of study 
has been considered as a prelude to social research on a particular topic. This type of case 
study requires that the framework of the study must be created ahead of time. Results from 
pilot studies can be useful in determining the final research design. Selecting cases is a 
difficult process, but the literature provides guidance in this area (Yin, 1989). Stake (1995) 
suggests that selection should be based on opportunity to learn about the problem, and 
subjects should be willing. A selected case generally represents a typical environment 
conducive for the problem. Explanatory cases are suitable for doing causal studies. In very 
complex and multivariate cases, the analysis can make use of pattern-matching techniques. 
Descriptive cases require that the investigator begin with a descriptive theory, the findings 
for which are in the form of in-depth description of the phenomenon from the researcher‘s 
perspective. Each research strategy has advantages and disadvantages. Yin (2003) suggests 
three conditions on the basis of which a research strategy could be designed. These are: 
nature of research question, the control a researcher has over actual behavioral events and 
the focus of the researcher on contemporary vis a vis historical events.  
In this study, the field case study took place from October 2007 - April 2008 in the 
Department of Information Technology for the City, a major south eastern city of USA.  
The data collection and analysis methods are discussed in the next section. The specific 
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data collection methods will be discussed in the following section. The entire staff of the 
IT department (with particular attention being focused on the IS Security policy group) 
was interviewed. The IT department totals approximately 100 employees. Daily 
observations and intensive document review will accompany these interviews. 
3.5 Research design  
3.5.1 Data Collection 
This research was conducted in two phases. Phase one used value focused thinking and 
phase two used in-depth case study as a methodology. In data collection for phase one, 
which used VFT, 52 interviews was conducted with a diverse group of people representing 
a good mix of people from the various functional areas of different organizations. From the 
security side, we have representation from Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief 
Information Officers (CIO), information technology directors, security managers, security 
officers, system administrators, systems auditors and helpdesk IT specialist. We also 
interviewed people with non IT job specialization for a fresh perspective about security 
controls. These respondents were manager and line staff from functionalities other than IT 
such as accounts, finance and human resources. The interviews were conducted over a 
period from July to November 2007. The average duration for the interview was 45 
minutes. The interviews were mainly semi-structured but a question template was 
developed to guide the discussions. The template is attached in appendix 1. The 
conversations were tape recorded and transcribed personally by the investigators. 
Participants in this study represent nine industries and provide a wide perspective on 
security governance issues. The industries included in this study are:  Insurance, 
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healthcare, credit card services, Banks, financial investment, energy, telecommunications, 
Internet service providers and real estate development, both in private as well as 
government sector. The respondents had at least 5 years of professional work experience 
and have significant experience of using IT and all are under the purview of security 
governance practices. Some of the respondents do not directly work in information security 
governance domain but were nonetheless included in the study. We feel that the pervasive 
nature of security controls impacts everyone across the board in an organization and it is 
useful to get the values of even those people who were not directly responsible for 
developing and implementing these controls.  
For data collection purposes in phase two of the study, which was an in-depth case study, a 
number of sources of data were used. Primary source of data was the semi structured 
interviews. Secondary sources include the policy and procedure manual, the audit manual 
at CCIT, the policy guidelines provided by the state agency which is responsible for the 
security policies of the state for the case study, primary source of data was the interviews 
with organizational members. Key stakeholders were identified at the case study site with 
the help of our point of contact at the organization. The key stakeholders were able to 
provide adequate insight into organization‘s internal control structure in the context of 
information systems security. The target organization has 4 main divisions: IT 
development, IT infrastructure, Security and Project management. Each division head and 
the manager from the particular department were interviewed. The CIO of the organization 
and the chief audit officer were interviewed increasing the total number of interviews to 
10. The overall representation of the respondents (top management, middle management 
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and operational level) provided good insights into the applicability of the developed 
objectives in the particular organizational context.  See appendix 2 and 3 for the topic 
guide used in the interviews and list of the respondents. Notes were taken during the 
interviews and were recorded in the master response document as soon as possible after the 
meetings.  
3.5.2 Data analysis  
For data analysis of phase one, we used Kenney‘s three step methodology to develop the 
decision objectives (explained elsewhere). For the data analysis of the case study in phase 
two, several methods were used. Huberman and Miles (1994) suggest three ways of data 
analysis for qualitative interview data: data reduction, data display and conclusion 
drawing. In data reduction process, the researchers identify portions of the data which is 
relevant for the theoretical construct under study. With the useful data, the researchers 
categorize and structure the data in a manner to facilitate the drawing of meaningful 
interpretations. This is done through writing summaries, synopsis or making networked 
diagrams that permit conclusions to be drawn. Finally conclusion drawing is the 
interpretive process through which the researcher analyses themes and patterns and then 
compares and contrasts these to triangulate the data.  Walsham (2006) suggests that even 
though the researcher is the agent of the interpretation, a theoretical framework should be 
used to guide and bind the researcher. Else, the result would be more anecdotal than 
empirical in nature.  In this case, each of the above three steps were performed iteratively 
several times before actual results emerged. When the initial set of results did not seem to 
provide insightful conclusions; the entire process was repeated. Various issues were 
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identified during the data analysis from the primary and secondary sources. Several 
iterations took place before the objectives were put into clusters. These clusters were 
revisited with the second phase data and many of the sub objectives were condensed in the 
light of new data from the case study. Identifying an informant and the key stakeholders in 
the case study setting helped in applying triangulation technique. Final interpretations were 
done in accordance with the theoretical basis of the research. This provided meaningful 
principles that have applicability in other settings too. An overview of the research design 
is provided below in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 An overview of the research design  
 
Research Design Description 
Types of Research Questions  Phase 1: Questions about values regarding 
information security governance 
Phase 2: Questions regarding the usefulness of the 
proposed objectives from the previous phase.   
Strategy Two phase study: Value focused assessment 
through interviews and Case study  
Data Collection method Semi-structured interviews, case study, 
observations, secondary support documents in form 
of manuals and policies   
Data Analysis Phase 1: Value focused assessment steps as 
suggested by Keeney (1992) 
Phase 2: Data reduction, data display, triangulation 
Theory Used  Value Theory 
Major References  Keeney (1999), Catton (1954, 1959), Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh (2006) 
Respondents  IT managers, IT Auditors, security professionals 
Expected Results Framework of means and fundamental objectives 
for maximizing ISG, principles of ISG    
Validation Criteria  Klein and Myers‘ seven principles for interpretive 
field studies 
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3.5.3 Evaluation Criteria  
The set of principles for evaluating interpretive research proposed by Klein and Myers‘ has 
been used to evaluate this study. The principles include the hermeneutic circle, 
contextualization, interaction between subjects and researcher, abstraction and 
generalization, dialogical reasoning, multiple interpretations, and suspicion. The 
fundamental principle of the hermeneutic circle   refers to the idea of developing the 
complex whole from the meanings and the parts and their relationships. This signifies 
developing a complete picture about the context, the phenomenon and the complexities of 
the construct under study. The principle of contextualization requires reflection on the 
social and historical background to integrate the emergent situation in the field.   
The principle of interaction between the researchers and the subjects shows the need for 
critical reflection on how the research data was socially constructed through the interaction 
between the subjects and the researcher. The principle of generalization deals with details 
that are revealed by the data interpretation through the application of principles one and 
two.   
The last three principles point to the requirement of a degree of sensitivity on the part of 
the researcher to minute details of their data and findings. The principle of dialogical 
reasoning means that the researcher should be open to the idea that theoretical 
preconceptions might not be able to explain the case situations in the field. The principle of 
multiple interpretations alludes to the researcher showing sensitivity to the differences in 
interpretations of the participants to the same event. Lastly, the principle of suspicion 
refers to the sensitivity towards possible biases and distortions by the participants. These 
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principles were used to establish the validity of this study and a discussion on their usage is 
presented in chapter 7 of this dissertation.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter established the importance of using individual values for development of ISG 
objectives. An outline of the philosophy, theory, methodology and the research design that 
is being followed in this study is provided.   A discussion on generalizability of the results 
is presented. Based on the discussions in this chapter, an empirical investigation of ISG 
development and validation was conducted. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of these 
investigations.  
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CHAPTER 4 Means and Fundamental Objectives for Information Systems Security 
Governance 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to present the means and fundamental objectives for 
information systems security governance. The objectives have been derived from the 
interview data gathered across 9 industries over a six month period. The chapter begins by 
providing a brief description of the profile of the respondents who were interviewed.  This 
chapter then presents the list of means and fundamental objectives which emerged from the 
data. The discussion section presents the relevance of the proposed objectives in the light 
of research literature and establishes the contributions there of. The key lessons for 
practitioners of Information systems security governance are also listed. The concluding 
section discusses the results and establishes the need for the case study, which is 
subsequently presented in the following chapter.  
4.2 Developing means and fundamental objectives   
In the first phase of the study, a value focused approach is used to develop the means and 
fundamental objectives for information systems security governance. As discussed earlier, 
Keeney suggests a 3 step process to develop decision objectives from the values of the 
stakeholders in the decision context.  Objectives in a multi objectives decision analysis 
model are generated in hierarchical fashion. The overall objective is defined first, followed 
by a definition of the fundamental objectives. These are the objectives that we actually 
wish to achieve in a decision context, as opposed to means objectives which merely 
provide a means to attaining our fundamental objectives (Kirkwood, 1997). A value 
  79 
hierarchy helps in ensuring that fundamental objectives are appropriately related to the 
overall objective (Kirkwood, 1997).   
In the context of this study, maximizing information security governance is the overall 
objective for the organizations in order to ensure an effective security program. The 
achievement of this strategic objective is affected by the various decisions that the people 
in the organization take. We seek to understand the fundamental objectives that apply to 
these decisions for multiple decision contexts within an organization.  
4.2.1 Respondent profile 
In an attempt to understand the values that affect ISG objectives in organizations, 52 
interviews were conducted with a diverse group of individuals representing a broad cross 
section of industries and functionalities. The roles which the respondents were discharging 
included: Chief Executive Officers (CEO), Chief Information Officer (CIO), Information 
Technology Directors, Security Managers, Systems Administrators, Systems Auditors and 
helpdesk IT specialists. We also interviewed people with non IT job specializations for a 
generic and non-technical perspective about security controls. These respondents included 
managers and line staff workers from functionalities other than IT such as accounts, 
finance and human resources. The interview questionnaire template is attached in 
Appendix 1.  
Participants in this study represent nine industries and represent a wide perspective on 
security governance issues. The industries included in this study are:  Insurance, 
healthcare, credit card services, Banks, financial investment, energy, telecommunications, 
Internet service providers and real estate development, both in the private and government 
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sector. All the respondents had at least 5 years of professional work experience and 
significant experience of using IT. They are also under the purview of security governance 
practices.  Some of the respondents do not directly work in information security 
governance domain but were included in the study nonetheless. We feel that the pervasive 
nature of security controls impacts everyone across the board in an organization and it is 
useful to get the values of even those people who were not directly responsible for 
developing and implementing these controls.  
4.2.2 Keeney’s three step methodology  
Keeney‘s 3 step methodology is explained in this section to demonstrate how the steps 
were incorporated in the conduct of the first phase of the research. As Keeney (1999) 
suggests, the best way to understand the underlying values of people about an issue is to 
directly ask them. To understand the individual values, this study uses a three-step 
procedure as proposed by Keeney (1992).  
Step 1: Listing Values 
In the first step, Keeney suggests the development of a comprehensive list of personal 
values which might underlie the problem being explored. The process of identifying these 
values begins with interviews, which can be done individually or in groups. It is important 
to clarify the decision context of the study to the interviewees. Thus before the interview 
process, a guiding definition of information security governance was provided. We defined 
ISG as: 
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  Information Security Governance is defined as organizational structures, 
 procedures and practices put in place to help in ensuring the integrity of the 
 information flows and business continuity. Information Security Governance helps 
 in protecting the information assets of the organization through the use of proper 
 internal controls.  
 
This definition provided clear boundaries for the scope of this research. The governance 
practices internal to the organization that affect the working of employees on a daily basis 
have been studied in this research. This research does not concern itself with the external 
practices such as relations with vendors or outsourced services.  
We applied the process of listing the values which emerged during interview sessions with 
domain experts and other stakeholders in order to develop the objectives. The aim of the 
interview was to develop objectives for maximizing information security governance in an 
organization. The interviews continued with questions which sought to generate typical 
values and bring them forth for observation (Keeney, 1992) such as (1) probing for a wish 
list of the perfect characteristics for the ideal situation; (2) discussing the shortcomings of 
the proposed characteristics in real life cases; (3) considering actual work examples from 
the interviewee‘s experience; (4) discussing the consequences of bad decisions made; (5) 
asking the interviewee‘s about how others in the organization will be impacted by 
decisions and (6) generating scenarios to actually understand and cross check values being 
communicated.  
People express their values in a variety of ways. In order to facilitate better understanding 
of what they meant, each respondent was interviewed individually and asked to explain 
their responses with examples. Probing further proved to be useful as the researchers 
developed a clearer perspective of exactly what a respondent meant. Thus, presenting 
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scenarios, interpreting consequences, understanding the constraints and goals of a decision 
context helped bring the values to the surface in a lucid manner. We extracted 260 values 
from the interview data and converted them into common forms (see Appendix b). After 
40 interviews, we felt that the data had a lot of repetitions, which clearly pointed reaching a 
theoretical saturation in the process. Nonetheless, we conducted 12 more interviews to be 
exhaustive of all possible values about the decision context and reach a well informed 
theoretical saturation.  
Step 2: Categorizing Values 
All statements or the raw values for the problem context were changed into a common 
form. These common forms are subsequently converted into objectives. An objective has 
three features: a decision context, an object and a direction of preference (Keeney 1992). 
Decision context in this case is ―What should the information security governance 
characteristics be in an organization?‖ Hence, each of the values that are listed by 
respondents is an object and the way to achieve this object becomes the objective. Thus the 
verb form of the object could be termed as the objective of that object.  For example, data 
from the interview suggests a raw value such as ‗‗Problems one comes across are usually 
lack of awareness about controls‘‘. The value explicated above can be changed into a 
common form ―Lack of awareness about controls is a problem‖, which in turn can be 
converted into an objective ―Create awareness about control in employees‖. The decision 
context is related to controls, the object is awareness and the direction of preference is to 
have more awareness about controls. It is possible to derive more than one objective from a 
specific value statement, e.g. The maximization of education and training for security 
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governance is another objective that can be derived from the above value statement. As 
Keeney suggests, better alternatives for a decision problem can be generated once 
objectives have been established. This is opposite to alternative focused thinking where 
alternatives are first identified and then the objectives are specified. After striking down 
the repetitions in the data, we developed a list of 190 objectives (see appendix c). 
Step 3: Relating Objectives 
The list of objectives thus generated was arranged into clusters according to the underlying 
idea being conveyed by the objectives. After clustering, these objectives were rearranged 
through means-ends relationships (Keeney 1992). This basically involved classifying all 
the categories thus formed into either a ―means‖ to the decision or an ―end‖ to the decision 
objective for the problem context. Thus an objective that leads to another objective being 
considered in decision-making is a means objective whereas an objective which is 
fundamental and important in its own right, in the decision making process is called 
fundamental objective. This is primarily done through performing a Why Is This Important 
(WITI) test for each of the objectives (Keeney 1992). For example- ‗ensure audit efficacy‖ 
objective does not directly impact information systems security governance in an 
organization. In its own context, the audit functionality gives an assessment of current state 
of controls and their strengths and weaknesses. It does so in a way that controls are 
developed and implemented in a better way, hence it is a means objective. 
 However, the objective ―ensure continuous improvements in controls‖ directly impacts 
information security governance practices because if a security control is not implemented 
well, it creates vulnerability, thus weakening the governance process. Therefore ―ensure 
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continuous improvements in controls‖ is a fundamental objective. Using similar logic, all 
the objectives are classified into either the means or fundamental category. Both 
fundamental and means objectives are important for the decision context. The set of 
fundamental objectives specify the core values which the decision should incorporate. The 
list of means objectives suggests areas of improvement for decisions based on the 
fundamental values.  Our data suggests six fundamental and seventeen means objectives 
that are essential for information security governance in organizations. The next section 
presents a discussion on each objective and its relevance in achieving overall effective ISG 
in organizations.  
4.3 Establishing the objectives in information security governance research  
The fundamental and means objectives developed in this research need to be reviewed in 
the light of the existing information systems security governance literature. It is important 
to ground the developed objectives in extant literature to understand the implications of the 
objectives for research in this domain. Also, the grounding helps in interpreting the extent 
to which these objectives would be useful in establishing the information systems security 
governance agenda for organizations. The discussions about the fundamental and means 
objectives are presented in the two subsections below.  
4.3.1 Fundamental Objectives 
Establish Corporate Control Strategy (F1)  
Our data suggests that developing a corporate wide control strategy is a fundamental 
objective for maximizing information security governance in organizations. It is important 
to define a strategic control plan that establishes the business requirements of information 
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systems security in order to make the organization achieve its business objectives. A 
control strategy maps the information security governance objectives to the business 
objectives and aligns the two. The strategic control plans should be then translated into 
operational controls that in turn set clear short term goals. As suggested by our data, it is 
crucial to develop a corporate security control strategy and ensure that security is a non-
negotiable budget line item for the management. This involves developing a risks 
management strategy, understanding organizational power structures in developing 
controls and viewing security controls as cost of doing business. As observed by a senior 
IT manager in the electronics goods industry:  
 Security control is a non–functional requirement and there is no place for non 
 functional requirements in the system design. User groups do not talk about 
 security, the so called non-functional technical requirement. How do you manage 
 it? It becomes an issue of internal policies, and then it has to be related to IT 
 architecture. 
 
A control strategy ensures that security governance is an antecedent to complete security 
and process integrity. A control strategy requires developing guidelines using consensus 
and flexibility in tools for control. As mentioned by one of our respondents:  
 ―Security is addressed during normal strategic and operational planning cycles. 
 Security has achievable, measurable objectives that directly align with our 
 enterprise objectives. Determining how much security is enough is directly 
 proportionate to how much risk and exposure an organization can tolerate‖.  
 
Gregor et al. (2004) suggests a relationship between strategic planning practices and the 
value derived from IT. Business and IT management jointly create IT strategy, using the 
business strategy and objectives as the key reference (Peppard, 2001). Research in IT 
strategy stresses the need for top management to be closely involved in the IT strategy 
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process (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Peppard and Ward, 1999), so that the IT 
strategy, upon implementation, results in IT systems that support the business strategy 
(Premkumar and King 1994). Consequently it is important to have a control strategy which 
ensures information security and thus helps in developing the IT strategy. Control strategy 
involves planning for the success of the security program. Having a centralized control 
strategy provides the departments with control plans that are required for successful 
implementation of security controls. IT strategy is a ―macro competency‖ necessary for the 
success of IT (Peppard and Ward, 2004) and control strategy is important for the security 
of IT assets.  
The use of inadequate control tools and inefficient internal practices for security has a 
negative effect on the management process and also compromises strategic objectives 
(Alves et al, 2006). Information security governance requires strategic direction and 
impetus. It requires commitment, resources and assignment of responsibility for 
information security management. It also requires a means for the board to determine that 
the intent has been met (Information Technology Governance Institute, 2006). Information 
systems control strategy is required to address information threats by conducting risk 
assessments aimed at identifying mitigation strategies and required controls (Da Veiga and 
Eloff, 2007). The control strategy should be an inherent part of an organization‘s IT 
strategy and overall business strategy in order to ensure that organizational objectives for 
both the short and long term are comprehensively met.  
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Encourage a Controls Conscious Culture (F2)  
Culture creates and sustains connections among policies, processes, people, and 
performance (Julia and Westby, 2007). Our data suggests ―establish control culture‖ as an 
important objective for information systems security governance. Developing control and 
risk consciousness in employees creates a ―prevention mentality‖ that helps in minimizing 
intergroup rivalry over security initiatives. A control conscious culture interwoven into the 
fabric of the organization holds together all the technical, formalized and informal controls 
of the governance program. An environment where individuals ―watch out‖ for each other 
strengthens the actual controls, leading to the achievement of the desired results. Also, 
with changing security needs, which in turn impact the controls, changes in the corporate 
culture too have to be formally taken care of. As a senior systems auditor from the 
healthcare industry commented:  
 Changes being made in the corporate culture have to be managed in a better way.  
 For instance, if the Internal Audit suddenly has to play a bigger role or a separate IS 
 security department is required…all these things require a corresponding change in 
 corporate culture. Why am I doing this? This needs to be explained better to people 
 in  MIS. If suddenly people are reviewing everything that you do…this kind of a 
 change just has to be managed properly. 
 
Management should establish ethical standards of conduct, which are essentially the rules 
to be followed by employees (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Ethical considerations, such as 
maintaining employee‘s privacy, must be included by the management as a part of security 
governance program. The control consciousness is the general atmosphere in the 
organization, in which people perform their activities and carry out their control 
responsibilities. Controls must be implemented to protect the privacy of both the 
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employees and the customers. This enhances trust within the organization and with 
customers outside the organization (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007). Communicating these 
measures is part of control awareness in an organization. All organizations have a set of 
unwritten norms and values to which their members subscribe. This cultural dimension is a 
powerful force in enhancing or compromising security (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002).  
Maximize Clarity in Policies and Procedures (F3)  
Security policies, procedures and guidelines are paramount in the implementation of 
information security governance as they provide direction and support (ISO 17799, 2005). 
Our data suggests that management should have clarity in security policies and procedures 
to make the implementation of the controls more effective and get the intended results 
from the governance process. Clarity in policies and procedures is essential to ensure the 
proper use of applications and technological solutions instituted in an organization. 
Controls should be reflected in the policy document and seen to be implemented through 
the procedures. As shared by the chief architect at a leading computer services 
organization: 
 I think internal security controls are in the policy. In order to impose the policy, 
 controls are developed, so controls in a way are policy. It helps you to ensure 
 your policy. 
 
Clarity in policies can be achieved through a structured approach to the development of 
user and operations procedure manuals, service requirements and training materials. 
Policies should be made easily accessible and reflect truly the control requirement in the 
policies. The high visibility of fair policies ensures that everyone follows the policy. Our 
data suggests that it is important to make the policies readily available for reference. It is 
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also vital to develop controls that follow procedures and are convenient to use. As 
mentioned by a senior auditor from a financial services industry: 
 At the start, I just tell the auditee- if you just follow your security policies and try 
 to implement the controls, you will be able to answer most of the questions, and 
 there will be no problem. 
 
There is a heavy emphasis on developing clear policies in information systems security 
governance (von Solms, 1996; Straub and Nance, 1990). Ward and Smith (2002) argue 
that the IT security policies also provide the basis for displaying the executive 
management‘s commitment to IT security. Moultan and Cole (2003) suggest that policies 
should be developed in a way that should facilitate the development of the relevant 
controls for security. In their proposed security governance framework, Moultan and Cole 
(2003) have identified ―policies and procedures‖ as an objective. In their security 
governance framework, Eloff and Eloff (2005) place policies as a first priority for an 
effective governance program. In their proposed model, McCarthy and Campbell (2001) 
identify policies, procedures, documented guidelines and standards as crucial components 
for proper implementation of security controls. However, the policies should reflect the 
human, technical and procedural aspects of security management holistically.  
Maximize Regulatory Compliance (F4) 
Information systems security governance entails preparations for fulfilling the mandatory 
requirements of complying with relevant regulations. The governance structure should 
ensure compliance with external requirements as it is important for the organization to 
meet legal, regulatory and contractual obligations. Security governance practices are able 
to meet the regulatory requirements by identifying and analyzing external requirements for 
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their security impact and taking appropriate measures towards complying with these. Our 
data suggests that ensuring regulatory compliance is a fundamental objective to maximize 
information systems security governance. Regulations do not improve the governance 
measures efforts per se. To a certain extent, the regulations force an organization to rethink 
its security preparations and take actions which it should have taken anyways. As one of 
the respondents, internal auditor in credit card services industry, explained 
 Five years ago our CEO did not know about controls, so we had to sit down and 
 explain them to him. Over some time he was still in the process of getting it, but 
 now he knows all about controls. It [SOX] helped a lot in increasing the popularity 
 of controls. People are scared of SOX…we can just not fail and say I will do it next 
 year. You have to keep testing till you pass. You have to be compliant. 
 
Regulatory compliance has been a big driver in recent years to develop and shape security 
governance initiatives. As one of the respondents, Chief Executive Officer in a state 
agency commented: 
 Regulatory compliance drives a lot of what we do. It also has an impact on your 
 stock price. Control conciseness has come about in a big way because of this.   
 
Compliance with regulation as a security governance objective has been extensively 
supported by literature (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; Tudor, 2000; Eloff and Eloff, 2005; von 
Solms, 2006; Moultan and Cole, 2003). Both internal as well as external compliance with 
policies and regulations requires preparedness and understanding of codes of practice, legal 
requirements and international standards. Dhillon and Torkzedeh (2006) classify 
compliance as a fundamental requirement for security initiatives.  
Ensure Continuous Improvements in Controls (F5) 
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‗Proper implementation of controls‘ has been identified as a fundamental objective for 
information systems security governance. Our data suggests that continuous and iterative 
control assessment helps in implementing the right controls in the correct fashion. 
Implementing controls requires caution to ensure minimum likelihood of disruption and 
errors in the functioning of the systems. Understanding the organizational context of 
particular controls helps in the implementation and adoption of controls. Our data suggests 
that to develop effective controls, implementation practices of an organization should use a 
―clean slate‖ approach i.e. start afresh and not superimpose old methods which will make 
existing biases impede the process.  
Implementation of controls is not a one time phenomenon but an evolutionary exercise. It 
includes adapting the controls as per changing business needs. Managing the changes is 
crucial too, especially in a production environment. This requires analysis, implementation 
and follow-up of all changes requested and consequently made to the existing IT 
infrastructure. It is crucial that the changed roles reflect changed controls in the 
organization. As observed by a respondent, internal auditor in financial services industry: 
 For example you make a great access control upfront and don‘t come back and 
 look at it again. So we could point out some of those issues. We try to make 
 sure that you develop something, to take care of those processes where it has 
 holes. So if somebody changes roles, changes jobs or the organization restructures, 
 what controls do you have in place which ensure that you change your procedure 
 accordingly? Or then you have to consider- do the procedures need to be changed? 
 So there is a lot you have to think about. 
 
In his security management model, Booker (2006) identifies ―implementing a holistic 
approach‖ as one of the objectives for good security governance. The author suggests that 
all the security requirements of the organization should be exactly mapped to the controls 
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and implemented precisely to provide a holistic security governance approach. Realizing 
the importance of the control implementation process, ITGI has a domain of activities and 
objectives dedicated to successful implementation of controls in its governance framework, 
COBIT (2007). In the Acquire and implement domain of COBIT, seven objectives are 
identified. All these objectives suggest a meticulous implementation process. COBIT even 
emphasizes the importance of managing changes [objective AI6 (Manage Changes) of 
COBIT] for successful ongoing implementation, which is similar to what our data 
suggests. COSO framework, in its control activities component describes the impact of 
well implemented relevant controls on security environment of the organization. Eloff and 
Eloff (2005) argue for proper execution of security controls to develop a secure IT 
infrastructure and to maintain the control environment. Rees et al. (2003) identify the 
importance of proper controls implementation in their security governance model.  
Enable Responsibility and Accountability in Roles (F6) 
Our data suggests that responsibility and accountability in structures is essential for good 
information systems security governance. Clarity in roles and ownership of decisions in the 
organization helps in aligning security governance goals with business goals.  Some of the 
sub-objectives associated with this objective are ‗discourage sudden changes in 
responsibility structures‘, ‗define and document roles and privileges properly‘ and 
‗encourage transparency about accountability for actions‘. The groups of sub-objectives 
argue for a stable, well-defined and clearly communicated responsibility structure to 
provide right direction to the security practices. Clear role differentiation encourages 
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accountability of the managers and results in better alignment of personal motivations of 
the individuals with organizational expectations. As one of our respondents commented: 
 Roles and responsibilities have to be very clear upfront. Nobody should be 
 surprised at their work by having to do something which they were not doing 
 yesterday. Making sure that people understand the priority,  roles, responsibility is 
 important. If you can demonstrate this, then you can get the level of service 
 required. 
 
In a global survey of IT managers regarding ‗what activities should be a part of 
information systems security governance‘, about 94% of the respondents emphasized 
alignment of roles and responsibilities and accountability as a crucial activity (Deloitte, 
2006). Thus it is important to encourage ownership of data sources and assign appropriate 
roles and privileges to managers in order to carry out the governance objectives effectively. 
It is also true that organizations can allocate roles and authority but responsibility can only 
exist once it is accepted (Drummond, 2003). Accountability, thus results when the 
responsibility is accepted by all parties to ensure that all the resources are used for 
authorized uses and such actions can be traced back to the responsible person (GISP 
security principles). Hence it is absolutely essential to communicate the importance of the 
roles to the managers.  
To summarize, the list of six fundamental objectives for information security governance is 
presented in the table 4.1 below. Under each objective, the corresponding sub objectives 
are shown.  
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Table 4.1 Fundamental objectives for information security governance 
 
 Objective 
Name  
Sub-objectives 
F1 Ensure corporate 
controls strategy 
 
Develop corporate security control strategy   
Establish a risk management strategy  
Ensure that security governance is a non-negotiable budget line item 
Understand organizational power structures while developing controls  
View security governance as a cost of doing business  
Ensure that security governance is an antecedent to security and process integrity 
Develop guidelines using consensus 
Develop measurable security control objectives  
Ensure departments have control plans  
Develop flexibility in tools for controls  
F2 Encourage a 
controls-
conscious culture 
 
Establish a control- consciousness culture  
Develop risk consciousness in the employees  
Establish a security conscious culture  
Create prevention mentality 
Encourage appreciation for security governance culture  
Establish a culture where individuals watch out for each other 
Encourage an environment of conformity  
Instill the desire into the employees to meet expectations about controls   
 
F3 Maximize Clarity 
in Policies and 
Procedures 
 
Enhance visibility about fairness of policies and procedures   
Create controls which logically follow the procedures  
Create convenient policy  
Define control policies for access to information resources 
Ensure compliance with policy document  
Ensure policies are readily available  
Reflect control requirements in security policies  
Encourage discussion on internal controls as identified in the policies 
F4 Maximize 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
Define controls for compliance with regulations  
Encourage regulatory compliance through internal controls  
Encourage respect for laws of the society  
 Ensure that compliance is a substantive and sustained improvement in business   
processes 
Establish a compliance culture 
Explain the importance and need for compliance to technical people 
Follow regulations in entirety  
Formalize process of compliance in the organization  
Understand the impact of regulations on controls  
Use regulations as a catalyst for implementing better practices  
Avoid turning compliance into ―check the box exercises‖ 
F5 Ensure continuous 
improvements in 
controls   
 
Ensure continuously iterative control assessment and implementation  
Maintain and integrate the controls properly in changing business needs 
Change controls with process changes  
Effectively test the controls   
Manage changes efficiently  
Manage changes in production systems   
Manage controls from the source of problems i.e. employees  
Understand the organizational context of controls implementation  
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Use clean slate approach for controls implementation   
Develop effective change management practices 
F6 Enable 
responsibility 
and 
accountability in 
roles  
 
Create organizational responsibilities for compliance  
Define responsibility and accountability of controls for security governance 
Discourage sudden changes in responsibility structures  
Encourage a sense of responsibility 
Encourage individual responsibility for ensuring proper access to data resources 
Encourage responsibility sharing  
Ensure accountability  
Assign responsibility for protecting information  
Define and document roles and privileges properly 
Encourage transparency and accountability for actions 
Encourage individual responsibility for ensuring proper access to data resources 
Ensure responsibility and accountability sharing in protecting information 
Ensure job design around IS needs 
 
4.3.2 Means Objectives 
Ensure Efficacy of Audit Processes (M1)  
Efficacy of auditing, on the part of both the internal and external auditors, is essential for 
assessing the progress of the organization on various security governance fronts and the 
efficiency of the efforts in this direction. In this research, ―ensure efficacy of audit 
processes‖ has emerged as an important means objective which essentially inserts checks 
and balances into the governance program. Audit practices are essential for ensuring that 
the management is incorporating adequate consideration towards the changing context of 
governance tasks.  Our data suggests that internal auditors can be treated as consultants to 
ensure effectiveness of the controls. Talking about the role of auditors in internal control 
assessment, the chief audit officer of a fortune 500 organization in credit card services 
industry mentioned: 
 We do not create controls, we only test them. We consult about them and we tell 
 them [auditee] here is the type of control you will need to have and you will 
 have to create it because that‘s your job. If you need help in creating those  controls, 
 we can provide some guide lines and come back and see how well you have done 
 it. 
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It is important to provide adequate access to the auditors across the organization and 
establish a cross checking mechanism for the audit function. Auditing helps in integrating 
the information rules into daily management practices. Periodic internal audits with well 
defined objectives and scope can help in enhancing the security governance mechanisms in 
an organization.   
Auditing is an important functionality which provides assurance for risk management, 
controls and governance structures (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2006).  Organizations 
may regard strategy, people, assets and finance as pivotal but equally so are routine day-to-
day aspects of an organization including the mechanics of the IT system. Thus auditing 
becomes crucial to provide a reasonable assessment of risks of day-to day jobs in IT and 
suggest improvements for better security of information systems. It is vital for 
management to consult experts proactively and to advise on IT security (Trcek, 2003). 
Auditing ensures segregation of duties and points out anomalies in normal business 
transactions. Lack of segregation of roles and auditing of the suspense account were the 
major cause of the failure of Barings Bank (Drummond, 2003). This is ssentially an 
example of security governance loopholes. Internal auditors are responsible for pointing 
out management deficiencies negatively impacting the strength of an organization‘s 
internal control (Banks, 2004). The greatest benefit of audit function is its unbiased 
assessment of management adequacy.  A strong, independent audit committee can be 
critically useful in ensuring high quality of reporting and controls and the proper 
identification and management of risk (Wagner, 2000).  
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Maximize Clarity in Business Processes (M2)  
Our data suggests that it is absolutely essential to maintain the integrity of business 
processes for proper security management. To maintain the integrity, it is essential that 
there be clarity in how these processes work, so that proper controls can be instituted in the 
right places. Business processes need to be clearly understood and awareness of normal 
business activities should be increased. As explained by an internal auditor from the 
financial sector: 
 The application should not be a black box. We should understand the business 
 processes.  What is it that it is doing? How does it convert the input into output? 
 Whether the whole processing it is doing is correct or not, should be clear.  
 
If the implemented controls make it difficult for the people to perform their day-to-day job 
efficiently, there is a greater possibility of these controls being circumvented. As observed 
by one of our respondents: 
 The practices do not take into consideration the impact on the user‘s performance. 
 The introduction of new requirements in an existing process necessitates additional 
 effort on the part of the user. This effort is often perceived negatively because it can 
 be intrusive, complicated, unclear, or draining. 
 
Business processes can be described as ―a set of ordered activities, controlled by central 
vision which consume resources and use information‖. Adequate information security 
governance has clearly defined business processes (Alves et al, 2006). Efficiently designed 
processes reach maturity faster, hence can be protected better. It is important to recognize 
that security requires an end-to-end view of business processes (Dutta and McCrohan, 
2002). A clear and holistic view of business processes can lead to a comprehensive 
security governance program. Moulton and Coles (2003) argue that implementing and 
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ensuring effectiveness of governance requires business process information risk 
management (BPRIM) approach. This approach recommends that business process owner 
must appreciate that risks arise due to faulty business processes and the information that 
they use. It is imperative that the management inserts and enforces controls related to the 
risks throughout the business process. Along similar lines, Banks (2004) argues that 
organizations should not change job descriptions, employees or business practices without 
first examining the impact of these changes on controls. A sudden change in business 
process can create vulnerability from the security management perspective and should be 
avoided.  
Ensure Communication about Controls (M3)  
Our data emphasizes the significance of sound communication about the controls. It is 
important to clearly communicate the various consequences of non compliance with 
controls, the nature and scope of the controls themselves and consequences of possible 
control breaches that can occur.. Our data also suggests that organizations should 
encourage communication about control issues amongst employees. It would be helpful to 
have a communication policy that results in frequent internal debates about controls in the 
organization. Employees would be better prepared to follow the controls if they are aware 
about the rationale, purpose, risks and values of the controls and the reasons governing 
organizational actions. Communications acts as the backbone for a successful security 
governance program. As one of the respondents shared about his organization: 
 Communication, discussion, and debate on controls topics are encouraged. Such 
 exchanges are conducted in visible, open, participative forums, both formal and 
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 informal, as appropriate. The security actions and their contribution to mitigation of 
 enterprise risk are well known throughout the organization. 
 
The failure to regularly and effectively communicate information security policy, 
standards, baselines, procedures, guidelines, responsibilities, related enforcement 
measures, and the  consequences of failing to comply to all relevant parties can cause 
unintentional breach  of policy by parties to whom the policy has not been effectively 
communicated (GISP, 2006). Such failure can also result in the intentional breach of policy 
by parties to whom the adverse consequences of such a breach have not been effectively 
communicated. COBIT 4.1 (2007) emphasizes the importance of constructive 
communication between IT and other functions within and outside the business for security 
governance. COBIT identifies, communicate management aim and direction (PO6), as an 
important objective that stresses the importance of ongoing communications policy to 
articulate the vision and the objectives of security governance program. In COSO 
framework, information and communications, the capture and communication of relevant 
information for integrity of controls is proposed as an objective. Leach (2003) observes 
that it is important to gather input from staff on the precise points where the body of 
available information is being undermined by confusing messages in the company‘s 
pronouncements or contradictory practices in its systems. Open communications help 
employees‘ form a clear picture of the intent and scope of the controls.  
Ensure Alignment of Individual and Organizational Values (M4) 
Our data suggests that it is very important for the individuals in an organization to be able 
to identify with the organizational goals. ―Ensure alignment with individual and 
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organizational goals‖ has emerged as a fundamental objective in this research. It is 
important for the management not to contradict the values being imposed on employees by 
setting conflicting managerial and security goals (Ruighaver et al, 2007). There is a 
significant cost to be paid for not understanding individual values about security 
governance and not attempting to reconcile these values with those of the organization at 
large. For the proper alignment between individual and management security goals, values 
of people about security governance should be reflected in the objectives developed by the 
management. As observed by the chief security officer of a state agency: 
 Information security should flow from bottom-up; people with their hands in the 
 actual work should influence information security governance policies with 
 guidance from the top. 
 
This objective articulates the need for understanding an individual‘s attitudes and beliefs 
about security and how their behavior is influenced by peers. It is important to promote 
certain values in individuals for better security governance. Some of these values, as 
suggested by the interviews, are: respect for others, privacy, integrity, self-pride in job and 
honesty. As observed by one of our respondents, a compliance officer in insurance 
industry:  
 Personal integrity influences information security governance practices a lot. No 
 matter what laws are in place, if your own values are not upright, there is little that 
 would stop you from behaving unethically. 
 
The importance of individual values for better security governance is also established in 
the literature. Leach (2003) argues that an individual‘s personal values and standards of 
conduct is a major determinant of the willingness of that person to stay with the 
organization and conform to the established norms. Most people ascribe a high importance 
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to shared values and sensible rules. Such employees are also expected to imbibe and apply 
the organization‘s value system and standards of work to their own preconceived and 
individually accepted set of rules. If there is a conflict between an individual‘s values and 
organizational values, tension arises and most people are unable to sustain in such an 
environment for long (Leach, 2003). As one of our respondents, an HR manager at a state 
agency mentioned:  
 It is important to acertain whether one‘s personal values/norms are the same as the 
 company‘s or not. If they are not, then most likely his behavior would negatively 
 affect the security governance.  
 
Values provide keys to reach an understanding on how people evaluate the organization 
and its measures for governance (Jones and George, 1998). If the values embedded in the 
security measures do not match individual‘s values, chances of the failure of such 
measures increase drastically (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002; Warman, 1992; Angell, 
1996). It is important to involve end-users in control development process so that too 
complex and stringent controls do not result.  
Ensure Data Criticality (M5)  
Information systems security governance measures must protect the integrity of critical 
business data. This requires acquiring and maintaining technology infrastructure that 
satisfies the business requirement of providing the appropriate platforms for supporting 
business applications. It is important to maintain the integrity of the electronic data for the 
accuracy of business decisions and for meeting regulatory compliance criteria. An IT 
governance manager from a state agency in California suggests: 
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 Security governance safeguards information against unauthorized use, disclosure 
 or modification, damage or loss by implementing logical access controls. These 
 controls ensure that access to systems, data and programs is restricted to authorized 
 users.  
 
Some of measures to establish criticality of the data, which our data suggests, are through 
assessment and classification of data. The various parameters governing this are 
sensitivity, identification of data owners, assigning of responsibilities according to 
information criticality and linkages of data with authorizations. Articulating the need for 
protected data, one of our respondents says: 
 With data resource, you have to specify data ownership. Some body needs to own it 
 and resources should be classified, according to their sensitivity, whether it is 
 proprietary information or not. Access to those data resources should be restricted 
 except by authorization which should come only from the data owner. It should be 
 granted on roles. Access should be given to roles rather than individuals.  
 
It is imperative to ensure that data remains complete, accurate and valid during its input, 
updation and storage. It is also important to establish data integrity for compliance 
purposes. Data integrity and auditibility of data resources is a big part of compliance 
efforts (Volino, 2004). Establishing data criticality through confidentiality, integrity and 
availability has been enthusiastically supported by security governance researchers (Finne, 
1996; Sherwood, 1996; Ward and Smith, 2002). ISO/IEC 27002 identifies asset 
classification and control as governance objective for information systems security. 
Access control and authentication rules (Sandhu and Samarati, 1994) have been considered 
very significant for proper governance structure. Booker (2006) argues for maintenance of 
a database critical network and information assets for better security governance. A secure 
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and reliable IT infrastructure can only be created though the institution of proper protection 
mechanisms for critical data in an organization.  
Ensure Punitive Structures (M6)  
It is important to establish deterrence criteria to communicate the consequences of non 
compliance with controls and policies. Our data suggests that it is of paramount 
importance to ensure disciplinary action in case of unethical behavior or against law 
breakers. Establishing clear consequences for not complying with controls and explaining 
the disciplinary actions signifies the seriousness and commitment of the management in 
instituting the controls.  It is also important to explain the meanings of criminal actions to 
the employees. A respondent said: 
 You have to make the consequences of the action very clear. Most of the times, 
 companies do not make it clear. They warn them saying ―if you do that, criminal 
 action will be taken‖. But what is the criminal action? People are held responsible 
 for breaches, but it‘s not clear that if breaches happens, what action would be 
 taken? 
 
Deterrence criteria help in creating the fear of punishment amongst employees which in 
turn cultivates conformity with rules and regulations. Developing countermeasures to deal 
with destructive actions is required in order to ensure quick and effective responses in case 
of security breaches. One of our respondents added: 
 Some of the governance practices may not work because the people involved have 
 personal agendas such as wanting to meet deadlines even if it means not adhering 
 to company policy. People will continue to put the company in financial and 
 operational risks until they experience the consequences for doing so. 
 
Deterrence criteria for security have been emphasized in information systems security 
research. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) argue for developing deterrence criteria for better 
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security. Straub (1990) and Straub and Nance (1990) have used the general deterrence 
theory from criminology, which suggests sanctions to prevent people from committing 
crimes. The theory suggests that it is prudent to maximize prevention and deterrence and 
thus minimize abuse. There has not been much work about deterrence criteria in security 
governance research. Most of the leading standards for security governance such as 
COBIT or ISO 27000 do not mention deterrence as an objective. Research models in 
security governance also do not emphasize deterrence activities as an important objective 
for governance. However, our data suggests that deterrence is an important objective when 
controls are used as a governance mechanism.  
Ensure Clarity in Control Development Process (M7)  
Our data suggests that establishing clear control development process creates transparency 
in governance efforts and creates a favorable perception of the controls in the organization. 
It is important to create systemization in control development process and define 
achievable objectives. Critical data or business processes should be protected by multiple 
layers of controls, so that in the event of one set of controls failing, there would be other 
sets of controls to fall back upon. The chief architect of one of the leading IT services firm 
in the USA observed:  
 For example, we made sure there no single point if failure, by providing layers of 
 protection through logins. Unfortunately you have to remember more than one 
 password for this. Particularly vexing is that anything different from your daily 
 desktop login, and you have lot of problems remembering it. But everything can 
 not be convenient, and people are getting used to it as there is no other option.  
 
Change initiatives also require development of fresh set of controls at all levels. Controls 
should be simple, flexible, timely and easy to use.  Security controls could be developed by 
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structuring information needs and performing risk assessment to understand the scope of 
their impact. There has to be a balance between stringent and usable controls for the 
security governance environment to prosper. The Chief Information Officer of a leading 
insurance firm commented:  
 Yes, we want to create environment of innovation and creativity. People are free 
 to do what they want to do but I would say within the framework. So we define 
 the framework within which people can freely move but retain enough controls 
 so that people do what they have to do 
 
COBIT (2007) touches upon the development of application level controls and emphasizes 
clarity in the process. NIST, in its special publication (800-53 revision 2, 2006) provides 
guidelines for selecting and specifying controls, specifically for information systems 
supporting the agencies with federal government. The guidelines suggest creating a 
foundation for the development and assessment of security controls determining the 
governance efficiency. COSO, in its controls activities phase, touches upon the process of 
defining security objectives. It calls for transparency in the process for better fits with the 
organization. There is a lack of discourse in research literature about the process of 
development of security governance objectives and the actual controls which follow from 
this process. Definitely, there has not been much guidance on how to develop effective 
controls. This research suggests establishment of clear control development processes.  
Ensure Formal Control Assessment Functionality (M8)  
Establishing ―formal controls assessment‖ functionality has emerged as a ―business 
requirement‖ for successfully governing information systems security. Our data suggests 
that the controls assessment functionality enables continual assessment and improvement 
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of controls. A formal entity for control assessment ensures that appropriate controls are 
designed around information systems needs, where company‘s assets are protected, 
bureaucratic delays are avoided and stakeholder viewpoints are reflected in the governance 
process. As suggested by a database administrator in a state agency: 
 It is very difficult to take into account how each employee conducts their job 
 responsibilities and design IS around that, but ideally each employee job function 
 and needs should be looked at and incorporated in the  IS design 
 
It is important to differentiate between lines of business and industries before applying 
popular controls which are being used by others. A periodic cost benefit analysis and IT 
architecture review for the appropriateness of a particular design for the security controls 
should be performed by such an entity. The Chief Information Officer from a state agency 
explained: 
 In controls assessment for internal system, we perform what we call security 
 architecture review. Anything that goes into the production is part of overarching 
 set of policies. Look at our governance model, one  dimension is change control. 
 Part of our change management process is security architecture review for 
 application developers, purchasing officials, to check if this meets security 
 guidelines. 
 
Instituting formal control assessment functionality also discourages implementing controls 
as an ―afterthought‖. It is important to understand how and why controls work and what 
can be done to make them more effective. This can be the chief responsibility of such a 
business unit.  As mentioned by a senior auditor at a state agency: 
 You go though it [control] and make sure it is ok and put it in production. This is 
 what I had done to improve it, so we try to check a lot of those or test the 
 procedures. We try to make sure, do you have it?  Or the segregation of duties? 
 Which is the set of developers who approve the actual production? We take a lot of 
 their input because it‘s crucial for the controls, so they know exactly how it has 
 been done. 
  107 
 
Establishing controls assessment as functionality helps in managing the IT investment for 
security. Control assessment as a functionality meets the need of the business requirement 
for funding and controlling disbursement of financial resources. Security governance 
would be more effective if there are regular investments made in this area and an 
operational security budget is established and approved by the organization. Our data 
suggests that a formal entity for control assessment could help in achieving several sub 
objectives for security governance. Some of these are: explaining prioritization of tasks 
and actions for organizational members, establishing the relation between controls and IT 
architecture, ensuring good IT architecture, developing dynamic controls structure and 
balancing centralization vs. decentralization and effectiveness vs. usability.  
The existing frameworks of information systems security governance do not have a clearly 
articulated objective of this kind. But there have been discussions on the various functions 
that the control functionality would perform. For example, security investment, a sub 
objective for control assessment functionality, has been researched arduously over the 
years. It is difficult to make security investment decisions as it requires calculation of net 
benefits expected from the investment (Ryana and Ryanb, 2006). Calculation of net 
benefits from security is difficult but required nonetheless. As Dhillon and Moores (2001) 
suggest, key to controls implementation is to identify the exact level of resources 
allocation needed. The amount spent should be proportional to how critical the data is, the 
cost of controls and probability of the occurrence of the event. Ryana and Ryanb (2006) 
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argue that investment in security initiatives results in greater freedom from successful 
attacks and the system survives longer before actually succumbing to such an attack.  
The role of IT architecture in managing security is also acknowledged by research 
literature. Dynamic business environment and sophisticated security needs call for newly 
formulated IT architecture demands and revised assumptions about design and deployment 
of information systems (Melling, 1994). Such architectural shifts have strategic 
implications for the organization. Amer and Hamilton (2008) claim that it is important to 
have a security architecture which governs and ensures that various security related tasks 
are deployed correctly. Appropriate controls need to be designed along the way inherently 
in the business process as the IT infrastructure of an organisation evolves. Organization 
make important business decisions on real time information but there are hardly any 
assurance methods associated with data of this kind (Flowerday and von Solms, 2005).  
Current auditing practices provide assurance months later which might be too late. 
Appropriate and timely controls to mitigate such risks are required and the oversight from 
a formal body are playing increasingly important roles in the  integrity of such data. It 
should be capable of arranging for continuous auditing on demand (Flowerday and von 
Solms, 2005). Hence we infer that some of the points that we have emphasized under this 
objective, have been touched upon in literature but there is no direct call for establishing 
controls assessment as a separate functionality. Our data suggests that this is something 
which needs to be done.  
Maximize Monitoring and Feedback Channels (M9)  
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Our data suggests that security governance requires effective and established channels for 
monitoring the controls and incorporating feedback for further enhancements. Monitoring 
the controls helps in achieving the performance standards set for IT processes. Establishing 
monitoring and feedback channels as a security governance objective requires commitment 
to continuous reviewing, getting feedback from people and assuring that ―what is being 
claimed‖ is done. As shared by the Chief Information Officer at a state agency in Virginia: 
 Nothing can derail a security initiative and change management quicker than 
 agitating employees. Whether it is a VP or a CFO, if people feel you are not being 
 responsible and are taking control away from people or trying to impose it, it 
 makes people jump through hoops. 
 
Periodic review from external auditors helps in providing a fresh perspective about the 
controls. Review and feedback about the controls should be encouraged on a daily basis. 
Our data suggests that it is important to review the controls with respect to the 
organizational objectives and analyze the existing gaps. As explained by chief architect at a 
software service provider organization: 
 There are certain controls which are not liked by people…more pertinently, people 
 hate them! How you go about making sure that controls are effective? Well! 
 We do have some feedback processes wherein people register their concerns. After 
 all internal control is the most important part of security. 
 
Monitoring of employee behavior includes monitoring the installation of unauthorized 
software, use of string passwords and keeping records of internet sites visited (Da Veiga 
and Eloff, 2007). Technology monitoring could include installation of sniffers for 
incoming and outgoing data packets, capacity and network monitoring. In COBIT (2007), 
there are four domains for managing information technology and monitoring and 
evaluating one of the domain in this model. In this domain, all IT processes need to be 
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regularly assessed over time to check their compliance with controls (ITGI, 2007). This 
domain prepares the management to ask difficult questions such as; ‗How well is the 
organization prepared to assess the effectiveness of security controls?‘ ‗Can IT 
performance be linked to business goals?‘ (ITGI, 2007).  COSO (2006) too emphasizes on 
monitoring to ensure that controls give the intended results. Internal auditing can help in 
the monitoring process as well. Monitoring the effectiveness of controls is a difficult and 
ongoing process (Dhillon and Mishra, 2006). There is no mention of feedback channel in 
COSO though. Tudor (2000) defines ―monitoring compliance‖ as a security governance 
objective which is critical for protecting IT infrastructure. Rees et al. (2003) emphasize 
that all control processes should be monitored and reviewed. In their proposed model, 
feedback is considered critical to a successful governance program. Every stage of the 
model suggested is followed by a feedback channel so that there is continuous 
improvement in the process of governing security. Kolokotronis et al (2002), in a proposed 
multidimensional multilayered security governance model, suggest monitoring as a crucial 
objective for managing security controls. The authors also argue that monitoring of the 
controls should be done at a corporate level 
Ensure Visible Executive Leadership (M10) 
Visible leadership for security governance entails a philosophy and style which promotes 
security controls throughout the organization. Our data suggests that establishing executive 
leadership in visible roles fundamentally helps in improving the perception of security 
governance in an organization. As suggested by our respondents, executive leadership 
should be able to ―walk the talk‖ and should lead by example. Such behavior generates 
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respect for the security leaders and encourages key individuals to enforce rules and 
remedial solutions effectively. As one of our respondents collaborated; 
 There has to be strong leadership, reinforcement of a tie between what‘s being 
 done and its value and risks. Also practice what you preach. It helps to have 
 IT personnel in visible positions with good commitment being shown from top 
 executives. 
 
For a strong foundation for information systems security governance program, it is 
important for the leadership to nurture relationships with the employees. As our data 
suggests, in order to promote the security governance initiatives, it is important to put 
committed IT personnel in visible positions and encourage a control conscious attitude on 
the part of the supervisors. Having an enthusiastic manager to lead the security governance 
initiatives goes a long way in shaping the perception of the people about security.  As one 
of our respondents, a manager in accounting department of the insurance industry 
explained:  
 Leaders should understand their accountability and responsibility with respect to 
 security for the organization, for their stakeholders, and for the communities they 
 serve, including the Internet community and the protection of critical national 
 infrastructures. 
 
Research literature in information systems security governance argues for a strong 
leadership for the success of security governance program. Committed leadership is 
required to manage resources for the security program. It is necessary that senior leaders 
should be seen to be visibly engaged in the management of enterprise security program and 
champion the security cause (Julia and Westby, 2007). Also, senior executives should 
accept the responsibility of the success of their security programs. Security leadership 
should be responsible the sponsorship, strategy and return on investments metrics 
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(McCarthy and Campbell, 2001). Tudor (2000) emphasizes the importance of executive 
sponsorship in developing security infrastructure for better governance. Leadership in 
terms of guidance and executive level presentations is a key objective for security 
governance (Eloff and Eloff, 2005; ISO 17799, 2005). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) propose 
leadership and governance as a primary objective for a comprehensive security 
management program both at strategic and operational levels.  
Maximize Group Cohesiveness (M11)  
Group cohesiveness, as a security governance objective, informally creates a favorable 
environment for the actual use of the security controls. As the data suggests, group 
behavior can greatly influence and shape individual perception about security controls. 
Norms of security behavior influences cohesive groups better and more profoundly than 
groups with disagreements. As mentioned by a help desk staff at a state agency: 
 I think the biggest influence to individual and group behavior towards IS 
 governance is  peer pressure. On always look around to see if everyone else is 
 following or not following the controls. 
 
Also, with cohesive groups, an individual gets few opportunities of feeling left out and be 
disgruntled. Our data suggests that it is important to have cohesive groups which perceive 
security governance initiatives positively. Enhancing group cohesiveness can be achieved 
through acquiring and maintaining a motivated and competent workforce, thus maximizing 
personnel contributions to security. Acknowledging the impact of peer pressure in group 
behavior, security governance should comprise of active measures to enhance team spirit 
through sound personnel management practices.  
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Managers should pro actively initiate measures to enhance group cohesiveness. As our data 
suggests, some of these measures could be: encouraging the tendency to share the work 
and credit for good work, respecting personal integrity and values, restricting personal 
competition within the group, discouraging favoritism and self interest in groups and 
understanding when the group‘s behavior changes due to peer pressure. Even though an 
objective such as ―enhance group cohesiveness‖ does not give tangible benefits in the short 
run, it is nonetheless essential for the well being of the security governance measures in the 
long term.  Director of Integrated Systems Security department at a state agency observed:  
 A person‘s ability to give credit where credit is due; appreciation to others for 
 their work, not taking undue individual credit for group work is important for the 
 group to work together.  
 
In information systems research, the importance of group solidarity has not been 
emphasized specifically for security or governance related works. Eloff and Eloff (2005), 
in their security governance model, describe ―developing teams‖ as an objective for 
governance. This component describes employee‘s responsibilities towards security and 
aims at creating an improved control culture. But organizational behavior and social 
psychology research have long argued for encouraging the formation of cohesive groups 
within organizations (Lepine and Dyne, 2001) for meeting business objectives. It is 
important to have teams and groups that can carry out governance responsibilities to meet 
security objectives. Well planned security initiatives need even better planned execution by 
responsible members. Much of the work in organization is completed through teams. 
Success of a team is a function of team member‘s talents and available resources, but also 
depends on how such team members interact to get the work done (Marks et al., 2001).  
  114 
People derive part of their identity and sense of self from the work groups to which they 
belong (Hogg and Terry, 2000). This is significant in terms of security management, as 
even minor deviations from the expected role could be catastrophic. From security 
governance perspective, it is important to understand how group membership based self 
definition produces behavior which is in sync with the group (Hogg and Terry, 2000). 
Such strongly motivated security groups can shape security perception and behavior and 
influence the culture of the organization positively for better security management. After 
all, organizations rely on employee initiatives in order to perform effectively (Hogg and 
Terry, 2000) and security governance is no exception.  
Maximize Management Commitment (M12)  
Our data suggests that ―maximize management commitment‖ objective for security 
governance initiatives can actually decide the fate of the controls instituted. Management 
needs to actively participate in the entire control development-implementation-monitoring 
process from end to end in order to establish effective controls as a ―top priority‖. As 
mentioned by a senior auditor from the health insurance sector;  
 Security governance needs to be driven from the very top of the organization to 
 down. Unless it‘s starts at the top, it is difficult to enforce it at a lower level. 
 They [management] set the tone for the entire organization. If the people know that 
 the executives are continually violating the policies, they will think that policy is 
 not important. Executives should be self aware in the compliance era, since they are 
 the driving force behind the security initiatives. 
 
Managing security governance efforts requires setting of priorities for resources invested in 
controls. Also, management needs to reward conformity with controls, develop an 
environment that facilitates control adoption, provide recognition for good control 
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behavior, instill good values about controls and ensure that it is accessible at all times. As 
observed by information security manager in an educational institute:  
 There should be positive reinforcement for doing the right thing and doing things 
 right; and there should be negative consequences for failure to do so. 
 
It is wise to assess the damage to the organization and to individuals from lack of the 
controls. Management should proactively encourage values such as dedication, 
determination, open mindedness and truthfulness for a secure environment. Providing 
appropriate attention to all stakeholders in the organization and instilling the desire to meet 
the expectations from the controls is important for long term success of the governance 
program. As a respondent from internal audit division at a Bank said:  
 With respect to oversight, planning, and performance, security is treated in the 
 same fashion as any other business requirement. Security is considered a cost of 
 doing business, not a discretionary or negotiable budget-line item that needs to 
 be regularly defended. Business units and staff don‘t get to decide  unilaterally how 
 much security they want. Adequate and sustained funding and allocation of security 
 resources are required as part of the operational projects and processes they 
 support. 
 
Research literature in information systems security governance calls for greater 
management participation for the success of security initiatives. Moultan and Cole (2003), 
in their security governance model, identify ―management‘s role‖ objective as an important 
dimension for the success of the security program. Management should foster a control 
environment that encourages high level of integrity and professional standards. The 
involvement of the senior management with security agenda is a key to achieving good 
security governance (Ezingeard, McFadzean and Birchall, 2005; ISO 17799, 2000). 
Information security can only be established if senior managers give it their complete 
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support and commitment (Von Solms, 2001). It is the management‘s responsibility to 
convey it‘s seriousness about governing security matters and emphasize the strategic 
benefit of the controls implemented. It is difficult to implement the appropriate plans for 
security strategy with the support of the top management (Kankanhalli et al, 2003). 
McCarthy and Campbell (2001) emphasize the importance of security and user 
management for better security governance and propose a crucial role for the management 
to ensure success.    
Maximize Resource Allocation for Controls (M13) 
In this research, ―maximize resource allocation for controls‖ has emerged as a means 
objective to maximize information systems security governance. Management needs to do 
a lot of groundwork before developing the actual controls for security. This objective 
suggests that organizations should take some proactive initiatives in order to develop 
conducive environments for effective control development, implementation and 
monitoring. Our data suggests initiatives such as allocation of resources, coordination of 
multidisciplinary functions, enhancement of measures like trust, development of an 
environment for free and politics-free environment, as being a precursor in resources 
allocation. These control initiatives act as an antecedent to creating a control friendly 
environment and aligning the business strategy with the security strategy of the 
organization.     
Security is often treated as the job of IT people and controls as part of accounting 
department domain. Resultantly, there could be potential conflict or lack of responsibility 
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between the two departments resulting in compromised systems. These tensions need to be 
resolved. As suggested by a senior auditor, retail industry: 
 Plug the gap. MIS and Accounting have to play in the same sandbox. Both 
 departments have to understand that they are trying to resolve the same issues of 
 securing information.  
 
An environment of politics and fear can undermine the seriousness of security controls. It 
is therefore important to create fear-free conditions where individuals can voice opinions 
about use and relevance of controls. One of our respondents adds: 
 Secrecy creates fear, which ultimately leads to someone making a mistake by 
 letting information out. Caution would be a better value to push because it allows 
 for openness, but not fear to occur. 
 
Research literature on information systems security governance does acknowledge the 
importance of some of the proactive initiatives as suggested by our data, but does not 
accord the same importance to all. According to von Solms (2000), trust is the most 
important issue in establishing information security governance in an IT environment. The 
fundamental question that needs to be asked is: ‗Can I trust the entities I depend 
upon?‘(DeMaio, 2002). Management and employees should have mutual trust for each 
other for implementation of controls and procedures and also to guide employees through 
changes in security behavior. Often good security plans fail due to lack of proper resources 
and guidance. It is critical for the management to ensure that adequate resources are 
allocated to support the overall enterprise information security strategy (Information 
Technology Governance Institute, 2006). For getting enough resources, the security 
department needs to make a good business case for security. As observed by a project 
manager, electronics industry:  
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 Security is a non–functional requirement. There is no place for non functional 
 requirements in system design. User groups do not talk about security, as this a so 
 called non-functional technical requirement. How do you manage it then? It 
 becomes an issue of internal policies. 
 
One of the obstacles in engaging senior executives to address information security is the 
difficulty of connecting security expenditures to profitability (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002). 
It is imperative that the business value of security expenditure be justified to the 
management. Our research indicates that expenditures in security are intricately linked to 
business continuity and hence the very existence of an enterprise.  In the review of 
literature, we did not find an explicit support for many of the security initiatives as 
suggested by our data. We believe that this is an important finding and has the potential to 
dramatically change the success of governance efforts.  
Encourage Standardization of Controls (M14)  
Our data suggests that ―Standardization of controls‖ as a security governance objective 
helps in improving and assessing the nature and impact of security controls against the 
mechanisms employed by other players in the industry. This provides avenues for 
improvement by learning from others. Benchmarking security investments and governance 
practices with industry standards provides motivations for improvement and implementing 
innovations in the existing control practices. As voiced by an internal auditor from the 
energy industry: 
 An organization should regularly compare and benchmark its security state, 
 investments, and actions with others in its market sector and community of 
 practice. 
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It is prudent to compare the state of controls with standards across the industry and, in the 
process, standardize the control development process within the organization. Our data 
suggests that it is helpful to refer to the prevalent industry models and frameworks for 
control formulation as it provides a baseline to start with. As a project manager from a 
Bank responded: 
 Security is integrated into enterprise functions and processes. These include risk 
 management, human  resources (hiring, firing), audit/compliance, disaster 
 recovery, business continuity, asset management, change control, and IT 
 operations. Security is actively considered as part of new project initiation and 
 ongoing project management and during all phases of any system-development life 
 cycle (applications and operations). Security controls should be standardized to 
 be able to fit into the other processes  seamlessly. 
 
Research literature in security governance is in favor of standardizing the controls. 
Standardization is a process of alignment and entails stabilization and closure in definition 
and boundaries of the standard (Hanseth et al., 2006). Some of the potential benefits of 
standardization are that management‘s performance can be judged by how well the 
organization performs in terms of internationally accepted information systems security 
governance practices. (Eloff and von Solms, 2000) This ensures that management has 
covered all security bases (von Solms, 2000). Eloff and von Solms (2000) suggest system 
evaluation with process certification as an effective way of managing security. The authors 
argue that such an approach manages security from a holistic perspective of process and 
procedural domains. Standardizing the controls over a period of time will help the 
organization compare its practices with potential business partners. It also increases the 
trust and confidence of the external stakeholders. However, standardization has its pitfalls 
too. Such standards can only be viewed as baseline reference frameworks and might not be 
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adequate enough (von Solms, 2000) for all the contextual security needs of the 
organization. The variety of standards and their interrelations as well as the socio technical 
nature of the standards makes it difficult to achieve standardization (Hanseth et al., 2006). 
In conclusion, standardization of controls can be helpful if performed for repetitive and 
operational tasks. The task environment for routine business processes is less uncertain and 
the management aims at adhering to the same routine to gain efficiency. Standardization of 
controls for such tasks not only provides opportunities to improve it through 
benchmarking, but also gives opportunities to gain in productivity owing to these 
processes. We have argued against using standards ―as it is‖ for overall security 
governance. Strategic processes and controls should not be standardized as it takes away 
the unique advantage of the organization and decelerates innovation.   
Maximize Training and Education (M15) 
Educating and training employees about the usefulness of control requirements ensures 
that users are aware of the controls, the risks and responsibilities involved in implementing 
the controls. Our data suggests that controls training programs could illustrate the 
relevance of controls with work related examples. Training with work related examples 
would be useful in understanding the depth and reach of the controls. Also, increasing 
awareness of social engineering issues is required. Education can be provided through 
regular training sessions about the need and usage of the controls. As shared by one of our 
respondents: 
 Applying knowledge in daily practice is important. I think the training should be 
 implemented in such a way that you not only develop the principles of security or 
 privacy but also let them know its common usages and where they should be used  
  121 
 
Our data suggests that regular training and education is good but should be assessed 
frequently for its impact on the trained personnel. Training should be enforced and the 
results from such efforts should be measurable in some way. As opined by a project 
manager from retail industry: 
 How do you integrate your security and your development? If you have very 
 standard mechanisms, then you can  go for training. Hardly anybody goes for it. I 
 haven‘t seen people going for security training, as it is not  required. Interestingly. 
 I do not think there is any additional cost to be incurred because the infrastructure 
 is readily available. 
 
Information systems security governance literature has long emphasized training and 
education as major components of security governance program. Lack of security control 
awareness is a major obstacle for effective information systems security governance 
(Johnson, 2006). Proper training and education helps in adopting a more congenial mindset 
and behavior towards security. Management should take measures towards increasing the 
awareness of the intent and scope of the controls. Education about controls is required for 
all levels of employees (Banks, 2004). Awareness about security issues and controls has 
many benefits in the long term. Some of the major benefits include (Johnson, 2006): 
increased customer confidence, better protection of confidentiality, increased reliability 
and correctness, fewer internal errors, early detection of security incidents, improved 
employee morale and improved compliance with laws. Organizational responsibility for 
controls varies from the top of the organization to the bottom. In a holistic approach, the 
organization has an unavoidable responsibility to educate all levels and functions in 
controls fundamentals (Banks, 2004).  
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Whitman (2003) suggests that employee security education, training and awareness 
program should be designed early on in the process of an information security strategy. 
This helps in increasing awareness of computer security problems and controls amongst 
employees‘ right from the very beginning. According to Warman (1992, p. 308), ―It is 
essential for the success of any computer security policy that staff at all levels fully 
understand and implement the necessary procedures.‖  
Newsletters can also improve employee awareness by publicizing new and previously 
unknown hazards. This also encourages employees to remain alert for up-to-date 
information and perhaps unidentified threats (Whitman, 2003). Consequently, education, 
training and awareness programs will create an organizational culture that will enhance, 
rather than compromise, security (Dutta and McCrohan, 2002). Understanding the 
perceptions of an organization‘s Board members with reference to risks and market 
expectations is another key to improving Information Security Governance (Ezingeard et 
al, 2003). 
Ensure ethical and moral values (M16) 
Ethical environment is essential for information security governance mechanisms to work 
effectively. Our data suggests that ethical and moral values tend to shape individual‘s 
perception about the importance of security control mechanisms and these perceptions lead 
to secure or un- secure behavior of the employees. It is important that the morality of the 
staff is encouraged and shaped towards respecting and conforming to the controls 
requirements. As explained by the systems manager, credit card services industry: 
  123 
 Be aware of the morality of your staff. Allow them small things and don‘t wait for 
 things like notices or bureaucracy. 
 
Individuals often associate self pride with their jobs and this should be encouraged by the 
management. Self pride in the job actually shapes the work ethics in an organization which 
would ultimately help the controls culture in a positive way. As mentioned by an internal 
auditor, electronics industry: 
 I would say that personal ethical and moral codes have a big role to play in 
 security governance. Its very clear that people who are not honest or ethical, are not 
 going to uphold codes which they think are useless and unnecessary. 
 
Ethical environments where the strong moral values are communicated by the leaders of 
the organization tend to create a positive outlook about security governance and also a 
normative pressure on employees around to behave in a certain way.  
Research literature in information systems security supports is appreciative of the role of 
ethics and moral values in shaping a positive security governance environment. Even 
though technical and formal means of security controls are important, these can only 
protect the data in the system. The contexts in which data is interpreted and used by 
employees keep changing and require broader normative controls to ensure that controls do 
work (Backhouse and Dhillon, 1995). Ethics and moral behavior is one of those controls. 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) argue that clear work ethics should be defined in work 
security environment as the types of data crucial to business are constantly changing. 
Policies, ethical and moral behavior should be communicated widely and clearly since this 
helps in formalizing the normative structures in an organization.   
Maximize Trust building Mechanisms (M17) 
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Our data suggests that good security governance practices should be able to build trust 
relationships with stakeholders within and outside the organization. Given the nature of the 
job description in security work, it is crucial to win the trust of employees in order to 
ensure things run smoothly even in the absence of close supervision. One of the 
respondents, systems administrator and insurance industry spoke in this vein:  
 We all must be capable of trusting everyone in the organization that comes into 
 contact with our shared assets.  
 
An environment of ―lack of trust‖ and group politics, delineates people from the 
organizational objectives and a culture of ―self before organization‖ creeps in.  
As shared by a respondent, director IT services, state agency: 
  
 Politics, favoritism, and self-interest typically trump values and may undermine 
 the security of  information systems. 
 
Organizations should consciously try to maximize trust building mechanisms by ensuring 
clarity, transparency and accountability in actions. The role of the management goes a long 
way in shaping the trust building exercises. Management should work towards reducing 
the fears of the employees about unknown turn of events. This can be communicated 
through effective policies about sequence of events in case of deviation from the normal 
routine.  
Research literature in information systems security suggests the importance of trust in 
effective security governance environment. Tsiakis and Sthephanides (2005) suggest that 
lack of interpersonal trust create ideal circumstances for a security threat. Trust and 
trustworthiness are fundamental for every security solution. The needs for trust elements 
and tools that are used to implement it, affect the security mechanism of any commercial 
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system. Ratnasingham (1999) suggests that role of trust is an essential element for long 
term ED1 trading partner relationships. The study suggests that trust leads to high 
performance via better trading relationships. In another study on trust and security 
measures, application interface was found to be important in terms of security. Trust needs 
to be established with outsider about the interface integrity and data protection via it 
(Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne, 2003). Trust refers to defining the appropriate levels of 
norms and patterns of behavior that all members of an organization should be expected to 
implement (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000). Trust is important for information security 
governance as sensitive data is often handled in the absence of close supervision.  
In summary, the list of seventeen means objectives for information security governance is 
presented in the table 4.2 below. Under each objective, the corresponding sub objectives 
are shown.  In summary, all the objectives developed in phase one of this study, are 
grounded in research literature.   
Table 4.2 Means objectives for information security governance  
 
 Objectives Sub-Objectives 
M1 Ensure Efficacy of Audit 
Processes 
 
Develop audit practices for changing contexts of governance task 
Develop audit process to integrate the information rules 
Develop cross checking mechanisms for audit function 
Ensure adequate access to auditors across the organization  
Establish difference between audit functionality and actions  
Treat internal auditors as consultants to ensure effectiveness of 
controls  
M2 Maximize  clarity in business 
processes  
Avoid improper business processes  
Establish clarity in business processes  
Understand the business processes 
Increase awareness of business activities and processes 
M3 Ensure Communication about 
Controls  
 
Communicate importance of controls 
Communicate the consequences of non compliance of controls  
Communicate the nature and scope of controls  
Communicate the consequences of internal controls breaches  
Encourage communication amongst employees about control 
issues 
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Encourage debate amongst employees about control issues 
Encourage efficient communication policy within the organization  
Explain the purpose of controls  
Explain the rationale behind controls  
Explain the reasons behind organizational actions  
Explain the risks and values of controls to users 
Ensure damage assessment for individuals from lack of controls  
Ensure damage assessment to the organization from lack of 
controls  
Encourage discussion amongst employees about control issues 
Ensure responsiveness for media hyped issues 
M4 Ensure Alignment of 
Individual and 
Organizational Values 
 
Align personal and organizational values  
Align security control objectives with enterprise objectives 
Respect other people‘s confidence 
Respect other people‘s personal information   
Respect the rights of others  
Ensure employee satisfaction  
Ensure honor of the employees  
Protect self image of the individuals  
Change attitude of executives about security controls  
Understand people‘s attitudes and beliefs about controls   
Develop a result oriented attitude  
Develop people oriented controls 
Encourage determination about following controls   
Encourage dedication to the company 
Encourage individuals to improve controls  
Ensure that people see value in controls  
Ensure good values about security governance  
M5 Ensure data criticality  
 
Establish control structure to reflect sensitivity in data  
Assess the criticality of data integrity  
Assess the sensitivity of the information  
Define responsibilities according to level of confidentiality of 
information 
Identify data owners for sensitive data   
Link data owners with authorizations  
Ensure ownership of information 
Ensure adequate technical controls   
Develop identity management control 
Ensure confidentiality  
M6 Ensure punitive structures Set deterrence criteria to be followed    
Ensure action against unethical behavior    
Ensure disciplinary action against unethical behavior  
Ensure protection against disgruntled employees  
Ensure that action is taken against law breakers 
Establish clear consequences for not complying with laws   
Establish clear punishments for rule breakers  
Respect company‘s rules  
Encourage discipline in the organization  
Explain the disciplinary actions clearly   
Explain the consequences of failure to comply with regulations   
Explain the meaning of criminal action to the employees 
Create a fear of punishment in organizations  
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Create counter measures to deal with destructive actions  
Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators  
Ensure environment of conformity that affects individual behavior  
M7 Ensure clarity in control 
development process 
 
Define multiple layers of controls 
Develop achievable objectives  
Develop controls as a part of the change initiative  
Develop controls for all the levels in the organization 
Develop simple and easy to use controls  
Discourage complex controls 
Ensure that control usage is simple. 
Ensure risks assessment to develop controls  
Structure the information needs  
Ensure that controls are easy to use 
Encourage flexibility in controls  
Ensure timeliness in controls  
M8  Ensure formal controls 
assessment functionality  
 
Institute controls as part of organizational design 
Discourage planning about control implementation as ―after 
thought‖  
Establish controls department  
Centralize the control functionality  
Develop security governance as a functional requirement  
Explain prioritization of tasks and actions for controls to members 
Establish the relation between controls and IT architecture 
Ensure IT architecture review for correctness of design 
Develop dynamic internal control structures 
Balance between gains and losses from the controls  
Balance centralization-decentralizations 
Balance convenience with usability 
Increase understanding of stakeholder viewpoints 
Ensure individual care to all stakeholders   
Protect company assets  
Avoid bureaucratic delays 
M9  Maximize monitoring and 
feedback channels  
 
Ensure adequate review of programs  
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls  
Ensure periodic review of controls from external auditors  
Incorporate feedbacks from people on daily basis 
Institute feedback channels for security governance 
Review controls with respect to organizational objectives  
Review the controls regularly for proper functioning  
Ensure the veracity of claims    
Institute corrective measures for continuous monitoring    
Encourage informal feedback from people about controls  
M10  Ensure visible executive 
leadership 
 
Encourage the management to ―walk the talk‖  
Encourage top management to lead by example  
Ensure respect for security leaders 
Ensure that key individuals enforce rules and remedial solutions   
Nurture relationships with employees  
Provide strong leadership  
Place committed IT personnel to be in visible positions  
Encourage control conscious attitude of supervisors 
Create an environment of leadership style and culture to minimize 
intergroup rivalry   
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M11 Maximize  Group 
Cohesiveness  
 
Encourage sharing the credit for good work  
Encourage the ability to share work 
Understand the group behavior driven by peer pressure  
Discourage favoritism in groups  
Discourage self interest in groups  
Encourage internal competition to stay within groups  
Encourage collaboration with peers 
Understand the influence of peer pressure on individual behavior  
M12 Maximize management 
commitment   
 
Ensure efficacy of controls through the management  
Ensure management commitment to controls 
Provide rewards for conformity with policies 
Discourage employee agitation 
Discourage impeding people from their job 
Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules  
Discourage providing all rights to an individual  
Discourage secrecy amongst employees  
Establish positive reinforcement for doing the right thing 
Ensure availability of the management  
Accord priority to the controls from the management  
Ensure that truth is told  
Encourage open mindedness to provide inputs. 
Reward good performance  
Provide recognition for complying with policies 
M13  Maximize  resource 
allocation for controls  
 
Establish suitable environmental and physical controls  
Ensure adequate resources allocation for maintenance of controls   
Discourage individuals from feeling restrained due to resources  
Provide resources for compliance 
Encourage co-ordination between MIS and accounting for 
controls 
Establish controls proactively 
M14 Encourage Standardization of 
Controls 
 
Benchmark security governance investments against industry 
standards    
Benchmark security governance practices with industry standards 
Compare the state of controls with standards across the industry  
Establish standardization in the control process  
Refer to industry models and frameworks for control formulation 
Create systemization in the control development process 
Differentiate between lines of business. 
Differentiate between types of industry  
M15 Maximize Training and 
Education  
 
Define training programs to reflect details of internal controls 
Discuss the relevance of controls adequately 
Educate users regularly   
Encourage education about internal controls  
Ensure training with examples 
Illustrate with specific work related examples 
Ensure learning about internal control issues 
Increase awareness of breaches because of social engineering 
M16 Ensure ethical and moral 
values 
 
Encourage acceptable and respectable actions  
Encourage honesty  
Encourage access to individuals with strong moral values  
Ensure strong moral values in auditors 
Encourage personal integrity 
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Encourage self pride in the job 
Understand the morality of the staff 
Respect personal integrity in a group 
Instill good principles into employees  
M17 Maximize  trust building 
mechanisms  
 
Encourage trust building mechanisms for controls  
Establish trust in the organization  
Enhance an environment of trust in the organization 
Discourage an environment of fear 
Discourage an environment of mistrust  
Discourage politics in the organization  
Encourage free expression  
 
4.4. Discussions 
The first phase of this research proposed seventeen means and six fundamental value based 
objectives for information systems security governance. The objectives presented in the 
previous section have all emerged from our data. The means and fundamental objectives 
developed in this research have implications for information systems security governance 
research and practice. These contributions have been classified into three categories and 
each category is individually discussed below.  
4.4.1 Relevance of the proposed objectives 
The ISG objectives proposed in this research is not a stand alone effort but built on the 
cumulative knowledge in this area, above and beyond. Each objective proposed in this 
research is substantiated by the research literature. Some key lessons can be drawn from 
each objective. Table 4.3 presents the fundamental objectives proposed in this research 
with the research support and key lessons. On similar lines, table 4.4 presents the means 
objectives with research support and key lessons for practice.  
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Table 4.3 Summary of Fundamental Objectives 
 
 Objective Literature Support Key Lessons 
F1 Ensure Corporate 
Controls Strategy   
Gregor et al. (2004);  
Peppard, 2001;  Peppard 
and Ward, 2004;  Alves et 
al, 2006; ITGI, 2006;  Da 
Veiga and Eloff, 2007;   
Control strategy aligns the security 
governance and business objectives  
 
Antecedent to complete security and 
process integrity 
 
Provides the departments with control plans 
F2 Encourage a 
Controls- Conscious 
Culture 
Julia and Westby, 2007;  Da 
Veiga and Eloff, 2007);  
Dutta and McCrohan, 2002 
Risk consciousness in employees creates a 
―prevention mentality‖  
 
Helps in minimizing intergroup rivalry over 
security governance  initiatives 
 
Creates environment where individuals 
―watch out‖ for each other 
F3 Establish Clarity in 
Policies and 
Procedures 
Ward and Smith, 2002; 
COBIT, 2007; COSO, 2005;  
Von Solms, 1996; Straub 
and Nance, 1990;  Moultan 
and Cole, 2003;  Cockcroft, 
2002; Straub and Welke, 
1998; Eloff and Eloff ; 
2005;  Tudor, 2000;  
McCarthy and Campbell, 
2001 
Ensure the proper use of the applications 
and technological solutions instituted 
 
Make policies easily accessible  
 
Reflect control requirements in the policies 
 
Develop  visibility of fair policies 
 
F4 Maximize 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007; 
Tudor, 2000; Eloff and 
Eloff, 2005; von Solms, 
2006; Moultan and Cole, 
2003; Dhillon and 
Torkzedeh (2006) 
Meet legal, regulatory and contractual 
obligations 
 
Use compliance as a driver to develop 
security governance initiatives 
F5 Ensure Continuous 
Improvements in 
controls   
Booker (2006); 
COBIT(2007); COSO, 
2000; Eloff and Eloff 
(2005); Rees et al. (2003) 
Continuous and iterative control assessment 
improves the controls environment  
Understand the organizational context of 
particular controls 
 
Change in roles should be reflected in 
subsequent controls  
F6 Enable 
Responsibility and 
Accountability in 
Roles  
Pironti, 2006; Drummond, 
2003; GISP security 
principles; Dhillon, 2001 
Provide clarity in roles and ownership of 
decisions 
 
Promote transparency  in roles and avoid 
sudden changes in responsibility structures 
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Table 4.4 Summary of Means Objectives 
 Objective Literature Support Key Lessons 
M1 Ensure Efficacy of 
Audit Processes 
IIA, 2006;  Drummond, 
2003;  Banks, 2004;  
Wagner, 2000;  Trc`ek, 
2003; 
Have frequent internal and external audits 
Treat auditors as consultants to assess 
management‘s adequacy  
M2 Maximize Clarity in 
Business Processes 
Alves et al, 2006;  Dutta 
and McCrohan, 2002;  
Moulton and Cole, 2003;  
Banks (2004) 
Efficiently designed mature business 
processes are better protected 
Provide end-to-end view of business 
process and manage changes  
M3 Ensure 
Communication 
about Controls  
GISP, 2006; Leach 2003; 
CobiT, 2007, COSO, 2005 
Have frequent debates about controls 
Develop communications policy for 
constructive communication within and 
outside functional groups 
M4 Ensure Alignment of 
Individual and 
Organizational 
Values 
Leach (2003); Jones and 
George, 1998; Baskerville 
and Siponen, 2002; 
Warman, 1992; Angell, 
1996; Dhillon and 
Torkzedeh (2006) 
Promote values such as respect for others, 
privacy, integrity, self-pride in job and 
honesty 
Involve users in the development process  
to understand individual‘s attitudes and 
beliefs about security 
M5 Ensure Data 
Criticality 
Volino, 2004;  Finne, 
1996; Sherwood, 1996; 
Ward and Smith, 2002, 
ISO 17799, 2006;  Sandhu 
and Samarati, 1994; 
Booker, 2006 
Assess and classify data according to 
sensitivity 
Identify data owners to assign 
responsibilities according to information 
criticality  
Link data with authorizations for  
secure and reliable IT infrastructure 
M6 Ensure Punitive 
Structures  
Dhillon and Torkzadeh 
2006;  Straub, 1990; Straub 
and Nance, 1990; 
Establish clear consequences and 
disciplinary actions against non 
compliance with policies 
 
Explain the meanings of criminal actions 
and respond effectively in cases on non 
compliance   
M7 Ensure Clarity in 
Control Development 
Process 
CobiT, 2007;  NIST 800-
53-2, 2007; COSO, 2006 
Develop a favorable perception and 
transparency of the controls  
 
Develop simple, flexible, timely and easy 
to use controls 
M8 Ensure Formal 
Control Assessment 
Functionality  
Ryana and Ryanb, 2006;  
Dhillon and Moores, 2001;  
Melling, 1994;  Amer and 
Hamilton, 2008;  
Flowerday and von Solms, 
2005 
Develop formal entity for control 
assessment  
 
Differentiate between lines of business and 
industries before applying popular ISG 
frameworks  
  
Stakeholder‘s viewpoints needs to be 
reflected in the governance process 
 
Perform periodic cost benefit analysis and 
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IT architecture review for correctness of 
design for the security controls 
M9 Maximize 
Monitoring and 
Feedback Channels 
Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007;  
CobiT (2007);  COSO, 
2006;  Tudor, 2000;  
Dhillon and Mishra, 2006;  
Rees et al, 2003;  
Kolokotronis et al, 2002 
Helps in achieving the performance 
standards set for the IT processes 
 
Assures ―what is being claimed‖ is 
accomplished 
 
Incorporate the feedback into the controls  
M10 Ensure Visible 
Executive Leadership 
Julia and Westby, 2007; 
McCarthy and Campbell, 
2001, Tudor, 2000; Eloff 
and Eloff, 2005; ISO 
17799, 2005; Da Veiga and 
Eloff (2007) 
Fundamentally helps in improving the 
perception of security governance 
 
Lead by example  and nurture the 
relationships with employees executive   
M11 Maximize Group 
Cohesiveness  
Lepine and Dyne, 2001;  
Marks et al., 2001;  Hogg 
and Terry, 2000;  Kanter et 
al., 1992; Eloff and Eloff, 
2005 
Group behavior influences and shapes 
individual‘ perception about security 
controls 
 
Discourage favoritism and self interest in 
groups and manage peer pressure  
M12 Maximize  
Management 
Commitment   
Moultan and Cole, 2003;  
Ezingeard et al, 2005; ISO 
17799, 2000;  Von Solms, 
2001;  Kankanhalli et al, 
2003;  McCarthy and 
Campbell, 2001 
Reward for conformity with controls and  
encourage values such as dedication, 
determination, open mindedness and 
truthfulness 
 
Establish effective controls as a ―top 
priority‖ 
M13 Maximize Resource 
Allocation for 
controls  
von Solms (2000), ITGI, 
2006; Dutta and 
McCrohan, 2002 
Groundwork before developing controls 
requires coordination of multidisciplinary 
functions 
 
Allocate appropriate resources in politics 
free environment  
M14 Encourage 
Standardization of 
Controls 
 
Hanseth et al., 2006;  Eloff 
and von Solms, 2000;  von 
Solms, 2000) 
Create systemization in control 
development process and assess against 
mechanisms employed by others 
 
Benchmark security investments and 
governance practices to learn from others 
M15 Maximize Training 
and Education  
 
Johnson, 2006;  Banks, 
2004;  Whitman, 2003;  
Warman, 1992;  Dutta and 
McCrohan, 2002;  
Ezingeard et al, 2003 
Awareness about social engineering issues 
can be provided with work related 
examples 
 
Apply the knowledge in daily practice  
with focused training and education   
M16 Ensure ethical and 
moral values 
 
Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2000 
Propagate right ethical environment  
 
Leadership establishes  the right tone of 
ethics in organizations  
M17 Maximize  trust Ratnasingham, 1999; Develop a conducive environment for 
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building mechanisms  
 
Johnston, Eloff and 
Labuschagne, 2003; 
Dhillon and Backhouse, 
2000; Tsiakis and 
Sthephanides,2005 
controls deployment  
Enhance trust with partners within and 
outside the organization 
 
4.4.2 Empirically grounded value based objectives 
This research is presents a set of theoretically and empirically grounded information 
systems security governance objectives. A critical review of the extant literature for 
information systems security governance research suggests a lack of theoretically grounded 
information systems security governance framework. The popular security management 
standards such as COBIT, COSO, ITIL and ISO/IEC 27002 that are commonly used in 
practice are not without drawbacks. In the available models, there is neither any theoretical 
basis of the proposed objectives nor any of the frameworks proposed are grounded in data. 
The above mentioned models are atheoreical, anecdotal, generic and lack grounding in 
organizational context. Also, the above mentioned models are difficult to operationalize 
and implement because these frameworks need to be interpreted and bounded depending 
on the nature of the organization. As deliberated by a senior audit director at a fortune 500 
financial services organization: 
 COBIT is a pretty big model and very generic. It teaches you to think about 
 what you have to think about.  Look at COBIT and try to follow COBIT; you 
 may need a lot of interpretation, it is going to be a long process. Companies have 
 separate COBIT implementation project. It will help us greatly to look at that 
 framework. You go to seminars to understand how it works, COBIT is way too 
 much. 
 
This research suggests 23 security governance objectives that are organizationally 
grounded in the context of controls. This study used ―value theory‖ as a theoretical basis to 
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develop value based security governance objectives. The theory emphasizes the 
importance of values in human decision making and eventually behavior (Catton, 1954). 
The methodology used is a value focused approach which has been used in information 
systems research before (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Keeney, 1999; Sheng et al, 2001, 
Drevin et al, 2007) but not in the context of information systems security governance. This 
is an important contribution to information systems security research and a stepping stone 
to take the work forward in this area. In information systems security governance 
literature, there is a lack of guidance on ―how to develop security governance objectives?‖ 
In available security governance frameworks, not much light has been shed on how the 
suggested objectives were developed. This research suggests a value focused approach in 
developing decision objectives for information security governance.   
4.4.3 Emergent nature of security governance objectives 
There have been calls in the research literature about participative approach to security 
governance (Warman, 1992).  In this ―bottom up‖ approach, individual values are 
considered in developing governance objectives as it facilitates alignment of individual and 
organizational values. But none of the existing security governance models suggest 
objectives that reflect the values of the stakeholders. This research proposes value based 
security governance objectives. The process of developing a multi objective decision 
model using value focused approach has certain other benefits in addition to the direct 
benefit of creating better alternatives. Some of it‘s far reaching benefits include improving 
communications between stakeholder groups and providing systematic and transparent 
approach that often leads to uncovering hidden objectives (Merrick and Garcia , 2005). 
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Value focused thinking has been applied in many fields such as healthcare, waste 
management, transportation, port traffic management public health risk management 
(Merrick and Garcia , 2005; Keeney, 1992; Parnell et al, 2001).  
Values are general standards or principles that are considered as intrinsically desirable ends 
(Jones and George, 1998). Considering that technological usage is influenced by the values 
and goals imposed by the executive culture (Schein, 1996), it is important to explain and 
reflect on the values of stakeholders for security purposes. People prioritize between 
various options and make a decision based on the relative importance of the values, which 
are their guiding principles (Rokeach, 1973). Value systems of individuals determines 
which type of behavior, events, situations or people are desirable or undesirable.  
Butler (1991) argues that when people view something as desirable, their internal values 
strive to uphold the standard in behavior. For example an individual whose value system 
emphasizes loyalty and honesty will strive to achieve the same loyalty and honesty in work 
and personal life (Jones and George, 1998). Agreeing with the above researchers, we 
believe that values become all the more important in security governance context as the 
risk from circumventing controls can be catastrophic, a case in point being demise of the 
Barings Bank (Drummond, 2003).  
In the context of security, organizations have to learn about new emerging threats and find 
means to deal with the threats proactively. As we know, organizational learning is the 
process of assimilating new knowledge into the organization's knowledge base 
(Abouzakhar and Manson, 2002). Organizational learning begins at the individual level. 
New individual knowledge is incorporated into organizational knowledge only when it is 
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shared and is assimilated into organizational routines, documents, and practices (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Incorporating the values of stakeholders into the governance 
objectives is important as beliefs and value systems may be used as mechanisms for 
strategic change (Marginson, 2002). As shared by a respondent:  
 More and more businesses and government talk a lot about these personal values 
 and train folks to understand the definition of the terms. What organizations fail to 
 do is actively promote these same values by rewarding positive behavior and 
 punishing unethical behavior [chief security officer, state agency]. 
 
This research provides a template for information systems security governance objectives 
that are rooted in the values of the stakeholders and provides an outlet for the opinion of 
individuals.   
4.4.4 Synthesized information security governance objectives 
The information security governance objectives presented in this research are grounded in 
literature and none of the objectives have been proposed for the first time. The above 
discussion on the proposed ISG objectives begs the question. ―So what makes these 
objectives unique?‖ Research literature has presented much information security 
governance objectives in the past (see chapter 2). In practice, there are some leading 
frameworks such as COBIT, COSO and ISO/IEC 27002 which suggest ISG objectives 
based on experience and best practices across industries. But these frameworks for ISG do 
not suggest a comprehensive set of objectives that encapsulate all the dimensions of 
organizational governance in a single framework. For example, COBIT, COSO 
predominantly have formal socio-organizational orientation where the role of formal 
management is emphasized over the other aspects of security governance. Similarly, ISO/ 
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IEC 27002 and ITIL have a technical orientation to security governance where formal, 
socio, ethical and moral dimensions are overlooked or under emphasized. We believe that 
these objectives are unique on several accounts. Their uniqueness lies in: 
First, this research presents a synthesized set of ISG objectives which touches upon 
technical, formal, informal, moral and ethical dimensions of security governance, leading 
to a comprehensive internal controls program. While all our objectives have been generally 
recognized in literature (see table 4.3 and 4.4), they have not been presented cohesively as 
a synthesized ISG framework. This is a unique framework for ISG which incorporates 
several aspects of security governance into one platform thus allowing the development of 
a comprehensive security management program when implemented.  
Second, the sub-objectives presented under each ISG objective clearly articulate the cross 
functional nature and multi dimensionality of the proposed objectives. Even though 
objectives by definition are generic in nature, the sub-objectives under the objectives so 
suggest specific directions for operationalizing a particular objective and putting it into 
practice. These objectives are more directive or prescriptive in nature. When implemented 
through appropriate tasks and activities, these would help in achieving the overall 
objective. Many ISG models in the research literature lack these powerful sub-objectives 
(see discussion on ITIL, COSO, Ward and Smith 2002, Booker 2006 in chapter 2) which 
facilitate the use and adoption of the objective.   
Third, some of the objectives developed in this research have not been emphasized enough 
in ISG literature but potentially can play a crucial role in security management. Objectives 
such as ―establish corporate control strategy‖, ―establish punitive structure‖, ―establish 
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clear control development process‖, ―ensure formal control assessment functionality‖, and 
―maximize group cohesiveness‖ have been hardly designated as important for ISG in 
research literature. Thus the comprehensive nature of the proposed objectives provides a 
unique ISG framework for organizations.    
4.5 Conclusion 
Managing information systems security requires a holistic approach encompassing 
technical, organizational and behavioral aspects of security. The proposed information 
systems security governance objectives address risks to information assets from 
technology, processes and personnel perspectives in all facets of information asset 
environment. As Segev et al. (1998) note, the way towards security ―lies not with 
technology, but with the organization itself‖. Effective information systems security 
governance calls for internal controls objectives that are grounded in organizational 
context and based on the values of the stakeholders in the organization. A common set of 
principles underlie all levels of an organization for any activity or objectives and is 
important to establish effective control (Galloway, 1994). In this chapter we have 
developed a set of security governance principles or objectives that guides the overall 
security program. The goal of this chapter was to present the data and the results of phase 
one of our study. In the beginning, a description of Keeney‘s three step methodology and 
the way it is used in this study was presented. The 17 means and 6 fundamental objectives 
which emerged using value focused approach are presented. All the objectives are 
grounded in the extant literature in the subsequent section. Having grounded the 
objectives, an overall discussion on findings and contributions of this framework is 
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presented. This phase of the research has produced theoretically and empirically grounded 
information systems security governance objectives. But the objectives developed have not 
been validated in an organizational setting to understand their relevance in real life. The 
validation of the developed objectives is addressed in the next chapter. A case study was 
conducted in the second phase of the research with two goals: reexamine the objectives in 
an organizational setting and interpret the relationships between various objectives to 
overall maximize security governance in organizations. The description of the case study 
site is presented along with the interpretations of the usefulness of the objectives in the 
particular setting.   
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CHAPTER 5 Reexamining information security governance objectives at CCIT  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of the case study that was conducted to reexamine the 
proposed control objectives of the previous phase of the research. An in-depth case study 
was done to understand the nature and significance of the developed governance objectives 
in an organizational context.  The case study site was the information technology (IT) 
department of a major City Council (hereafter referred to as CCIT) in south east of United 
States of America.  CCIT was chosen for the case study for two reasons. First, the 
organization is undergoing changes in its information security governance practices and is 
in the process of establishing new objectives, policies and controls for security. This 
seemed like a perfect fit for our purpose of examining the relevance of the proposed 
objectives in an organizational setting. Second, the management at CCIT was open to the 
idea of embracing changes in their ongoing security governance initiatives, based on the 
third party assessment of the state of affairs. A copy of this report would be shared with the 
organization.   
This chapter has four goals. First, to establish if the objectives developed in phase one of 
the study is meaningful and relevant. Second, to examine how well the means and 
fundamental objectives help in explaining information security governance practices at 
CCIT. Third, to improve both the fundamental and means objectives in light of the case 
study at CCIT. Fourth, to comment on the security governance practices at CCIT, given 
our understanding of the proposed governance objectives. Each of these goals is achieved 
in the subsequent sections described below. The rest of this chapter is organized as 
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follows. The subsequent section presents an analysis of case situation in the light of the 
proposed objectives. The pertinent discussion about how CCIT is achieving each objective 
provides insights into the importance and relevance of the dimension of ISG vis a vis each 
one of these objective represented. The following section presents a synthesized 
understanding of how the objectives are relevant to CCIT. After establishing the relevance 
of the objectives, a discussion section is presented. The section shows how the objectives 
from phase 1 were refined and improved during the case study. It also documents the 
emergent issues at CCIT. Finally a conclusion section presents a summary of the case 
study and establishes the need for the subsequent chapter.  
5.2 Context of the case study: CCIT 
The City council (CC) is a state agency responsible for the administration of the city. The 
organizational goal is to work with customers to align business and technology objectives.  
A set of guiding values have been explicitly stated in the mission statement of the 
organization. Managing information security governance is identified as a strategic area of 
improvement by the agency. Security architecture at CCIT is focused in five areas: 
applications, authentication, networking & infrastructure, physical and process. The 
management emphasizes that improving security controls will drive efficiency and 
effectiveness across the city. 
CCIT helps its citizens to receive more from the state government in terms of state of the 
art facilities enhanced by a strong information technology network. It also supports 
publicly accessible computers for free use by the citizens.  The state uses an innovative 
technology planning process, which is driven by business needs of the state and aligned 
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with the city‘s business initiatives. The organization‘s CIO has implemented a new 
approach to create business technology plans. The strategic plan of the organization is to 
establish the common framework and processes that delivers IT services for each agency 
and establishes an enterprise view. The intent of such planning is to establish more 
enterprise level targets and evolve from agency focused goals. The benefits from such an 
approach are manifold. An enterprise approach by the agency reduces the costs of 
maintenance and helps manage enterprise level risks. Building common services leverages 
the resources and establishes effective partnerships between CCIT and other agencies.  
The organizational structure includes the CIO as the head of the agency. There are 5 
managers who directly report to the CIO. The applications development manager is 
responsible for all the in-house development work. End user services manager is in charge 
of operations and support facilities. The infrastructure services manager is responsible for 
enterprise systems and database administrators. The manager in charge of administration is 
responsible for training and administrative support functionalities. The newly added 
project management manager looks after the software development projects in the 
organization. The organization overall has more than 100 employees at the time the case 
study was conducted, with several positions open for recruitment, as well as some 
consultants. The organizational chart is enclosed in figure 5.1   
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Figure 5.1 The organizational chart at CCIT 
The technology planning process is tightly integrated and requires investment of resources 
from agencies and CCIT. Being the service IT provider for the entire state, CCIT has the 
additional responsibility of keeping the data and services protected. It is mandatory for the 
organization to keep its procedures auditable so that public scrutiny is plausible. The 
organization, having the ownership of IT services, acts as a service provider to all the other 
agencies supported by the state. To provide good infrastructure, the organization 
approaches every agency individually and assesses the agency‘s information needs and 
current state of technology utilization. The organization targets improvements based on 
specific needs of different agencies. These improvements are based on joint maps created 
with the IT organization and the agency.   
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The City Council is central to the information technology (IT) changes within the city. As 
IT evolves, it provides more and more ways to improve service delivery and operational 
efficiencies, providing valuable information for decision making and leadership purposes. 
CCIT plays an important role in the process of transformation of the ways in which 
business is conducted. The organization plays a strategic role in the way business is 
conducted in the city. The CIO of CCIT has initiated several task forces to implement 
changes to manage the IT architecture. The IT infrastructure is based on city‘s business 
needs and not on the latest technology trends.  
5.3 How is strategic planning for information security governance being undertaken 
at CCIT?  
The previous chapter proposed six fundamental and seventeen means objectives for 
maximizing information security governance. In order to understand the relevance, each of 
the objectives is reexamined separately in the context of CCIT. The objectives are used to 
explain the situation at CCIT, the measures taken by the organization to meet the objective 
and their impact on the overall security governance at CCIT.  
5.3.1 Regulatory compliance at CCIT  
This section discusses how regulatory compliance is perceived at CCIT and what is being 
done to accomplish it. Regulatory compliance, as a part of information systems security 
governance program, ensures that all the legal and mandatory requirements about security 
and internal controls are met in the organization. This objective entails formalizing the 
process of compliance in the organization and promotes development of controls in 
accordance with the legislations. Ensuring regulatory compliance is a fundamental 
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objective for information systems security governance. It suggests following the 
regulations in their entirety and using the legislations as a catalyst for the improvement of 
security governance.  
CCIT as a state agency does not come under the purview of Sarbanes-Oxley act yet. But 
the agency has HIPPA and e-discovery as its main regulations to comply with. The agency 
has compliance audit, both from internal as well as external auditors.  The culture in the 
organization is such that transparency about processes and availability of information are 
considered of paramount importance. The CIO is aware of people‘s right to ask for 
different types of information about the agency and use of taxpayers dollars in the 
operations. In accordance with state laws, most of the information about the agencies‘ 
current and future plans is accessible through the website. The common perception about 
the regulations and the compliance efforts in the organization is that of a ―necessary evil‖. 
The middle level managers and the line staff consider compliance as the ―right thing‖ to do 
but not necessarily helpful. This is understandable given the mammoth preparations 
required for compliance. Compliance with laws such as SOX is costly (Bennett & Cancilla, 
2005). It needs managerial as well as technical support to create an infrastructure in 
organizations to meet the demands of this law. Some of the technical areas that need 
special concern for compliance purposes are: data management issues (Volonino et. al., 
2004; Farris, 2004, Yugay and Klimchenko, 2004), security of data and system, choice of 
software development methodologies that could incorporate the compliance issues in its 
lifecycle, strong documentation for external auditing purposes, versioning and auditibility 
of electronic record needs and file systems in use (Peterson and Burns, 2005). 
  146 
The internal IT audit director for the agency considers the regulations as something that are 
very helpful in providing a momentum to security and internal controls operations in their 
organization. This view is supported in the research literature as well. Myler and 
Broadbent (2006) argue that evaluation of compliance with the policies and procedures in 
an organization and regular follow up of the recommendations are important. The 
evaluation process helps in estimating the effectiveness and possible shortcomings of the 
controls process. Delineating audit controls and tools to determine areas for improvement 
(Myler and Broadbent, 2006) is what the IT audit director for the City believes in.  
The chief agency head did not have a favorable opinion about the regulations though. As 
applications development manager commented: 
 In my personal opinion compliance is reactive not proactive. You look at SOX. 
 Enron collapsed and so many people were ruined or hurt and then SOX came. So 
 compliance is a vehicle, the way compliance operates today, I don‘t think that 
 an organization should say ok…we rely on compliance as a mechanism for 
 developing our internal controls. If you do that you are going to be in bad shape. 
 
This is an indication of the control consciousness and direction of the organization. The 
chief security officer is skeptical about the use of the regulations in developing actual 
controls. As he mentioned: 
 SOX and HIPPA and other kind of things are to help protect data. But these are 
 guidelines and they really don‘t mean anything by themselves because they don‘t 
 come down and tell you specifically what you are supposed to do. 
 
Internal controls are considered as something so serious that the organization should begin 
with these. At least this is what was apparent from our interviews. The general perception 
of the management about compliance is that it drives the security governance efforts 
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backwards. The regulations legislate something that should already have been a part of the 
governance program in the first place. This perception is consistent with the majority of 
research in this area. One of the biggest managerial issues that regulations imply is for IT 
governance purposes (Fox, 2004). Effective IT governance would require the management 
to plan for preparedness for quarterly reporting, security policies, cost management for 
compliance and preparation for external audit. These measures need planning and effective 
internal control assessment (Chin and Mishra, 2006). The management believes that the 
preparedness should be there to begin with and not inserted as an after thought while 
preparing to pass compliance.  
Another interesting perspective about regulatory compliance came into light. Compliance 
acts as a huge driver in getting all the resources that are required for the agency. The 
security officer shared how in name of compliance, they order software, get management‘s 
attention and other required resources. The responsibility of the regulatory compliance 
efforts for the city does not lie with the agency. This explains a lot of discontentment with 
the use of regulations in the organization. Officials at CCIT just comply with the requests 
of auditors and supply all the paperwork required.  The organization plays a passive role in 
the City‘s compliance plan.  
Overall, it did appear to us that regulatory compliance is important for the agency. Since, 
the prime responsibility of being compliant did not lie with this agency; managers in the 
organization were candid about it. CCIT used compliance as a means to get things from the 
City which they would never get otherwise. Also, the organization is in the process of 
developing new policies and controls. It remains to be seen that how these new controls are 
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implemented and assessed. To sum up, compliance is important to CCIT but not in the 
right spirit of the legislations. A summary of regulatory compliance at CCIT is presented in 
the table 5.1 below.  
Table 5.1 Regulatory compliance at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
“SOX and HIPPA and other kind of things are to 
help protect those data but these are guidelines and 
they  really don‘t mean anything by themselves 
because they don‘t come down and tell you 
specifically what you are supposed to do‖  
 
 Compliant with several 
legislations for state as well 
as federal 
 Internal audit department 
guides through the process 
 Develop controls 
proactively that easily meet 
compliance requirements 
 
5.3.2 Ensuring continuous improvements in controls at CCIT  
 
This section explains how continuous improvement in controls is achieved at CCIT. 
Instituting continuous improvements in controls implementation process has been 
identified as a fundamental objective for maximizing information security governance. The 
control implementation process should be iterative, continuous and adaptive in nature. The 
controls need to be changed over time and this should be reflected in the implementation 
process. Also, the importance of managing the changes in the controls is highlighted 
through continuous improvements. Effective implementation of controls calls for putting 
the right controls in right place at the right time and this can only be achieved through 
flexible implementation practices.    
At CCIT, the management identifies the need for a constant reevaluation of controls under 
changing business conditions. Constant revalidation of the controls is very important for 
CCIT. As the Chief Security Officer shared:  
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 You have to keep up with it…It‘s not what you are getting over with…you have to 
 constantly keep up with it…we do have some machines and software that are 
 from over 10 years old…but you have to keep up with it….what else can we 
 do..we need constant  reevaluation as controls implementation is an evolving 
 process. 
 
This Chief Information Officer at the firm has a similar vision of regularly testing and 
updating the control structure. The importance of controls is appreciated in the 
organization and majority of the employees understand the need for a structure in place to 
accomplish the constant evaluation of the controls. The organization provides training and 
education to the security staff about the changing needs of controls and policies. The 
security officers are encouraged to attend conferences and seminars in the relevant area to 
keep abreast with the upcoming trends and technologies in security area. As one of the 
security officer said:  
 I am a firm believer that you can put whatever you want in place but if the end 
 user doesn‘t own it up, it is not going to work. I have been in seminars where I 
 dealt with fortune 500 companies, people who are making billions of dollars a 
 year as revenue and they still have the same problem. You know those guys 
 have everything, they have done every thing but it [control implementation] 
 needs to be a constantly evolving process. They have to learn and then 
 reeducate because things change.  
 
It was apparent from our observations at CCIT that the management understands the 
importance of the controls implementation process and maneuvers ways for everyone in 
the city council to be on board with it. There were frequent meetings and seminars about 
security controls and discussions on how controls should be used to overcome common 
security breaches. We felt a clear disconnect in the attitude of the managers and the 
operational people, about continuous changes in controls. The knowledge about the 
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benefits from revalidation of controls is concentrated more on the management side than 
on the operational side of the organization. The line staff and the non security people did 
not have much of an opinion on this issue. The non security folks considered control 
implementation as a technical requirement for the organization and clearly distanced 
themselves from the domain. The perception in the non security staff, working in 
development or other IT related areas, is that control implementation is primarily the work 
of security staff. The majority of operational people believe that the security staff should 
be responsible for the success or failure of the controls.  
The situation at CCIT is not unique and the reasons for such responses from line staff is 
documented in research literature. The non security staffs at operational level, do not 
understand the significance of the security controls and governance for overall success of 
the organization. The enabling value of security controls has to be clearly articulated. 
Benefits of security governance should be linked with business objectives so that the 
stakeholders see the positive impact of security on attaining profits, productivity and 
growth. Security governance can help in avoiding negligence and enhance strategic 
business goals hence acting as motivator for top management (Wright, 2007). Research on 
the conditions which are conducive to information security problems clearly shows that 
where there are inconsistencies, there will be security problems such as errors, frauds, 
privacy and violations (Wood, 2006). It is important to ensure that security controls and 
security management practices of the organization are regularly reviewed. Such reviews 
could lead to finding mis-configurations in the systems and identify areas where security 
protection is such that a single failure could lead to large exposures (Wilson, 2005). The 
  151 
changes introduced should not be radical and introduced with caution. An effort to 
implement technical and physical information security controls without considering the 
culture in the organization could have disastrous consequences (Thomson and von Solms, 
2006). A summary of how continuous improvements in controls are being done at CCIT is 
presented in table 5.2 below.   
Table 5.2 Continuous improvement in controls at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure continuous 
improvements in 
controls  
“We need constant reevaluation as controls 
implementation is a always an evolving process‖ 
 
―I have been in seminars where I dealt with fortune 
500 companies, people who are making billions of 
dollars a year as revenue and they still have the same 
problem. You know those guys have everything, they 
have done every thing but it [control 
implementation] needs to be a constantly evolving 
process. They have to learn and then reeducate 
because things change‖ 
 Constant reevaluation is 
done 
 Considered an iterative 
process 
 Attend seminars and 
conferences and learn about 
implementation practices 
form others 
 Involve people across 
discipline and other agencies 
under city,  to help in 
implementation 
 
5.3.3 Responsibility and accountability structures at CCIT 
In this section we discuss how CCIT assigns responsibility and accountability for security 
governance? Responsibility and accountability structures ensure that roles are defined in a 
way that appropriate responsibilities are shared and stakeholders are held accountable for 
their actions. This is identified as a fundamental objective for information systems security 
governance. The objective prescribes that job descriptions should be not changed abruptly, 
clear organizational responsibility for compliance should be defined, individuals should be 
made responsible for appropriate accesses and transparency about the accountability 
should be encouraged.   
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The management at CCIT completely identifies with the criticality of having clear 
responsibility and accountability structure for information systems security governance. 
The Chief Information Officer said:  
 If you are talking about the outcome of the controls, then to me, its management. 
 The idea of having a documented hierarchy especially around data is a must. If you 
 think about it; we publish corporate organizational charts all the time. We  should 
 have a controls organizational chart which says, okay, if you are at this level, this is 
 what you get [controls]. 
 
The CIO believes in the concept of having a ―controls chart‖ which is similar to the 
organization chart. The controls chart clearly defines the responsibilities for the members 
regarding security controls. The controls chart is like adding control responsibilities to the 
organization chart. It helps in documenting the requirements for a role in owning up the 
responsibility of controls. As we go up in the controls chart and the roles become more 
crucial for security governance, the individual higher up should have more controls and 
accountability associated with their work. Research in security governance suggests that 
increased awareness and individual accountability can greatly affect how security practices 
are implemented in an organization (Mellor and Noyes, 2006).  
The concept of a controls chart, as suggested by the CIO, is that as one moves further 
move up in the chart, the individual has more power in the organization. People higher up 
in hierarchy have greater accessibility to sensitive data and have greater probability of 
creating vulnerability in the system. Mellor and Noyes (2006) found that adding personal 
accountability into the roles helps the cause of security governance. The concept of 
controls chart is not implemented yet at CCIT, but would definitely be helpful for security 
governance purposes. As explained by the CIO, it is important to understand what is it that 
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we want to protect from a management point of view. If there is clarity in responsibilities 
and roles, better controls can be associated with the position and the individuals. For 
example, if the human resource people have high level of access to crucial personal 
identifiable data of personnel in the organization, there should be stringent controls for 
people in this department. As suggested by the CIO, such managers should be audited for 
their access pattern on a quarterly basis just to ensure that the managers are doing what 
they are supposed to do and security is not being compromised. Given the nature of the 
sensitive information that human resources people have access to, it makes sense to have 
better protection and accountability for such people. Research literature suggests that top 
management should be proactive about responsibility assignment to roles. Myler and 
Broadbent (2006) argue that corporate boards that undertake the challenge of plugging IT 
oversights show that they understand the scope of their corporate accountability and 
responsibility, and are proactive in their leadership duties.  If organizations do not ensure 
that all employees understand their information security roles and responsibilities, it may 
become difficult to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
assets (NIST Special Publication 800-16, 1998).  
CCIT has access to crucial data about the taxpayers in the City. The department has access 
to DMV data, readings for gas, water and electricity consumption, property details and tax 
details about the residents. One of the duties of the department is to ensure that the meter 
reading for the household utilities is performed correctly as and when required. This 
operation, if not performed correctly, could present serious threat to integrity of the data 
recorded. As mentioned by the end user services manager: 
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 I think the accountability piece is required. How do they control, say even a meter 
 reading application? How do we insure that every meter gets read every morning? 
 You have meters that haven‘t been read and there has been no consumption on that 
 meter for over a year and the service is still on, then there is a problem. So put 
 controls and make someone accountable, that‘s how you guarantee that every meter 
 is being read and the consumption of gas and water is recorded.  
 
 Reading utilities meter requires that there is appropriate segregation of duties defined in 
the organization else the security of the data could be compromised. It is essential to 
separate developers who make the application from people who actually read the meters 
and record the consumption by providing logical access to the groups. Else, it is possible 
for the developer to enter the application and change the readings for themselves or friends 
or whoever they deem appropriate. 
At CCIT, management is concerned about assigning appropriate responsibilities and 
accountability to users of the systems. But it seemed that there is a lack of clarity of roles 
and responsibilities on many fronts. For example, when discussing the regulatory 
compliance issues in the organization, there seems to be confusion about who in the city 
council was actually responsible for the meeting compliance deadlines. People at CCIT 
meet auditors‘ request for submitting required documents. No one is sure as to who is 
finally responsible for putting everything together for compliance. A summary of how 
responsibility and accountability is being ensured at CCIT is presented in table 5.3 below.   
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Table 5.3 Responsibility and accountability in structures at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish 
Responsibility and 
Accountability 
Structures 
―The idea of having a documented hierarchy 
especially around data is a must. If you think about 
it; we publish corporate organizational charts all the 
time‖ 
 
―So I think accountability piece is required. How do 
they control, say even a meter reading application? 
How do we insure that every meter gets read every 
morning? You have meters that haven‘t been read 
and there has been no consumption on that meter for 
over a year and the service is still on, than there is a problem. So put controls and make someone accountable, that‘s how you guarantee that  every meter is being read and the consumption of gas and water is recorded‖ 
 clear segregation of roles 
 developing a controls chart 
with clear control 
responsibility and 
accountability  
 encourages ownership of 
information 
 
 
5.3.4 Corporate control strategy at CCIT 
This section examines how the corporate controls strategy is accomplished at CCIT. 
Controls could be a part of the bigger corporate strategy and security governance should be 
incorporated as subset of bigger picture of corporate strategy. This objective suggests 
establishing a corporate risks management plan and developing controls guidelines using 
consensus. Clearly controls should be viewed as a cost of doing business and developing 
control plans for every department. Security controls should be a non-negotiable budget 
item and adequate planning for the governance initiatives should be ensured. A control 
strategy establishes security governance as an antecedent to complete security and process 
integrity.     
The management at CCIT believes that long term strategic planning is required to establish 
a security governance program in the organization. They need to have a clear vision about 
the security governance and each department should actually have its own controls plan 
and an enterprise level risk assessment plan. An information security risk assessment is the 
staged process by which an organization‘s information assets are valued. Here, the 
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vulnerabilities and threats are identified so that they then guide the implementation and 
monitoring of control strategies and measures (Whitman and Mattord, 2005).  
At CCIT, there is a lack of agreement between stakeholders on what controls should be put 
and how should the controls be deployed and monitored. This disagreement is a direct 
result of a fundamental lack of planning and understanding about what are the assets and 
what is that actually needs to be controlled. A controls strategy can actually provide a 
broad vision for the organization in this regard. As shared by security manager: 
 People should try to at first establish and see what the controls are. That‘s  reflected 
 in your requirements to some degree. People need to know what they want to 
 control. You have to know what you want to control and the problem is that 
 you don‘t know what you want to control. 
 
The basic process of controls development approach needs long term planning and 
undying commitment on part of the management. The upper management seriously feels 
the need for a strategic planning approach for the security governance program in the 
organization. As shared by the infrastructure manager: 
 I think that the design has to be around not necessarily verifying every single 
 account but identifying what is the exception. What are the things that are  causing 
 the organization pain today? Where is security lacking? Where is money lacking? 
 Where are people lacking? Where is time lacking? Why are the services not being 
 delivered according to what we agreed with the customers? So you need to
 strategize about this stuff [controls design]. 
 
The CIO believes that if a strategy about controls needs to be established such that all 
pieces of governance program comes together.  As explained by the CIO; 
 You need to plan ahead and have strategy about controls and its success. You need 
 to figure out how am I going to be proactive rather than letting a reactive 
 compliance approach drive my internal controls that we use. 
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Our observations at CCIT suggest that a ―bottom up‖ approach of developing security 
governance objectives would not work in this organization. The operational level 
management does not have a holistic picture about the role of controls in achieving overall 
organizational objectives. The strategic inputs about security governance should flow from 
the top management to the entire organization. Research literature is supportive of this role 
of the top management in control strategy formulation. Governance objectives cannot be 
decided from a bottom up approach. The lack of a control strategy would cause the, 
controls to be laid without risks analysis and policies. This could provide expensive and 
detrimental. With a top-down approach to management, a more appropriate strategy in the 
shape of long-term policies, efficient procedures and technical safeguards could be 
developed (May, 2005).  
There are certain issues that do need strategic interventions for the betterment of security 
governance at CCIT. For example, there is a serious lack of planning about protecting the 
human assets in case of an emergency such as fire or flood. Without a sound strategy, 
efforts will be wasted. Therefore, a structured methodology for developing a strategy will 
increase the likelihood of success of the corporate initiatives (Shupe and Behling, 2006). 
We believe this is a serious strategy issue where the management at CCIT and at the City 
at large should think about: what is our strategy about protecting employees and 
equipments in case of emergency? The management at CCIT seems distressed about the 
fact that the City does not consider this issue important enough to discuss at high level 
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meetings. The state of affairs at CCIT does substantiate our call for a controls strategy 
which could plan about things such as this at corporate level. 
Research literature in this area suggests that effective information security risk 
management processes should ensure that information assets are protected through 
selection and implementation of most effective control strategies (HB231, 2004).  There is 
a growing awareness of the need for such a strategy (Shedden et al, 2006). Information 
security should be integrated into an organization‘s overall management plan (Lane, 1985, 
Smith, 1989). Firms have to integrate the IT strategies with organizational strategies to 
attain business objectives (Lainhart IV, 2001). In case of CCIT, the management could 
have an oversight committee that sets an appropriate strategy for IT governance endeavors 
(Myler and Broadbent, 2006) especially about the security events. A summary of the 
control strategy initiatives at CCIT is provided in table 5.4 below.  
Table 5.4 Controls strategy at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure 
Corporate 
Control 
Strategy   
―People should try to at first establish and see what the 
controls are. That‘s some degree reflected in your 
requirements. People need to know what they want to 
control. You have to know what you want to control and 
the problem is that you don‘t know what you want to 
control.‖ 
―You need to plan ahead and have strategy about controls 
and its success. You need to figure out how am I going to 
be proactive rather than letting a reactive compliance 
approach drive my internal controls that we use.‖ 
 Provide more resources 
 Enhance trust   
  Proactive controls 
approach versus reactive 
approach  
 Corporate level 
planning for security 
governance in advance 
 
 
5.3.5 A Control conscious culture at CCIT 
In this section we discuss how CCIT nurtures a controls conscious culture in the 
organization. A control culture ensures an environment where individuals ‗watch out‘ for 
each other. This fundamental objective emphasizes the importance of a control culture that 
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creates and sustains connections among various security efforts such as polices, processes 
and norms. A ―prevention mentality‖ promoted by the control culture of the organization, 
helps in minimizing the friction between groups over security issues. It is important to 
establish standard codes of conduct for the employees in carrying out their security 
responsibilities.       
The CIO of the organization believes in establishing a culture that needs to consider all the 
information that CCIT has and protects it as something personal for the employees. The 
CIO explained: 
 I think you need to have a clear core value; a clear company recognized or 
 accepted perspective, the role of having those controls. For example in my 
 mind I think you should treat everything, every data you handle like its your 
 information. Would you leave your wallet out in the middle of the street, on the 
 bench  when you go to get a coffee? what type of care would you take if it‘s yours? 
 That is the kind of care you need to take. 
 
Management espousing similar values as it claims should ultimately lead to the shared 
tacit assumptions of employees becoming aligned with these espoused values of the 
organization, thus progressing towards an Information Security Obedient Culture 
(Thomson and von Solms, 2008). The management realizes that it is a long and tedious 
process before a control culture is actually established. As the chief security officer 
enunciated:  
 Establishing the concept [importance of controls] takes much time and 
 commitment, to do that you want to bring that culture and it takes time and it is 
 just a matter of time and that it will come, after you  do it for long.  
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The management feels that establishing a control culture would help the policies and 
procedures in being followed properly and the management becoming more involved in 
the security governance process. The implicit knowledge of information security practices 
and procedures and the resulting behavior guides the day-to-day activities of the employees 
in the organization. As a consequence, information security practices and procedures 
should become part of the corporate culture of an organization (Thomson and von Solms, 
2008). Culture is the glue that holds together various pieces of the puzzle and is a very 
important objective to be achieved. Speaking in the context of the culture, the desktop 
support manager commented: 
 we can not have controls every where but should have control in the places where 
 we can get the most  benefit for the organization  
 
From our observations in various meetings and even informal conversation with the 
employees, we did not feel that the organization had a control culture where people treat 
the information as they would treat their own property. Maybe it is the beginning of the 
long and tedious process of establishing a control consciousness of this nature because the 
leadership at the organization did seem determined to drive the organization towards 
control culture. There is evidence in the literature that suggests that instituting an 
organizational culture for controls is challenging, but important nonetheless. The controls 
culture is crucial for security governance as it can act as a powerful, underlying set of 
forces that establishes individual and group behavior within an organization (Schein, 
1999). Ideally, a corporate culture should incorporate information security controls into the 
daily routines and implicit behavior of employees (Thomson and von Solms, 2006). If the 
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beliefs and attitudes are addressed by the management, it leads to changed actions and 
behaviors of the employees and synchronizes it with the overall corporate security culture 
in the organization (Thomson and von Solms, 2008).  
Table 5.5 Controls conscious culture at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Control 
Conscious  
Culture 
―I think you need to have a clear core value; a clear 
company recognized or accepted perspective, the role of 
having those controls. For example in mind I think you 
should treat everything, every data you handle like its 
your information. Would you leave your wallet out in 
the middle of the street, on the bench when you go to get 
a coffee? what type of care would you take if it‘s yours? 
That is the kind of care you need to take‖ 
―we can not have controls every where but should have 
control in the places where we can get the most benefit 
for the organization‖ 
 Environment where 
individuals watch out for 
each other 
 Treat customers‘ 
information as if it is your  
own information  
 
 
5.3.6 Clarity in policies and controls at CCIT 
This section discusses how the management maximizes clarity in policies and procedures 
at CCIT? Establishing clarity in policies and procedures has emerged as fundamental 
objective for information systems security governance and has received extensive attention 
from researchers in this domain. This objective entails proper utilization of applications 
and technological solutions instituted in the organization by providing concise and 
consistent guidelines regarding its use. Policies should reflect controls requirements, fair, 
visible and easily accessible to all in the organization. Clarity in policies, communicates 
management commitment to security governance.  
Policies and procedures are organizational laws that determine acceptable and 
unacceptable conduct within the context of corporate culture (Whitman and Mattord, 
2003). It is a means to communicate management‘s commitment to the security 
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governance efforts (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). CCIT has a huge emphasis on 
establishing clarity of policies and controls. The common norm is to explain the policies 
and procedures frequently so that that it makes an impression on the user and stays with 
them eventually. Usually the most common reason why employees make mistakes about 
controls in the organization is the lack of understanding as to what needs to be done. 
Research suggests that good policies can protect vulnerabilities (Lapke and Dhillon, 2008). 
Better policies lead to deterrence as policies give the employees responsibility and 
accountability in the job (Maynard and Ruighaver, 2007). The security team feels that 
people never come up and ask about policies or controls unless they are in trouble. But to 
be preventive, the management at CCIT explains the purpose and scope of the controls 
proactively before the employees get into trouble. As the chief security officer explained: 
 Make the policy and procedures clear and accessible. [Establish]  Clarity in 
 policies and controls,  transparency in procedures and gradually standardization of 
 the process, everyone knows what it could mean. What you [employee] can do 
 to help & protect yourself without making those costly mistakes, make those 
 very clear and understandable because if people don‘t understand them and they are 
 not clear, people can‘t follow them and they make excuses.  
 
The old security policies are not considered reflective of the current organizational needs; 
hence new policies are being developed. Research literature in security policy domain 
accepts the need for revisiting the policies periodically. For instance, it is becoming a huge 
problem to prevent employees wasting their time on browsing the Internet during office 
hours. Policies about personal use of computers during office hours needs to be clearly 
defined. Restricted Internet use or unlicensed software usage should be discouraged (Essex 
and Schauer, 2001). Maynard and Ruighaver (2007) maintain than besides the iterative 
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nature, security policies need quality verification periodically. This assessment needs to be 
carefully managed to ensure a balanced approach and make sure that stakeholders have 
adequate skills and training to assess quality. The management also believes that polices 
should be developed as a continuous process so that changing business needs are reflected. 
The infrastructure services manager commented: 
 It‘s [policies and procedures] documenting and its following through. The key 
 thing is documentation and  it needs to be a fluid process, it‘s not static. You 
 don‘t just do it once and throw it away, things change I mean. You had the best 
 policy and procedure during mainframe but now you move to the Unix 
 environment, that is no good.  
 
The tax payers should actually be able to access the security policies in order to have 
confidence in the city‘s security measures about protecting their data.  Also, the current 
policies have not been made easily accessible to the employees as well. This creates a 
potential rift in minds of people about the policies. As the security staff officer explained: 
 We had regulation and policies established but did people know that? Make all the 
 required things accessible to people. Our policies are so hard to find on our 
 website that I don‘t know how anyone can ever read them. This is serious. 
 
The management is developing a new set of security polices and procedures. It is planned 
that the security policies would be made accessible to all the citizens at the web site. A 
central repository of security policy and control resources would be created on the Intranet 
which would be accessible to all Agencies City wide. To establish the clarity of new 
policies, extensive educational sessions have been planned. It remains to be seen in the 
future though that how well these measures play out in establishing effective security 
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governance. A summary of how clarity of policies and procedures is being accomplished at 
CCIT is presented in table 5.6 below.  
Table 5.6 Clarity in policies and procedures at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Maximize Clarity 
in Policies and 
Procedures 
―Make the policy and procedures clear and 
accessible. [Establish]  Clarity in policies and 
controls, transparency in procedures and gradually 
standardize the process, everyone knows what it 
could mean. What you [employee] can do to help & 
protect yourself without making those costly 
mistakes, make those very clear and understandable 
because if people don‘t understand them and they are 
not clear, people can‘t follow them and they make 
excuses‖.  
 Explain the policies 
repeatedly 
 Make the policies 
accessible easily  
 Continuous iterative 
process of development 
 Constant explanation of the 
benefits  
 
 
5.3.7 How is efficacy of audit processes ensured at CCIT?  
Auditing acts as a catalyst for the management to accelerate its efforts for information 
systems security governance. This objective is quite useful especially in the context of 
change management, to ensure segregation of duties in the organization. The underlying 
sub objectives point towards use of audit process for cross checking the business activities. 
Auditors should be treated as consultants for a third party perspective about risk 
management. Audit efficacy is required to assess management‘s adequacy with dealing 
with vulnerabilities.  
The role of auditing in improving the effectiveness of security controls is well understood 
and communicated at CCIT. The top management emphasizes the importance of auditing 
culture in the organization and claims that it should be undertaken frequently and on 
demand. Research literature suggests various reasons for having frequent audits such as 
estimation of organizational preparedness, identification of vulnerable areas, benchmarking 
against standards and practices, and compliance with legislation (Goel et al., 2006). Audit 
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trails can be designed to help in intrusion detection. Real time auditing can also help in 
detecting other problems in the system other than break downs. Swanson (1996) argues 
that auditing helps in creating individual accountability, reconstruction of events, intrusion 
detection and problem identification. Audit provides traceability of user action and chain 
of evidence can be reconstructed to actually understand when and how the system broke 
down (Goel et al., 2006). The need for frequent internal audits was felt all across the 
organization and not just the security group. The HR manager said:    
 You got to have some body audit behind them [employees]. You got to have 
 separation of duty and segregation of duty. Cross training is great, if works. 
 How do I control who should do what if I m not going to watch it? 
 
The administrative manager at CCIT believes in cross training her team members for a 
variety of roles such that the work does not stop in an individual‘s absence. But the 
auditors enforce segregation of duties so that no vulnerabilities are created in the processes 
because of interchange of the roles. Thus the auditing functionality helps in ensuring 
appropriate role design at CCIT.  
The perceived role of auditing at CCIT is to provide assurance about the quality of controls 
that are in place and effective. The management believes that auditing ―gives them a 
meaning for doing things‖. Even though the medium of business transactions have changed 
from paper format to electronic data, the traditional wisdom accrued from auditing and 
accounting standards is still valid.  As commented by one of the managers: 
 I think auditing provides quality assurance which is very important. If you don‘t 
 have audit you have no compliance. Right now, you have to audit because all 
 the process are not automated, you can‘t expect control at every single process. I 
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 think 60% of all processes here don‘t have any electronic support or 
 computers at all. People do the work, so we have the audit. 
 
The general perception in the organization is that audit helps in establishing and enforcing 
punitive structures. It is a means to ensure that people keep doing what they are supposed 
to do or else they would be penalized during auditing phase. Also, auditing is increasingly 
being viewed and accepted as a requirement for regulatory compliance preparations (Fox, 
2004).  Frequent audits help people in perform their jobs within accepted boundaries and 
ensure that organization is geared up for compliance purposes. As explained by the 
infrastructure services manager:  
 They [auditors] make people honest. If you know someone is watching and will 
 look at what you are doing, you know it makes a difference. Even if you don‘t 
 look, 90% of the time just the threat that you are going to be looked at, you 
 don‘t know when, makes a big difference on compliance. I would like to say 
 human nature is such. 
 
At CCIT, there is an apparent contradiction in what management believes that should be 
done and what it actually does about auditing. In theory, the management unanimously 
agrees to the importance of internal auditing functionality and its benefits for security 
governance in the organization. But in practice, there are fewer number of audits than we 
expected. One possible explanation of this contradiction could be that there is an 
underlying sentiment in the organization (as gathered from various informal discussion and 
observations) that usually in a government agency, auditing is perceived as a tool or excuse 
to ―get back‖ at someone or some department i.e., to punish them for some unrequited act. 
The under current is that if the boss is unhappy about something from an agency, that 
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agency faces the brunt by getting frequent audits. As shared by manager, ―We got to get 
over the idea that auditing is not losing control. Auditing is to keep us on top of things‖. It 
remains to be seen though that in the new security policies and controls that are under the 
way, what role would be provided to the auditor in the security governance framework. 
But as of now, CCIT gets very few internal audits and fewer security audits. A summary of 
the audit efficacy initiatives at CCIT is presented in table 5.7 below. 
Table 5.7 Audit efficacy at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure Efficacy 
of Audit 
Processes 
I think that if I took over, if I became the CIO, I would 
be looking at every one of my team members and I 
would tell them to prepare for an audit. I would bring 
an auditor here and each one of my team will get 
audited. That would give me a base line as a new boss 
to work on, I can only improve. If it got any worse my 
job should be gone that‘s what I would do. 
Management should be responsible for what‘s going 
on. Economy improves if the government works. 
 Management believes in 
frequent audits 
 Use audit as a deterrence 
tool 
 Used to provide quality 
assurance  
 Helps in keeping on top of 
things 
 Audit on demand 
 
 
5.3.8 Communications about controls at CCIT 
This section describes how the management communicates about controls at CCIT. 
Communication about controls is important to articulate the vision of the management 
about security and establish a constructive debate about the usefulness of such activities. It 
pays to clearly establish the intent and the scope of the controls and this can be achieved 
through open and constructive communications. Frequent discussions, not only within the 
security and control groups, but also with other functions in the organization, establishes a 
clear baseline of expectations from the employees and prevents unintentional breaches.  
The management at CCIT is serious about communication with the employees regarding 
controls. The CIO has an informal meeting on every second Friday with the employees 
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where the pertinent issues about security and controls are discussed, employee feedback is 
taken and agreement on future course of development is reached. The chief security officer 
adheres to the following principle about communicating with employees: 
 Make things very clear to the employees, these are our policies, these are our 
 procedures and controls and  these are our expectations. It is essential to 
 communicate this. 
The management has a preventive mentality and clearly wants to protect people from 
creating vulnerabilities in the system. The accepted point of view is to communicate the 
controls in a clear and concise way so that people understand the expectations. 
Consciousness-developing communications helps employees to identify with the 
organization and the work that they do in groups. The security officer explained: 
 The best time to do that [communicate] is during orientation, a sound 
 understanding of what is expected from you [employee] and how things happen. I 
 prefer accent on the positive rather than on negative thing. It doesn‘t mean 
 that consequences shouldn‘t be mentioned but I think rather than emphasizing that 
 part let‘s emphasize procedures and the prevention because that‘s what you 
 really want. You don‘t really want to punish people for mistakes who have done 
 something wrong. You want to prevent somebody from the beginning. 
 
The emphasis on communications about controls stood out clearly, in our observations, 
through the actions of the management at CCIT (see table 5.8). Research literature in 
information security governance emphasizes the role of communication in the success of 
governance program.  Fuller et al (2007) suggest that there exists a positive relationship 
between interactivity and knowledge retention about information assurance in an 
organization. The interactivity is best facilitated by open communications. Communication 
activities with stakeholders are critical for controls (AS/NZS 4360, 1999). A good way to 
achieve communications is through the standardization of controls. At CCIT, in the 
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process of the development of new security policies and controls, the management held 
meetings with employees‘ representing other non security expertise areas, and took their 
feedback on what were the most important issues for the security of the organization and 
the city. A list of priorities was decided based on the feedback from this meeting. The 
management proceeded with requisite actions in the direction agreed upon in the meeting. 
Thus management at CCIT is open about communications and feels that it pays to 
communicate, even when the payoff is not apparent immediately. The HR manager 
observed;    
 They [employees] like to know the reason, why? They like to hear things. People 
 may not communicate to us but people like to be communicated to, it may  not go 
 both ways all the time but in my experience I found that people like to be told 
 
Even though the communication culture seems strong within the organization, there is a 
lack of communication between the organization and other agencies under the City about 
the security policies and the controls. Organizations clearly communicate values and 
visions such that employees can internalize it and make sure that it is synchronized with 
their own (Wright, 2007). But this is not true for the directors working for the different 
agencies at the City. The fate of the newly developed security policies depends on the 
committee that comprises directors from other agencies under the City. It requires a lot of 
communication between these directors and CCIT to actually establish what policies the 
City needs and should be signed and made official. Evidences from research warn about 
such situations in organizations. Poor communication is itself a security risk (Wright, 
2007). It allows security policies to be misinterpreted, security messages to be 
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misunderstood, and ignorance about real security threats is cultivated. Communication is 
essential for a proper security governance program. But there is lack of communications 
partly because of the group dynamics within the City council. It is to be seen in the future 
how this communication gap would be addressed by the CIO of the organization in order 
to facilitate the efficacy of the policies.  
Table 5.8 Communications at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Encourage 
Communication 
about Controls  
―Typically in our case, we would draft a policy, edit 
it and go to city.  Managers and other directors from 
other agencies need to work on this but there is no 
communication among them.  So there is no 
feedback. If there are thing that you don‘t agree with, 
tell us, we need to get there input. They need to be 
treated differently, they are different departments‖.  
 
 Meetings with employees 
every second Friday 
 Communicate with people 
even when they communicate 
back 
 Prevention is better than 
creating vulnerability hence 
communicate to protect the 
people  
 
5.3.9 Data criticality at CCIT   
This section explains how data criticality is achieved at CCIT. Establishing data criticality 
has emerged as an important objective for maximizing information systems security 
governance in an organization. Establishing data criticality entails assessment and 
classification of data according to sensitivity, identification of data owners and assignment 
of responsibilities according to information criticality. Maintaining the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the data is not only required for securing business processes 
but also needed for regulatory compliance purposes. Linking data with authorizations helps 
in creating secure and reliable IT infrastructure. This is one of the most prevalent security 
governance objective, both in research as well as in organizations.  
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The core business for CCIT is IT service delivery to other agencies under the City. Since 
CCIT forms and supports the backbone of the IT infrastructure for the City, it is imperative 
that the organization ensures protection of critical data and make it available to all. The 
chief information security officer explained: 
 We do have data that is crucial. We may have health data, we may have social 
 security numbers and the names and dates and all of those things. Also 
 employee details that we need to keep private as well. We interact with other 
 state agencies and there is other information.  We have access to DMV that 
 means  details of basically any body who owns a car, so lot of data. We must ensure 
 that data doesn‘t go anywhere where it shouldn‘t be, so from that point this 
 is what we are going for. All of the IT security controls are  really all about the 
 data. 
 
Maintaining the criticality of data is absolutely essential as CCIT acts as the custodian of 
all sensitive information about the City. Being the centralized IT service provider to the 
entire City, CCIT prides itself on providing a technically superior state of the art service 
centre with 24/7 hotline and helpdesk services. A compelling need for data security at 
CCIT is materialized through stringent access control and authorization mechanisms. 
Research literature suggests the importance of establishing data criticality through security 
governance mechanisms (Finne, 1996; Sherwood, 1996; Ward and Smith, 2002). Security 
controls are important as assurance hinges upon the integrity of the critical underlying IS 
change and configuration management processes (Hinde, 2006). At a higher level, even 
security strategy is incomplete without planning for measures to safeguard data integrity 
(Tickle, 2006). A control strategy about data criticality provides users with confidence in 
the integrity of data and the end result is trust in the IT infrastructure, really valuable in 
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today‘s business world (Tickle, 2006). The management is appreciative of strict controls 
for access data. As mentioned by desktop support technology officer: 
 I think that what you would have to do is that you force the system to make them 
 [employees] doing things. If a person doesn‘t change his password, in thirty 
 days, he gets locked out the system. Don‘t allow them to fool around. 
The management at CCIT feels that developing controls for proper access of data requires 
adequate segregation of duties. Separation of development, test and operational facilities 
helps in reducing risks of unauthorized actions (Myler and Broadbent, 2006).  The director 
for internal audit asserted that it is critical that people on the development side of the 
environment, ones who write the actual codes for the applications, do not have access to 
the production environment and that each and every change in the production environment 
is documented and logged properly for audit ability purposes.  As explained by the chief 
internal auditor for the City; 
 Security controls are revolving around data, the ability to keep integrity of the 
 data. It [controls] revolves around internal and external access of the data. In 
 processing all sorts of access there you want to make sure  that all the access is 
 limited to the data somehow there is need to for a segregation of the production 
 data and that is accomplished in many-many ways. 
 
The security team also checks the external access devices for security purposes. The 
security team feels that even if there is a modem which is not very prevalent, let loose on 
the network somewhere, it could become a threat. It is crucial that only authorized people 
get access to authorized sites which include databases and other parts of the network. To 
ensure that the access rules are designed properly, frequent audit is encouraged. This helps 
in tracking the vulnerabilities in the systems and taking action about the weak points. As 
mentioned by the Chief Internal Auditor: 
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 There are several tests that a security auditor would perform such as penetration 
 test where the auditor  would try and acts like a hacker and try to break into the 
 network. If the auditor is successful he will  uncover various vulnerabilities of the 
 system and the network. The security people have to figure out how to deal 
 with these vulnerabilities without opening additional vulnerabilities. Thus quality 
 of network improves to the point that it becomes really good. 
The management believes in good access control polices and even better authorization 
mechanisms. At CCIT, access is defined for the users depending on the sensitivity of the 
data. It is important to ensure that the person who has the appropriate access is the person 
accessing the data. The management emphasizes strong authorization mechanism, which 
tells us how important data criticality is to the management. Many managers feel that 
security governance is all about managing risks through right access to right people at right 
time and making sure that those very right people are getting the access through right 
authorizations. A summary of how data criticality is achieved at CCIT is presented in table 
5.9 below. 
Table 5.9 Data criticality at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Data 
Criticality 
―We do have data that is so crucial. We may have 
health data, we may have social security numbers 
and the names and dates and all of those things. Also employee details that we need to keep private as well. We interact with other state agencies and there is other information.  We have access to DMV that means details of basically any body owns a car, so lot of data. We must ensure that data doesn‘t go anywhere where it shouldn‘t be, so from that point this is what we are going for. All of 
the IT security controls are really all about the data‖  
 
 ensures confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of 
data to all 
 Provides a technically 
superior state of the art service 
centre with 24/7 hotline and 
helpdesk services. 
 Segregation of duties 
 Stringent access control 
policies 
 Strict authorization 
mechanisms 
 Strict password policies  
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5.3.10 Clear controls development process at CCIT 
This section discusses how clarity in controls development process is established at CCIT. 
Clear control development process creates a positive perception about the controls and 
ensures transparency in control activities. This objective emphasizes the importance of 
systemization in control development process and defines achievable goals. Also, a 
balance between stringent and useable controls is desired, which can be achieved by 
structuring information needs for risk assessment to determine the scope of the controls. 
This objective encourages developing simple, flexible, timely and easy to use controls. 
Clear control development process helps in protecting critical business processes through 
multiple layers of controls as the requirements of such complex controls is evidently 
established for everyone.  
The management at CCIT clearly believes in the importance of establishing clear control 
development process for information systems security governance. As one of the security 
officer said: 
 Actually creating the policy and the procedure needs to be clear because if no 
 body knows about the controls and procedures or understands it, they are  not 
 going to follow it.  
 
Clarity in controls development processes is emphasized at CCIT. The management 
encourages employees to clarify any doubts about the policies and welcomes questions 
about them. The management has also created a channel through which such requests are 
formally processed and quickly responded to. The human resources department in this 
organization is responsible for enabling all the employees to get access to any resource that 
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the employees might need to understand the policies better. Also, it is encouraged in 
developing simple and easy controls that can be easily understood and quickly 
incorporated in daily work. As mentioned by the service engineer lead: 
 You got to put it [controls] in a way that it‘s not complex, it‘s not complicated. So 
 you put together a check list and put together a general list [controls]. More 
 general the list, larger the deviation from what you want. You have to be specific 
 but you don‘t want so  detailed [controls]. You have to define how far you  want to 
 go. So if you want City‘s webpage to be the homepage, you got to define in that 
 check list and  make sure that it‘s [making City‘s webpage as homepage] one of the 
 things you do.  
 
Research literature in this area suggests ways to enhance clarity in controls development 
process. Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) argue that patterns of behavior must be well 
defined and explained thoroughly in company policies to enhance trust within the 
organization. This can be achieved only through clarity in development process for 
controls. Dhillon (2001) establishes the benefits offered by clarity in controls development 
process. He suggests that clarity in controls development process and incorporating 
controls in systems development would have better impact on technical controls and thus 
enhance data criticality. Controls, where possible, should be transparent or viewed as 
positive contributions to job performance. The extension of controls that increase 
constraints on people should be minimized (Parker, 1996). Mature organizations have well 
established and institutionalized processes which help in the segregation of duties and lead 
to effective cross checking mechanisms such as auditing. 
The management‘s attempt to establish clarity in controls development process seems to 
work for the employees at CCIT. But with a change in policies and controls coming into 
  176 
effect very soon, it remains to be seen how well the management is geared to help people 
understand these changes in controls structure. It would require a lot of planning and 
coordination to actually implement the new policies and controls effectively and establish 
the clarity of the controls in the minds of the employees, crucial part of the success. A 
summary of how that management encourages clarity in controls development process is 
provided in the table 5.10 below.    
Table 5.10 Clear control development process at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Clear 
Control 
Development 
Process 
― Actually creating the policy and the procedure 
needs to be clear because if no body knows about the 
controls and procedures or understands it, they are 
not going to follow it‖ 
 
 Encourages employees to 
clarify doubts 
 Make all resources about 
controls accessible 
 Simple and easy to use 
controls 
 
5.3.11 Formal control assessment functionality at CCIT 
Formal controls assessment functionality allows establishing security governance as a 
functional requirement. Security has always been considered a non functional requirement. 
But security cannot be represented only by nonfunctional requirements since security goals 
often motivate new functionalities, such as monitoring, intrusion detection and access 
control, which, in turn, need functional requirements. In addition, a distinctive feature of 
security requirements is that they are asset-driven – their goal is to protect the set of 
identified assets (Antilla, 2007). Having a centralized entity for controls assessment would 
allow separate budget allocation for security governance functions and help in establishing 
a business case for security governance.  A controls department would integrate controls 
into the business processes. Formal controls assessment functionality also entails 
  177 
establishing a relationship between IT architecture and controls, dynamic control 
structures, balancing centralization-decentralization of controls and encouraging job 
designs around information systems needs. A formal entity for controls in the organization 
also helps in avoiding bureaucratic delays for controls purposes, prioritization of resources 
and tasks and institutionalization of controls as a part of organizational deign. A security 
governance objective of this nature is not emphasized in the extant literature.    
CCIT is in the need for a formal process or channel through which all its control related 
work is managed. It came up repeatedly during the interaction with the organization that 
controls should be treated in a way that other departments are treated. As manager of 
development puts it: 
 I would say sign off on the requirements that the key stakeholders have agreed 
 upon. Develop the feasibility metrics so that you can take each requirement and 
 trace it through out the whole system all the way from requirement to 
 functional design. This process has to be done formally 
 
The budget and monetary considerations is a huge thing for the organization. At CCIT, 
money allocation at any step is heavily bureaucratic hence delayed. Resources for controls 
need separate budgetary allocation and this could be achieved through establishing a 
formal entity with separate budgetary needs. As shared by manager security; 
 The biggest problem is that controls have limited resources. We want to do so 
 many things but can‘t  do it. Like it [controls] needs to be constantly modified and 
 monitored but that [modification and monitoring] needs investment. Do we 
 have separate money for this as a department?  We are always in a  cash crunch. 
 
The chief security officer shared the similar view: 
 You have to provide proper resources and assess the proper control requirements.  
 Hackers are not fools, you cannot use off the shelf controls and put these in 
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 place and expect them to work. We can ensure that it works but we need 
 resources for that and we don‘t essentially have those resources. To get the 
 resources, it is helpful to have separate budgets. 
 
The management feels that it is prudent to perform the cost benefit analysis to establish the 
worth for the investments in controls. Unless a business case in terms of cost and benefit is 
made, the directors up in the City council are hesitant to allocate resources for control 
purposes. The manager, enterprise systems team explained:  
 Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How do you balance cost of the 
 control versus the risk? Risk is great; cost of control may be worth it. How do 
 you balance cost of the risk to the control? It is same as security. You can  make it 
 so hard to get into the system such that they [employees] spend all  day just to 
 figure out how to get in, takes all the time and work is never done.  That‘s 
 obviously not the goal but protecting our data is very important 
 
It is evidenced in research literature that cost benefit analysis for security measures is 
important to establish the credibility of the efforts. Cost-benefit analysis of access controls 
devices should be done periodically (Schauer and Essex, 2001) to understand the risks 
involved. It is critical for organizations to ensure the most effective and cost-efficient 
controls strategies are selected. The management also needs to ensure that balance in cost 
of controls, the level of security and access to the system by end users is achieved. It is 
important to bring various user management, permission and access control functions 
together and to investigate how technology can be deployed to simplify or centralize 
management, reduce costs and achieve higher levels of control, security and assurance 
(Wilson, 2005). This can be adequately done through development of separate controls 
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assessment functionality. Establishing an entity of this sort entails new requirements for 
the management.  
Though it was not clearly articulated, the management suggested a need for centralizing all 
the controls initiatives for governance purposes, it remains unclear if any step towards this 
direction has been taken by the management. The job descriptions for individuals working 
in the controls assessment department could prove critical to security governance of the 
organization. Jobs dealing with confidential information should also have stringent hiring 
requirements and ensure that individuals being given these roles take their roles seriously 
and have an eye for details (Myler and Broadbent, 2006).  It is important to remember that 
the control environment has a pervasive structure that affects all business activities such as 
management‘s integrity and ethical values, operating philosophy and commitment to 
organizational competence (Ramos, 2005).  
Table 5.11 Formal controls assessment functionality at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Formal 
Control 
Assessment 
Functionality  
―The biggest problem is that controls have limited 
resources. We want to do so many things but can‘t 
do it. Like it [controls] needs to be constantly 
modified and monitored but that [modification and 
monitoring] needs investment. Do we have separate 
money for this as a department?  We are always in a 
cash crunch‖  
 
―Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How 
do you balance cost of the control versus the risk? 
Risk is great; cost of control may be worth it. How 
do you balance cost of the risk to the control? It is 
same as security. You can make it so hard to get into 
the system such that they [employees] spend all day 
just to figure out how to get in, takes all the time and 
work is never done.  That‘s obviously not the goal 
but protecting our data is very imp‖ 
 Cost benefit analysis for 
controls 
 Ensure resources  
 Needs a formal entity for 
centralized controls 
management  
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5.3.12 Monitoring and feedback for controls at CCIT   
Monitoring controls requires effective and established channels to incorporate feedbacks 
for further enhancements. This helps in achieving the performance standards set for the IT 
processes and assures the management ―what is being claimed‖ is being done. Periodic 
review from external auditors strengthens the controls structure and helps in analyzing the 
alignment between control objectives and overall business objectives. Monitoring the 
controls and incorporating the feedback from employees into the controls structure has 
been emphasized by almost all the prevalent governance models (COBIT, 2007; COSO, 
2003).  
CCIT believes in strong monitoring and feedback channels for the success of information 
security governance. It has a monitoring program, for the most part, for all its processes 
and controls. Research literature in information security arena accepts the critical role 
played by monitoring and feedback process in the success of security initiatives. The post 
implementation monitoring and review of controls is a critical phase for success of overall 
controls program (Shedden et al, 2006). Another positive result of good feedback is 
improved communication between the management and the employees. Straub and Welke 
(1998) suggest that regular feedback sessions lead to better communications in 
organization. These values are communicated through departmental meetings, and 
informal chatting. CCIT also believes in getting regular backups of the data set as a result 
of routine monitoring process. The backups help the management stay in touch with 
performance of the controls in real time. Having backups ensures that not only the 
unauthorized use is prevented, but also continuous authorized use is encouraged (Schauer 
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and Essex, 2001). Regular backups should be encouraged irrespective of the storage cost as 
the benefit from recent backups is immense in case of a disaster. The HR manager is 
optimistic about the monitoring tools that she has in her department. As she commented:  
 The system in which I am right now, I am in a place where I am able to find out 
 what they have done whatever needs to be done, seeing the audit trail. If they 
 haven‘t done their work, we find that pretty quickly 
 
Monitoring the controls and using the feedback for improvement is the norm at CCIT (see 
table 5.12). The management understands the role of monitoring in the success of 
governance efforts and takes the responsibility seriously. As shared by manager: 
 So the control has to be more than the lip service, some how it got to be enforced. 
 There got to be some  way to guarantee that if I give you access in security form, 
 how we know he gave that access to the right person at the right time. Even 
 if the person is authorized to do that, security controls are needed also about 
 how things are being misused even when legitimate access is there 
 
CCIT implements stringent authorization process and strict password policies to ensure 
that right people get the right access. The management follows the philosophy that the 
feasibility of the controls can be verified only through monitoring. Monitoring process 
validates that everything is being followed correctly and the feedback allows in assessing 
the feasibility of the controls. Feedback about the controls is encouraged at CCIT. As 
shared by the security manager:  
 It‘s kind of like you want to go back and constantly go back to people and keep 
 looking. Is this really  working for us? Asking people if this is what they can work 
 with is important.  
 
It is evident that monitoring and feedback does consume resources at CCIT. The 
effectiveness of monitoring techniques and policies requires employees‘ willingness to 
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comply with their use (Booker and kitchesn, 2007). Insights into employees‘ intentions to 
comply with policies or circumvent monitoring tools are helpful in promoting effective use 
of these technologies. The insights can be drawn from the feedback received. Monitoring is 
taken seriously and performed frequently. So is feedback from the operational level 
employees. The management at CCIT strives to create a controls culture where monitoring 
and feedback are valued in the organization. However, with forethought and purpose to 
build a culture of trust, employees will be more likely to embrace the need for monitoring 
techniques that prevent criminal and negligent activity (Fleming, 2007). 
But it is not clear that what is being done with the feedback? It is one thing to take 
feedback about things and make people involved in the process. The fact that employees 
get to voice their opinion of controls could actually make them feel empowered and hence 
more receptive to the controls. But is important to actually incorporate the feedback and 
implement the improved version of controls. Since this study collected cross sectional data, 
we did not get the opportunity of actually observing the new set of controls or policies 
being implemented based on the feedback received from the people. A summary of what 
CCIT is doing to improve monitoring and feedback is provided in table 5.12 below.  
Table 5.12 Monitoring and Feedback at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Develop 
Monitoring and 
Feedback 
Channels 
―The system in which I am right now, I am in a place 
where I am able to find out what they have done 
whatever needs to be done, seeing the audit trail. If 
they haven‘t done their work, we find that pretty 
quickly‖ 
 Has tools for monitoring  
 Sessions for obtaining 
feedbacks 
 Feasibility analysis of the 
controls through monitoring  
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5.3.13 Achieving group cohesiveness at CCIT 
Enhancing group cohesiveness helps in regulating the group behavior about security 
controls. Our data shows that peer pressure and groups‘ behavior influences and shapes the 
behavior of the individuals. The sub objectives under this are: encourage ability to share 
the work and credit for good work, discourage favoritism and self interest in groups and 
respect personal integrity in the group. Developing teams (Eloff and Eloff, 2005) is an 
important objective. People derive part of their identity from work groups (Hogg and 
Terry, 2000). The groups influence whether particular rules and controls would be 
followed or not. Thus encouraging cohesive groups with favorable security governance 
perception can help the organization‘s security program.   
The management at CCIT believes that it is in the best interest of the organization to assign 
critical and vulnerable jobs to groups and not individuals. As observed by the manager, 
end user services:  
 [We need to know] which roles have greatest vulnerability to assign groups. A 
 great example of that is, if you multiple people together, collusion is lot harder  
 compared to one person doing something wrong.  So it‘s a similar type of  thing, 
 people in groups are afraid that others might know what they are doing. Groups 
 have an impact on their behavior. 
 
The management believes that it is easier to regulate and manage group behavior than 
individual‘s behavior. So if the groups are tight and cohesive, it would be beneficial to 
impart good knowledge about controls to the groups and expect the dynamics of the group 
to take care of the conformity part. The management also encourages the groups to achieve 
goals. The groups‘ achievements could actually trickle down to the individuals. As 
explained by enterprise systems team lead: 
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 What can you say at the end of the day that you have contributed? Ideally, you 
 want the employees to plan in the beginning of the day; what they can 
 accomplish that day, what is the next thing that they can do to accomplish  their 
goals and then achieve something at the end of the day. Here is what I started out to 
 do and here‘s what I did in the day, goals and accomplish on daily, weekly, and 
 monthly basis in the way it‘s  measurable. So control would be to motivate them as 
 a group. Groups have a profound impact on the individual behavior.  
 
The management at CCIT seems to follow this ideology to the core. There is evidence in 
research that suggests that individual behavior is influenced by the group that they belong 
to. Henry (2004) argues that conscientious and diligent employees can become the 
strongest link in an organization‘s information security infrastructure.    
It was also evident from informal meetings and observations that the organization really 
has strong ‗group‘ culture. There are several informal groups in this organization and 
solidarity of the members towards the group is quite committed. Open discourses with 
several employees suggested towards the politics of groups in decision making at the City 
council level. The awareness and knowledge about the controls did seem to vary a lot from 
group to group in the organization. It is apparent that enhancing group cohesiveness would 
certainly have an impact on the controls knowledge and behavior in this organization. 
Security governance efforts require teams with representation from all functionalities in the 
organization. The challenge is to organize the work of this team, to clearly specify roles 
and responsibilities, to train and sensitize team members to the work to be done, and then 
to make sure that they are in fact doing the work that management has indicated (Wood, 
2006). Thus enhancing group cohesiveness in the security teams allows a coherent 
interaction channel with the management. A team approach to information security is 
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absolutely necessary if an adequate level of information security is going to be achieved 
(Wood, 2006). Chau (2006) argues for security professionals in development team from 
the beginning of the project. Trust also helps in making the groups tighter. Mutual trust 
helps in developing a strong sense of team within the organization as employee satisfaction 
is greatly dependent on their relationship with top management (Fleming, 2007). Research 
in group dynamics suggests that personal issues in groups can cause more damage to the 
organization than having job related issues. In a study by Trimmer et al (2000), 
relationship conflict was found to be more seriously detrimental to team success than task 
conflict. However, a high level of team conflict resulting from either source negatively 
impacts a team‘s success. IT staffers often demonstrate a sense of belonging to the IT 
team, due to their common expertise and training. If the managers implement clan controls 
(Ouchi, 1979) self-interested behaviors can be reduced. A summary of how group 
cohesiveness is enhanced at CCIT is presented in table 5.13 below.  
Table 5.13 Enhancing Group cohesiveness at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Enhance Group 
Cohesiveness  
―What can you say at the end of the day that you 
have contributed? Ideally, you want the employees to 
plan in the beginning of the day; what they can 
accomplish that day, what is the next thing that they 
can do to accomplish their goals and then achieve 
something at the end of the day. Here is what I 
started out to do and here‘s what I did in the day, 
goals and accomplish on daily, weekly, and monthly 
basis in the way it‘s measurable. So control would be 
to motivate them as a group‖ 
 Set group targets 
 Encourage group activities 
 Track the people based on 
their groups  
 Educate groups about 
controls 
 
 
5.3.14 How does CCIT ensure management commitment for security governance?  
Management needs to actively participate in security governance initiatives by rewarding 
conformity with controls and encouraging values such as a dedication, determination, open 
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mindedness and truth. If management communicates effective governance as ―top 
priority‖, the controls instituted are considered seriously by the employees. Our data 
suggests that management should assess damage to the organization, as well as individuals, 
from lack of controls and take appropriate measures to instill desire to meet expectations 
about controls. All stakeholders should be allowed to participate in controls development 
process and the management should ensure that the voices are reflected in the controls.  
Management at CCIT participates actively in ensuring that right controls are developed and 
implemented in the organization. The input from the upper management is crucial for the 
success of the controls. There is evidence in the literature that suggests the direct 
relationship between security initiatives success and management commitment. Successful 
deployment of information technology requires management commitment, a structured 
decision making process and a strategy based on understanding of the vision and 
architecture of the organization (Shupe and Behling, 2006). Security would fail without 
consistent support of the management (Wright, 2007). Regular meetings and briefings with 
the top management reminds the management of the ongoing nature of security 
governance. By their commitment, corporate managers help pave the way towards the 
information society (Savola et al., 2005). It is clear from the attitude of the executives at 
CCCIT that if the management has the power, resources and the willingness to make the 
security governance a success story, nothing can stop the governance initiatives from 
flying. As explained by team lead of operations:  
 Taking inputs from people is important, managers and directors. Decide how they 
 want a particular environment, the money and resources to be used and the 
 controls. Employees want more flexibility but really don‘t know what they 
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 want. Employees are always asking- why do we need to do this when you 
 incorporate their inputs. Better approach would be stick to the top and find out what 
 the management really wants and work with your given constraints. Find out 
 what is it that you can do with these resources. 
 
The top management feels that it needs to involve the city council and directors from the 
board to ensure that security governance is effective at CCIT. In case of developing new 
security policies and the controls, the managers are hesitant to take unfinished product to 
the board of the directors because once a decision is refuted by the board, its takes forever 
to actually get the decision changed. As the chief security officer shared;  
 It [new policies and controls] should not go from us directly to the top, there are 
 chances that it will not be approved. We should make it right the first time before 
 we actually implement it. We need everyone‘s [directors from other agencies] 
 perspective. It seems most of the things fall through the crack because of this[not 
 involving other agencies], things don‘t work that way. 
 
The CIO of CCIT gets involved in the development process of the controls and the policies 
at every stage and demands weekly progress report. He is also willing to provide resources 
to aid the process. The CIO invites outside consultants to provide their view on the policies 
and had ordered expensive textbooks, from where the policies could actually be referred. 
The top management shares the view that it is their job to protect the organization from 
risks and exposure and everything else is designed around this fundamental job 
requirement. As the CIO shared: 
 At the end of the day, everyday, what‘s my job? My job is to manage risks. I 
 assess  risks and I make my decisions based on that. If you look in that regard, the 
 idea that you should have a control program  almost becomes common sense. The 
 whole idea of having an internal controls program is to minimize risks and 
 exposure. That‘s really what we do everyday in everything that we do; that is what 
 management does. 
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The management has separate security department and has designated security officers 
who look after the controls management issues. This in itself is an indication of the 
management‘s commitment towards information security governance. As explained by the 
director, internal audit: 
 Security officer position is a very critical position in the organization. That 
 position has a  formal training to manage these controls. To establish and manage 
 these controls, security auditors try to make sure that security officer is doing 
 the work competently 
 
The management has to be proactive and work towards changing the corporate culture, and 
the resulting employee behavior (Drennan, 1992).  The management at CCIT is clearly 
involved with security controls initiatives which provide a lot of visibility to the controls 
program in the organization. But a lot of security governance decisions need an ‗okay‘ 
stamp from the higher management at city council level. Selling some of the governance 
ideas to this diversified gathering of board of directors is not easy. It is the duty of the 
management, nonetheless to use all the knowledge avenues and come up with the right 
decision for the organization. Management should be concerned about creation, protection 
and distribution of knowledge in the organization as it is a sources of competitive 
advantage.  
Since the current CIO is committed to the cause of effective security governance, it 
appears that many of the initiatives might actually get approved by the board. The future of 
the governance program at CCIT is contingent upon several factors which are beyond the 
control of the immediate management. The tenure of the CIO, the political clout of the CIO 
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with the directors higher up and the vision of the city mayor about these things greatly 
impact the organization. We also observed that the top managements‘ involvement at 
CCIT actually deters non compliance in the organization. Research literature supports this 
relationship between the management commitment and deterrence impact. Organizations 
with top management support lead to greater deterrent activities than ones with weaker 
support (Kankanhalli et al, 2003) and eventually to better overall security.  A summary of 
the assessment of management commitment at CCIT is presented in the table 5.14 below.  
Table 5.14 Management commitment at CCIT 
 
Objective 
Name 
Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Encourage 
Management 
Participation  
―Taking inputs from people is important, managers and 
directors. Decide how they want a particular 
environment, the money and resources to be used and 
the controls. Employees want more flexibility but really 
don‘t know what they want. Employees are always 
asking- why do we need to do this when you incorporate 
their inputs. Better approach would be stick to the top 
and find out what the management really wants and 
work with your given constraints. Find out what is it 
that you can do with these resources.‖ 
 
 Upper management 
participates in group meetings 
 Management seeks inputs 
from people  
 Management ensures that 
only the perfect version of the 
policies and control is presented 
to the higher management as 
City level 
 CIO is supportive and gets 
updated on weekly basis  
 Management ensures 
resources for the new 
development of policies and 
controls  
 
5.3.15 Standardization of controls at CCIT  
 Standardization of the controls helps in benchmarking the governance activities, such as 
design and implementation of controls and investment security governance activities, 
against other players in the industry. It is important though to clearly differentiate between 
what needs to be standardized versus things that are best left unique to the organization. 
Standardization provides opportunities for learning from others and avenues for growth. It 
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also helps organization gain acceptance internationally in the eyes of regulatory authorities 
or third party vendors.  
The controls developed at CCIT need to be specific to the organization. Being a service 
delivery organization, CCIT needs to set clear standards for what is expected from them 
and what would be acceptable. Having an idea about acceptable services, controls need to 
be designed in a way that at least the threshold level of performance is achieved. To 
provide a basic level of service, CCIT requires standardization of the process and hence 
controls. As explained by manager, development functions: 
 I guess one of the other things which is very important and lot of people don‘t do 
 this, establish acceptance criteria. That means that you are going to determine what 
 the controls will do and how everyone has to act, for it to work, and then to ensure 
 that it does act. It has to be consistent. 
 
The management develops its own set of controls and then strives to standardize the 
controls such that maximum benefits could be derived from it through improved 
coordination. As shared by manager infrastructure services: 
 I think every bureau has their own method [of developing controls] and in many 
 cases may be they don‘t need to be at the same point because they have different 
 applications. They all have a different way to do it. So it‘s key, it‘s important that it 
 probably should have some form of standardization. I mean they [employees] need 
 to be trained so they understand it works and a standard process helps in this 
 [training].  
 
One way of standardizing the controls is to look at the available governance models in the 
industry. Organizations should exercise caution while implementing the available 
frameworks as most of these frameworks cannot be used ―as it is‖ and need customization. 
Use of established standards has been criticized in literature. Standards contain hidden 
complexities and nuances which can overwhelm the risk mangers who implement them. 
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Also effective implementation of standards requires a great deal of expertise on part of the 
assessor regarding risk assessments probably requiring additional trainings for the staff at 
large in order to make good use of formal methodology. Standards also suffer the problem 
of subjectivity where every organization interprets it according to their convenience 
(Lichtenstein, 1996). There is little doubt that security standards are not being readily 
adopted amongst the business community (May, 2007). But it also sees the value of 
looking at such frameworks. As explained by the director of the internal audit at the city; 
 Somebody needs to do this, make sure that those objectives are being met by the 
 systems. Those things [governance frameworks] have come into existence by 
 looking at the experiences of several people who have suffered breaches. So, it‘s 
 kind of learning from someone else‘s experience. It is critical to look at the 
 frameworks. 
 
There are benefits of actually standardizing the controls benchmarked against the 
commonly accepted frameworks in the industry. Research literature suggests benefits of 
standardization process of the controls. Standards are one of the best methods for 
companies to develop a proactive strategy for information security (May, 2005). The 
benefits are manifold: helps in developing structured strategy for security, offers 
reassurance to outsiders‘ vendors and boost to organization‘s marketing potential. 
Research suggests the importance of defining baseline controls and standard builds for 
platforms, systems and applications. These baselines may be the common ground of all 
risk treatment processes or it is possible to develop specific baseline sets for platforms of 
different roles, based on the level of risk (Wilson, 2005). As suggested by DeMaio (2002), 
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a significant characteristic needed to develop e-Trust in the network economy is the 
standardization of processes, interfaces and technologies.   
The management also feels that standardizing the controls increase the acceptance of the 
organizations processes amongst vendors and enhances its credibility in the eyes of the 
regulators. The standardization process also helps in meeting the compliance criteria and is 
seen positively by the external auditors. In the process of development of new controls, the 
organization has not looked at the available frameworks so far. It would not be surprising 
though if the internal auditing demands adherence to existing governance objectives which 
forces the management to comply. It remains to be seen though, if the organization puts a 
blanket approval to all the controls from any standard framework to be used in the 
organization or only controls of operational nature are copied and the strategic ones are 
developed inside. A summary of standardization of controls at CCIT is presented in table 
5.15 below.   
Table 5.15 Standardization of controls at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Encourage 
Standardization of 
Controls 
― I guess one of the other things which is very 
important and lot of people don‘t do this, establish 
acceptance criteria. That means that you are going to 
determine what the controls will do and how 
everyone has to act, for it to work, and then to ensure 
that it does act. It has to be consistent‖ 
 Consistent controls  
 Refer to the industry 
frameworks 
 Required for the theird 
party vendors 
 
 
5.3.16 Alignment of individual and organizational values at CCIT   
This objective implies that security controls should be in alignment with individual‘s 
beliefs and values such that the probability of success of governance program increases. 
This alignment could be achieved in so many ways. Respecting other people‘s opinion, 
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involving other stakeholders in the control development process and incorporating 
employees‘ perspective in control design are some of the ways to approach the alignment 
task.   
The CCIT management is appreciative of the fact that employees need to play an important 
role in development and implementation of the controls. Leach (2003) argues that in 
situations of conflict between individual and organization value systems, most people are 
unable to survive the tension for long. Even in the light of various legislations the agency 
had to follow, there were incidents of non-conformity with rules and regulations. It is to be 
noted that in the recent past, two employees form the department were terminated for non 
compliance with Internet surfing policies. These employees visited web sites that were 
restricted for the department network. In a newspaper report (not cited for confidentiality 
reasons), one of them had mentioned that he did it because he thought it was okay once in 
a while. The rules and the laws can only provide a direction for accepted behavior. But 
unless the rules are in sync with the individual values, there is a higher probability that it 
would not be followed. As the chief information officer of the agency mentioned:  
 So we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in 
 reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do 
 the best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. If my personal values 
 allow then only I will follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t legislate 
 that; you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that. 
 
The organization, as mentioned above, was in the process of development of security 
controls for the entire city agencies. Being the IT department for the City, all the controls 
developed and approved by this organization would be applicable and enforced on other 
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agencies under the City. This means representation from various quarters of various 
agencies which were not even working directly with this organization. This represents a 
unique situation for control development. The agency which is responsible for 
development and enforcement of the controls is not in touch with other agencies which 
need to comply with the controls. The security officers, in charge of leading the control 
development process, understood the complexities involved. The Chief Security Officer at 
CCIT explained:  
 It‘s very complex [developing controls]. Reach out to HR, legal people, get all 
 resources to learn from them. Draft things that can actually work for everyone. You 
 need to take all stakeholders in confidence, win their trust and ensure that you are 
 working for them [individuals] not against them. It is what they need.  
 
The management at CCIT uses psychometric measures to influence people to think that the 
controls are about them and not about the top management in the organization. The CIO 
has developed mechanisms to informally bring the end users on board with the controls. 
The security team in the organization reaches out to the people in a way so that they find it 
appealing. It is common in this organization for the security people to have frequent 
lunches with other stakeholders in order to ―draw them in‖. Sometimes the bosses higher 
up make it mandatory to attend the sessions about controls and policies. But the intention 
of the people responsible for the controls is to make it more appealing to the users. The 
controls are being portrayed as something that is important for the employees, to protect 
them from any damage or harm in case of a security breach or a natural disaster. It is also a 
vehicle that makes the daily work easier. The managers accepted though that it is hard to 
ensure that the users continue to listen to them. 
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The influence of environment on individual beliefs and attitudes is well documented in 
literature (Thomson and von Solms, 2008; Kilmann et al, 1985; Dhillon, 2001). Lack of 
alignment between individuals and the organization leads the employees to work against 
management expectations, miscommunications, lack of cooperation from employees and 
environment complacency (Sathe, 1983). A lack of alignment leads to user resistance about 
the controls. User resistance manifests itself in various ways, including improper use of the 
security mechanisms (Schultz et al., 2001). Systems with a poor usability design tend to 
evoke a greater degree of user resistance (Al-Ghatani and King, 1999) and employees 
exploit the vulnerability already present in the system. The management and the security 
team at CCIT are aware of the importance of incorporating individual inputs into the 
controls. The management clearly wants the controls to be incorporated well into the 
processes and takes extra efforts to explain to the users about significance of the controls in 
their lives. Getting security controls and polices approved in the City is a very tedious and 
political process that involves managers and directors from various other agencies. In an 
environment such as this, efforts for individual and organizational alignment can go only 
so far. But the recognition of the fact that individual values matter should be helpful in the 
long run for CCIT. The attempts of changing the attitude of executives about security 
controls and developing people oriented controls should help in better understanding of the 
controls. No matter what the extent of technical and formal controls, prevention of insider 
security breaches demands certain normative controls. Such controls essentially deal with 
values, belief system and culture for the individuals (Dhillon, 2001). Behavioral change is 
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ultimately the result of changes in beliefs (Dhillon, 2001). A summary of the initiatives to 
align individual and organizational values at CCIT is presented in table 5.16 below. 
 
 
Table 5.16 Ensuring alignment of individual and organizational values at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure 
Alignment of 
Individual and 
Organizational 
values 
―Draft things that can actually work for everyone. 
You need to take all stakeholders in confidence, 
win their trust and ensure that you are working for 
them [individuals] not against them. It is what they 
need‖ 
―I mean, in reality, our personal values, our own 
values should define that we are going to do the 
best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. 
If my personal values allow then only I will follow 
the rules‖ 
 Use psychological measures 
to understand employees 
 Have frequent lunches to 
―draw in‖ the employees 
 Portray controls as something 
to protect the employees against 
harm. Its about them not the 
bosses 
 
5.3.17 Resource allocation for controls at CCIT  
Resources are the lifeline of the security governance program. Before developing the right 
controls and implementation plan, organizations need to take initiatives to develop the 
right environment for controls. Some of the proactive control initiatives that this research 
suggests are getting adequate resources for developing physical controls, encouraging co-
ordination between departments and discouraging an environment of fear and politics in 
the organization. A clear vision about security governance is required to start groundwork 
before establishing the controls infrastructure. The dividends of such actions a priori 
planning eventually help the security posture of the organization.   
The biggest issue that emerged from the case study at CCIT is the concern of the 
management about lack of physical and environmental controls. The management was 
worried about inadequate protection of not only the physical assets in the form of computer 
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monitors, CPUs and printers but also the crucial information in garbage cans. As shared by 
the administrative head of the organization:  
 The other issue which we have had is the physical security of assets by temporary 
 workers. The cleaning people are not the city‘s employees, they are from a 
 company. They are brought in as temporary workers and are managed by a city 
 employee. They come in and they got a giant trash can with them. Actually we 
 have lots of equipments lying around, it‘s not a lot of money but it is some money. 
 They can take away anything they want. How can I control that? They got to get in 
 and clean the trash. If someone puts all the papers in the trash can and take it away, 
 I won‘t know. 
 
The manager‘s concern did not seem unwarranted for. The protection measures of physical 
assets in the office complex seemed complacent and half hearted. For example, a general 
protocol for a visitor in the office area is to first sign in at the registration desk, get a batch 
and wait to be escorted by the person they are supposed to meet. The visitor is also entitled 
to be shown the way out to the reception after the meeting. It is a control put in place for 
restoring physical security of office space and assets. But the employees feel it is a 
ridiculous requirement to have. The argument being that several vendors visit the premises 
on a weekly basis for years and it is silly to go get them every time and escort them back. It 
takes the employees away from work. An important point to be noted is the furniture 
layout in the office area. All the employees at manager level have closed cubicles and 
directors have their own rooms. There are no open area work stations in the entire 
organization. But a lot of equipments such as printers, copiers, monitors, CPUs and mouse 
are lying around in open areas where everyone has a common access to it. The layout is 
such that, for the most part, you cannot watch the activities in the open area from a cubicle. 
The concern of the administration manager seems genuine since there is lot of equipments 
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and important papers (in the printers and copiers) lying around and anyone can walk away 
with these papers without getting noticed. As she puts it, ―we haven‘t got into lot of trouble 
yet because we have been lucky so far‖. Some of the directors echoed the similar threat 
and shared their disappointment at not doing anything concrete about it.  
Currently the administration manager is the warden of the floor at City Hall where CCIT is 
situated and she does not have access to any blueprint of the building with her. As she 
observed: 
 It really upsets me. They have made me the floor warden; I don‘t even know how 
 to get into those nooks and corners of the floor. It costs money to develop 
 reorganize things in an easily accessible manner. There is lot of complacency 
 because of that. 
 
The administration manager has no way of knowing, in case of an emergency, where are 
various people exit doors in the building and how to reach various corners of the office and 
check if anyone needs help. For the sake of emergency preparedness, City does store some 
wheel chairs and masks for the employees within the facility. But the administration 
manager made a mockery of this ill planned attempt of the management saying that she 
was the floor in-charge for emergency needs and even she had no clue about how the 
digital locks work where the emergency equipments are stored. To her knowledge, the 
locks were quite old and no body was quite sure how it actually works.  
All the stakeholders at CCIT unanimously argue for more resources to be injected into 
security controls to take the security governance plans forward. In this state agency, the 
resources are allocated after deliberations through several layers. This delays the benefits 
of some of the measures. The organization requires resources in monetary form as well as 
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more personnel urgently. These resources are important for the governance program but 
are lacking nonetheless at CCIT. As shared by the security officer: 
 You know I want to do encryption of certain things that helps me to be able to 
 monitor. People send me ssn [social security number], credit card information and I 
 want to protect that. We have tools you can buy and put them in place to protect 
 that [data]. We don‘t currently have those; it‘s a great job to get those tools, to get 
 the funding for that, to get the people for that.  
 
The political environment at City headquarters gets the better of the CIO and many a times 
good security control initiatives do not produce intended result. The management at CCIT 
should understand that developing adequate security mechanisms is a process of trade-offs 
between high security, usability and cost (Savola, 2007). The adequate level of security has 
to lie in the intersection of these three planes. All stakeholders, such as managers, 
developers, security experts and end users, should be on board in making such tradeoff 
decisions (Savola, 2007). Security governance decisions require coordinated efforts from 
all levels of management. The management at CCIT should influence directors at the City 
level about priorities and resource allocation for security and early involvement of security 
specialist in new projects or initiatives. Research literature has evidences to suggest that 
such teams are helpful in getting the right resources. Appointment of an expert team to 
conduct the strategic planning and resources to carry it forward (Shupe and Behling, 2006) 
helps the cause of security governance. The case at CCIT establishes the resources as a 
vital requirement for effective security governance program.  
Research literature in security governance suggests that physical access is one of the most 
important but neglected issue in security management (Schauer and Essex, 2001). And this 
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is what we observed at CCIT. Security governance program at CCIT realizes the need for 
resources for physical security measures. The result is a compromised security control 
structure that is vulnerable on several fronts and needs immediate attention. Organization‘s 
building and premises, equipment and information processing facilities must be fool proof 
to prevent unauthorized intrusions and access and possible theft issues (Parker, 1996). The 
risk of poor security should be articulated such that budget and resources allocation is not 
compromised (Wright, 2007). Extant literature suggests measures that CCIT could adopt to 
get proper resources. Management must discuss with personnel the appropriate actions to 
be taken in the case of unknown people entering the premises or leaving it (Schauer and 
Essex, 2001). Devices to lock computers can be installed (Schauer and Essex, 2001). 
Laptops security should be ensured when the user is away from office and the organization 
should have strong policies and about this. Keeping a watch regularly on trash habits 
includes printed reports, diskettes, hard drives and zip drives that are being discarded or 
given away (Schauer and Essex, 2001). Applying such measures could help CCIT deal 
with the pressing concern about physical and environmental controls. A summary of 
resources allocation efforts is presented in table 5.17 below.  
Table 5.17 Maximizing resource allocation for controls at CCIT 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Maximize 
resource 
allocation  for 
controls  
―Consistently they [employees] must learn to trust. When 
you say you are doing something it means you are doing 
it; when you say you will get back to them, you get back 
to them‖  
“We have tools you can buy and put them in place to 
protect that [data]. We don‘t currently have those; it‘s a 
great job to get those tools, to get the funding for that, to 
get the people for that‖ 
―It is like buying auto insurance the day after you had an 
accident. It is not going to help you the damage is done 
already. So is the case with the security controls for the 
 Enhance trust measures 
in the organization 
 Seek more resources to 
get the controls working 
 Registering at the front 
desk before entering the 
organization and at the 
time of departure 
 Escorted by the 
employees into and out of 
the office 
  201 
management. If you are not doing something to police it 
on your own then you are going to find about it after it 
really happens. So there is really nothing you can do, 
there is nothing you can do to protect yourself as you 
have already experienced the vulnerability‖ 
 
 
 
5.3.18 Visible executive leadership accomplished?   
Effective information systems security governance program requires visible leadership to 
provide the direction to controls management in the organization. This objective entails a 
leadership style and philosophy that provides the momentum to the controls program. The 
perception about security governance is created by the leaders who should be able to ―walk 
the talk‖. This objective demands that the leadership in that organization should present 
exemplary behavior and be able to nurture relationships with cohorts. Promoting 
executives with good security governance understandings in visible leadership roles should 
be an integral part of the governance program.  
The security managers at CCIT have faith in their leader i.e. the CIO of the organization. 
But the other factions of the top management at the City are ignorant about the needs of the 
security program and have little interest in knowing what‘s best for the organization. As 
explained by the security manger: 
 With the city, it‘s not hard to get the support of the CIO. He is supportive of our 
 actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues, the other directors, who need to 
 approve it but  have no clue about it. 
 
The lack of support from the leadership is hurting the new security governance program at 
the City. The general perception is that if the CIO is supporting the cause of the security 
controls, the program would be in effect sooner or later. The vision and dedication of the 
current CIO has actually been crucial in developing new security initiatives at CCIT. As 
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suggested by the objective, managers in this organization believe that leaders should be 
able to set an example for the rest of them to follow (see table 5.18). No control program 
can work if the leadership in the organization conveys contradictory message about the 
intent of the controls. Research literature in information security area calls for consistency 
in leadership about security issues. The executive leadership should espouse that controls 
are important and be consistent in behavior to convey what is espoused is real (Drennan, 
1992). Senior managers can communicate policies and codes of ethics to guide employees 
(Krull, 1996). It is the responsibility of the leaders to serve as a role model for the behavior 
it wishes to promote (Krull, 1996). Executive leadership sets the tone for employee trust as 
the core for company‘s success and is reflective of the culture in the organization 
(Fleming, 2007). If a control is being endorsed by the executives in the top management 
positions, it is important that the control is followed. As explained by application services 
manager:  
  A very good example here is that in an organization you tell people, if you share 
 your password and this is the law, you will be fired. Then president of the 
 company, she goes to some other site and shares her password with others. You 
 need to make sure that if you  set something up, you need to set an example for 
 others to follow and then you can control the process. 
 
In the light of the above objective, the organization is actually undergoing great changes in 
security governance program under capable leadership of the current CIO. The head of the 
organization has great understanding of the security issues and is willing to instill good 
values about security governance at CCIT. It is a part of the governance duties of the 
executive management to encourage employees to adhere to the behavior expected to 
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contribute towards the successful protection of information assets (Thompson and von 
Solms, 2008). Visible management is required to actually employees at all levels really 
internalize the code of conduct they want employees to follow. Leadership also leads to 
trust building and ethical environment in the organization when employees see consistency 
in behaviors. But being a part of the bigger organization (the City), CCIT does suffer 
temporary setbacks in their security governance program due to non cooperative directors 
and their lack of knowledge about security issues. Visible leadership plays a decisive role 
in every security initiative planned by the organization. a summary of leadership initiatives 
at CCIT is presented in table 8.18 below.    
Table 5.18 Visible executive leadership at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Visible 
executive 
Leadership 
―With the city, it‘s not hard to get the support of the 
CIO. He is supportive of our actions. The hard part is 
getting to his colleagues, the other directors, who 
need to approve it but have no clue about it‖ 
 
 CIO is supportive of the 
new security policies and 
controls  
 Take into confidence the 
leadership at the city level 
 
5.3.19 Ethical and moral values instituted at CCIT  
This objective suggests development of appropriate ethical environment for information 
security governance. An ethical organization would encourage right work ethics and 
institute appropriate moral values in the employees to shape a favorable perception about 
security controls. Management should encourage people taking pride in their jobs and that 
right display of morality is rewarded and valued in the organization. A strong leadership 
helps in actually establishing the importance of ethics and morality in the organization.   
At CCIT, management believes that ethical and moral values as something integral to the 
employees and there is not much that can be done to change it. Research literature supports 
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this assertion. In a study about impact of general and IS specific codes of ethics on 
computer abuse intentions, general codes had no impact of users intentions while IS 
specific codes ethics has a slight effect on one type of computer abuse (computer 
sabotage). Organization can have a code of conduct as documenting its ethical values but it 
is difficult to assess the operating effectiveness of such a control (Ramos, 2005). 
Management has to evaluate the effectiveness of such a code (Ramos, 2005). At CCIT, the 
director gave an example of regulatory compliance issues in the organization. Even though 
regulations are meant to ensure that people do the right thing, it really does not help 
organizations in this direction. The director said: 
 so we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in 
 reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do 
 the best we can, do the right thing at any point of time. If my personal values allow 
 then only I will follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t legislate that, 
 you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that 
 
The management at CCIT believes though that if the leaders ―walk the talks‖, they can 
certainly be exemplary in the organization and thus set an ethical and moral standard to be 
followed by the employees. The CIO of the organization is one such leader who is ―looked 
up to‖ by the employees in general.  The management respects personal integrity of people 
and rewards examples of the ethical and moral behavior through a ―star of the month‖ 
program. In this program, employees who have in some way set examples of good ethical 
behavior, which can influence people, are acknowledged publicly by the management 
monthly and the description of the behavior along with the winner‘s name is displayed in 
the meeting areas. This has actually influenced people positively and communicated a 
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message from the management that ethicality and morality are important and these 
qualities are valued in the organization. There are evidences in literature to support the 
management‘s belief that it can influence the ethical and moral environment in the 
organization. Information Systems professionals generally demonstrate a solid 
understanding of information security ethics as they apply to organizational goals. Dhillon 
and Torkzadeh (2006) suggest that instilling value based work ethics would help in 
ensuring an ethical environment which leads to employees‘ deterring from unacceptable 
behavior for a secure organization. The security governance initiatives must supplement 
the old technical and procedural mix of controls with the ones aimed at morality of the 
insiders. The security technology design often neglects the moral or ethical element of the 
governance process which is one of the most important aspects of security management 
(Gupta and Sharman, 2008). Addressing this pertinent issue, Gupta and Sharman (2008) 
suggest a model that offer insights into social behaviors that unravel the risk exposure of 
the organization from social engineering attacks. The authors develop a social engineering 
susceptibility index (SESI) that uses social network theory and organizational dynamics. 
Krull (1996) argues that employers must create an environment that encourages employees 
to recognize and respond appropriately. Standards and codes of ethics must also become 
part of the organizational culture and reward system. Whistle blowing can be encouraged 
by establishing policies that define appropriate responses to perceived problems (Krull, 
1996). We observed that top management at CCIT works towards creating an ethical and 
moral environment. A summary of initiatives to ensure ethical and moral values in CCIT is 
presented below in table 5.19. 
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Table 5.19 ethical and moral environment at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure ethical and 
moral values 
―so we can make a rule, we can make a law that you 
have to be honest. I mean, in reality, our personal 
values, our own values should define that we are 
going to do the best we can, do the right thing at any 
point of time. my if my personal values allow then only I will follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t legislate that, you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that‖ 
 ―star of the month‖ 
program 
 Leadership is encouraged 
to ―walk the talk‖ 
 Management provides the 
right environment  
 
5.3.20 On trust building mechanisms at CCIT 
The objective emphasizes the importance of role of trust in success of security controls in 
organizations. Building trust is important to ensure that individuals can work according the 
expectations of the management without close supervision. Trust is the enabling of 
confidence that something will or will not occur in a predictable or promised manner. The 
enabling of confidence is supported by identification, authentication, accountability, 
authorization, and availability. A positive environment where the leadership is dependable 
and the management less politicized, helps employees to trust the intentions of supervisors 
and each other for the best for the company. Employee beliefs about strong security 
governance in the organization are a good predictor of security success in the organization 
(Stanton et al, 2004). Outsider stakeholders should be able to trust the security measures in 
the organization to work with it and develop a positive perception about the reliability of 
the firm in the market.   
The management at CCIT believes in trusting employees about day to day activities (see 
table 5.20). This is evidenced from the fact that there are a lot of equipments lying around 
in the organization without being locked. These equipments are not stolen and the 
employees believe that no body is going to take the City‘s property. Self-control can be 
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helpful in this environment (Kirsch, 1996). One of the mechanisms to build trust within the 
organization, as employed by the management, is to maintain consistency in behavior. As 
explained by the security director: 
 They [employees] must learn to trust. When you say you are doing something, 
 [make  sure] you are doing it. When you say you will get back to them, you get 
 back to them.  You got to have that consistency. 
 The data suggests that trust is perceived as pivotal in the success of the controls at 
CCIT. The director of project management is of the view that trust needs to be cultivated 
on a daily basis with the co workers by respecting their points of view and engaging them 
in the decision process. As observed by manager project management:   
 Consistently they [employees] must learn to trust. When you say you are doing 
 something it means you are doing it; when you say you will get back to them, you 
 get back to them. You got to have that consistency and managing controls is going 
 to be the same thing, here is the policy, procedure, you must do it and it will be 
 done. 
 
Trust is an indicator of series of direct relationship with people and not with a series of 
organizational entities or policies (Fleming, 2007). This is evidenced in CCIT‘s trust 
relationship with other agencies under the purview of the City. There have been a number 
of incidents about the policies and the controls being developed at the CCIT being rejected 
by the council. As mentioned by the application development manager: 
 I am talking about the whole city. They [other agencies under the City] have to 
 trust IT to develop these policies and controls. We have best interest in doing so. It 
 is good for compliance as well with any federal state and local law. 
 
Other agencies and its directors are at loggerheads with CCIT top management about the 
content of the policies. The other directors at city council are afraid that these policies 
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would provide excessive power to CCIT over the other agencies with the City. Several 
board meetings and drafts later, CCIT is still struggling to get the policies okayed. The 
need for inter-organization trust building mechanisms is obvious at the City office. 
Research literature can guide CCIT in this situation of lack of trust with partners in 
business. Companies should be able to guarantee its trading partners that they enjoy a 
minimum level of acceptable security and have a certificate to prove that. This leads to 
trust building between trading partners (Trompeter and Eloff, 2001). CCIT could also try a 
novel concept that will enable information security professionals to implement effective 
security is ‗e-Trust‘ (DeMaio, 2002). Inter-organizational business requires standardization 
of processes, interfaces and technologies that help in development of mutual trust in 
collaborating partners in business (DeMaio, 2002). Other agencies could use pre 
established criteria to assess what CCIT proposes. Organizations could use performance 
evaluation criteria that emphasize trust, security and control requirements (DeMaio, 2002). 
Research suggests that lack of trust in policies and monitoring systems can make the 
employees alter systems and simply not complying with controls such as not sharing 
passwords or taking confidential data out of the office on laptops (Booker and kitchens, 
2008). This is what we observed at CCIT. Lack of trust impedes the optimal functioning of 
organization, as conveyed by one of the incidents shared with us. In one of the disaster 
situation, the organization sent a laptop to affected site for resuming normal functioning. 
Since the manager had to sign the receipt of the equipment and be responsible for it, she 
walked away with the equipment as she did not trust anyone to deal with it appropriately. 
The manager in question took it with her on a vacation; meanwhile, all the work that could 
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have been done could not be accomplished. This certainly shows how the spirit of the 
controls s defeated due to lack of trust amongst groups and mangers. On the other hand, 
there needs to be a caution in establishing trust with outsiders as it could be exploited for 
social engineering attacks (Gupta and Sharman, 2008). A summary of trust building 
mechanisms at CCIt is presented in the table 5.20 
Table 5.20 Trust building mechanisms at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Maximize trust 
building 
mechanisms  
―I am talking about the whole city. They [other 
agencies under the City] have to trust IT to develop 
these policies and controls. We have best interest in 
doing so. It is good for compliance as well with any 
federal state and local law‖.  
 
 Equipments are lying 
openly in the office as there 
is mutual trust about not 
stealing City‘s property  
 Managers maintain 
consistency in ―saying and 
doing‖ 
 
5.3.21  Ensure punitive structures at CCIT 
Punitive structures require the management to establish clear consequences for non 
compliance with policies and ensure disciplinary action against unacceptable behavior. The 
impact of deterrence activities, according to our data, is significant for impeding non 
compliance with controls and policies.  Deterrence helps in creating fear of punishments. It 
is important to explain clearly the meaning of criminal actions and in cases of non 
compliance, it is critical to take quick and responsive actions. Developing countermeasures 
helps in conformity with rules and regulations. Information systems security research has 
established the importance of deterrence criteria for better security (Dhillon and 
Torkzadeh, 2006; Straub and Nance, 1990, Straub, 1990). Researchers in information 
security governance domain have undermined the importance of deterrence activities and 
have practically not explored work in this area.  
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The management at CCIT, especially the CIO, is clear about establishing clear deterrence 
criteria as preventive measures for information systems security governance. As observed 
by the CIO; 
 I also think what you have to do is to have a clear punitive structure because big 
 things  are at stake. A  punitive structure is a must. So you must have some type of 
 thing that says even if the employee violates  this, what is going to happen to him. 
 
A punitive structure constantly reminds the employees about the consequences of their 
actions. There are evidences from research to suggest that punitive structures actually deter 
employees from non compliance with policies. For instance, Darcy and Hovav (2007) 
empirically examined user awareness of security policies, security-awareness programs, 
computer monitoring, and preventive security software and their effect on user intentions 
regarding IS misuse. Their results suggest that a combined proactive and preventive 
approach to security deters users from IS misuse (Darcy and Hovav, 2007). Repeated 
efforts are required to instill the results of non conformity with polices into the minds of 
the employees. As shared by security manager; 
 It is very important to establish consequences and give constant reminders. We 
 have to go there again and again. What constitutes a violation? What are different 
 levels of violations? Establish the penalties, the parameters of what constitutes non 
 conformity.  Nothing can be done later if you do this and if something happens do 
 take some action 
 
The top management also feels that one of the biggest drivers for establishing deterrence in 
not adhering to the controls in the organization is frequent auditing. The management 
believes that the process of auditing implies that ―you are being watched‖ and ―you will 
get caught‖ if you are deviating from the accepted behavior. This constant reminder 
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actually helps in deterring the employees form risk behavior and encourages respect for the 
controls.  
Since the organization has fewer audits that it actually thinks it needs, the impact that this 
complacency has on deterrence is unpredictable. If people think that the audit is not going 
to take place, say for next three years, they actually might get tempted to break the law 
more often. If the employees think that there is no way of getting caught for the next three 
years, the behavior might be modified accordingly. This could actually have serious 
implications for the security governance in organizations.  
Research in information security suggests several measures that could be adopted by CCIT 
to deter employees from deviant behavior. For example, the management could study 
employees‘ compliance and resistance behaviors and identify the most vulnerable areas 
which are not easy to be policed. This helps in creating deterring activities aligned with the 
employees‘ tolerance towards such measures (Booker and Kitchens, 2008).  CCIT could 
use more deterrence efforts to develop a preventive security management approach. 
Kankanhalli et al. (2003) argue that greater organizational deterrent efforts (in the form of 
person-hours expended on IS security purposes) and preventative efforts (in the form of 
more advanced security software) were associated with higher perceived IS security 
effectiveness. security countermeasures that include deterrent administrative procedures 
and preventive security software results in lower computer abuse (Straub, 1990). For 
maximizing deviant behavior, CCIT could reinforce positive beliefs and attitudes, in other 
words first clarify what behavior is unacceptable through clearly establishing the ethics and 
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morality expected from the staff. A summary of establishing a punitive structure in 
organization is presented in table 5.21 below. 
Table 5.21 punitive structure at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Ensure punitive 
structures 
 
―I also think what you have to do is to have a clear 
punitive structure because big things are at stake. A 
punitive structure is a must. So you must have some 
type of thing that says even if the employee violates 
this, what is going to happen to him.‖ 
 
 Explain consequences and 
send reminders 
 Clear punitive structure  
 Punish in case of security 
breach or non conformity 
with controls 
 
5.3.22 Training and education about controls at CCIT   
Education about need for controls creates awareness in the organization about risks, 
responsibilities and social engineering issues. Training employees about usage and scope 
of controls helps the end users in understating the impact of controls on day-to-day work 
and also reminds people to apply their knowledge in practice. Training should be enforced 
and the impact of such measures should be assessed periodically. Our data establishes the 
importance of training with specific focus and work related examples. Regular training 
programs should be designed early on in the security governance strategy.      
Training and education is greatly emphasized in CCIT, in theory and in practice. The upper 
management in the organization schedule regular training of the employees on various 
issues including security awareness and controls. The belief in training and education is 
echoed by a security officer: 
 You can put control such as discussing the policies. But in my opinion controls are 
 not going to do anything unless you educate your end user. Understand that 
 controls don‘t do anything for you unless you educate end users. 
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The management has a preventive approach towards security management and invests in 
protecting the organization and the employees proactively from vulnerabilities. Training 
the employees on use of various applications for business processes and other related 
technologies ensures a better understanding of the expectations from the employees. The 
management is proactive about providing enough information to employees about policies 
and control and is perseverant about making sure that the employees actually read the 
material are aware of its contents. As shared by chief security officer; 
 Human nature it is that they [employees] may read the policy and go ―ok I do know 
 that‖ but they wouldn‘t read in the details. There is an education factor also, to get 
 the word out to people. When you sign these forms, this is what it meant and 
 you are held responsible. Part of the procedure and guideline will hold, make it 
 standard this is what happens when you don‘t do this, first warning, second 
 warning, third warning. I believe that our HR is working on some of that now 
 [chief security officer] 
 
The management takes extra measures to ensure that the education is actually reaching the 
end user and provides extra incentive so that the material is read and understood y the user. 
As the administrative manager commented:  
 Education and reaching out to the employees [is important]. Reward them 
 [employees] for reading and knowing the controls. Give a gift certificate. If you do 
 this, take this test after reading and pass, you can go for this incentive. 
 Typically if you make it mandatory, they [employees] go and find it because they 
 have to go and look. Make it appealing to the employees, .explain that it helps me 
 in my normal everyday life and not because it is a burden or something that needs 
 to be done to survive. 
 
The training and education emphasis at CCIT has been helpful in creating awareness about 
security controls and governance. There is evidence in research literature to support 
CCIT‘s efforts on training and education. The success of IS security depends largely on 
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end-user behavior and awareness (Darcy and Hovav, 2007). Defining ways to inform and 
educate users on what constitutes legitimate use of IS resources training involves alerting 
users to known vulnerabilities and threats and through preventive security technologies 
(Darcy and Hovav, 2007).  Fuller et al (2007) conducted a study to examine the impact of 
training on information assurance awareness and knowledge retention in the organization. 
The results suggest that employee information assurance knowledge erodes over time 
suggesting a need for recurring training.  
The management utilizes resources for the knowledge of its employees about security 
control issues which in turn prevents the unintentional breaches of security. Training could 
communicate higher level concepts such as security action cycle but also detailed 
information about specific vulnerabilities. End users need to be educated on risk factors 
and how it affects bottom line (Garigue and Stefaniu, 2003). They should also be aware of 
emerging technologies and threats and business impact of potential security incidents. 
Extensive training is required to make the standards a part of organizational controls 
culture (Krull, 1996). The employees on the other had did not seem too happy with the 
training programs. It seems that the people who actually got the training did not see much 
value in the exercise. The importance of the training for the employees needs to be 
communicated clearly. It should not be a checkbox exercise which is to be done. The 
management‘s efforts of explain the employees ―what‘s in it for me‖ does not seem 
adequate. This emphasis needs to be changed when the new controls program in instituted. 
A summary of training and education initiatives at CCIT is presented in table 5.22 below. 
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Table 5.22 Training and education at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Encourage 
Training and 
Education  
―Human nature it is that they [employees] may read 
the policy and go ―ok I do know that‖ but they 
wouldn‘t read in the details. There is an education 
factor also, to get the word out to people. When you 
sign these forms, this is what it meant and you are 
held responsible. Part of the procedure and guideline 
will hold, make it standard this is what happens 
when you don‘t do this, first warning, second 
warning, third warning. I believe that our HR is 
working on some of that now‖.  
 
 Extensive training about 
applications and business 
processes  
 Explain with work related 
examples  
 Encourage use of 
knowledge in work  
 Provides incentives for 
education (gift cards) 
 
 
5.3.23 Clarity in business processes at CCIT  
 Establishing clarity in business processes is absolutely essential to maintain business 
integrity. This objective emphasizes the role of adequate understanding of the work flow 
and the coordination that is required for smooth operating environment. Unless the 
interrelationships of the business activities and the flow of information are clearly 
established, it is difficult to integrate appropriate security controls seamlessly and protect 
the business. Many businesses suffer vulnerability because of the lack of a deep 
understanding of the business processes resulting in inappropriate controls being 
implemented.   
At CCIT, the management believes that controls should be integrated in the business 
processes and build along in a way that there would be no flow of processes if controls are 
not executed. For governance purposes, it is crucial to understand the business system and 
dynamics of business processes within the systems for good security (Savola et al., 2007). 
Especially it is important to recognize linkages of information security with business 
processes and have abilities to create and distribute new knowledge horizontally and 
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vertically in organization by using normal business interactions (Savola et al., 2007). The 
right measure of the importance of an imbedded control is that you cannot do your 
business if you surpass the controls. As mentioned by project management manager:  
 Internal control means that you are following the right process, the right vigor, to 
 deliver what the business wants. What does that mean? It means that you have to 
 start in a clear, precise way about the scope of what you want. Clearly define the 
 requirements and then you get everybody who is involved to agree on those 
 [requirements] and then from there, you build out your processes. 
 
The controls should be aimed at improving the business efficiency. The provision of clear 
insight and advice in terms of IT strategy ultimately contributes towards an improved 
system of internal control that better supports the organization's overall corporate 
governance objectives (Myler and Broadbent, 2006).  The general sentiment of the 
management regarding controls is that it should be planned way ahead and instituted in the 
processes proactively and not as an afterthought (see table 5.23). The common belief of the 
management was echoed by, security manager: 
 I think they [controls] should be designed to help to ensure that your data and 
 processes are sound, that your money is accounted for and your resources are 
 applied correctly. Also, your performances and expectations are met as an agency. 
 It should basically improve the business process. 
 
There is again an apparent contradiction about what the management believes and what it 
does. At CCIT, the business processes are institutionalized and controls are always added 
as an afterthought. Service delivery being the prime business of the organization, it is 
important to ensure that data is accurate before providing it to the customer. A summary of 
efforts to achieve clarity in business processes is presented in table 5.23 below. 
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Table 5.23 Clarity in business processes at CCIT 
 
Objective Name Evidence from CCIT Measures  at CCIT 
Establish Clarity 
in Business 
Processes 
―I think they [controls] should be designed to help to 
ensure that your data and processes are sound, that 
your money is accounted for and your resources are 
applied correctly. Also, your performances and 
expectations are met as an agency. It should basically 
improve the business process‖. 
 Control the software 
purchasing system 
 Controls build along the 
business process 
 If controls are not 
executed, cannot run the 
business 
 
5.4 Relevance of ISG objectives at CCIT 
The management at CCIT identifies security governance as a strategic driver for ensuring 
effective service delivery to the other agencies under the City. The organization is in the 
process of redefining its security governance program. The desired changes in the security 
governance objectives in the new program are reflective of the managements‘ dedication to 
develop a critical IT infrastructure free from vulnerabilities. The proposed ISG objectives 
were discussed at length with the representatives from the top level, middle level and 
operational management in the organization. Depending on the nature of their roles, 
respondents from each level of the management identified with different types of 
objectives. The interaction with CCIT offers three different perspectives on the use and 
importance of the developed objectives. Each of these perspectives is discussed below and 
a synthesis is presented in conclusion of the section.  
  5.4.1 The top management perspectives on ISG objectives 
The top management is responsible for the defining the strategic direction, providing 
leadership and resources for the security governance program. The CIO and the directors at 
CCIT could identify better with the objectives with leadership and strategic aspects of 
security governance.  The objectives, Maximize resource allocation for controls, Ensure 
corporate controls strategy and Ensure visible executive leadership emerged as really 
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important for the top management at CCIT. By definition, the role of the top management 
is about strategizing and allocating resources for security purposes (Ansoff, 1985). The 
objectives Ensure punitive structures, Ensure formal controls assessment functionality, 
Maximize management commitment and Ensure ethical and moral values were rated as 
important for the success of the security governance program.  
The top management at CCIT believes in commitment to security governance initiatives 
and consequences of non compliance are very important for the success governance 
program. Establishing separate controls assessment functionality could only help the cause 
of strong controls in the organization. As explained by the chief security officer:  
 He [CIO] is supportive of our actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues, the 
 other directors, who need to approve it but have no clue about it. But we depend on 
 the CIO to get the things done. He helps in getting them [other directors in the city 
 council] on board.  
 
The top management perspective about security governance at CCIT is about emphasizing 
the importance of resource allocation for making sense of the controls program. This 
perspective emphasizes the importance of resource allocation in attaining a feasible 
security governance program. Resources in the form of finances, people and technology 
are essential for effective security governance. As one audit officer pointed out: 
 A strategy for good governance is good, but we do need the resources, may it be in 
 the form of money, people or infrastructure. 
 
The extant research literature in this area recognizes the importance of the objectives 
important to the top management at CCIT. The need for controls strategy has been 
articulated in the research literature even though not explicitly. In the literature, there have 
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been explicit calls that information security should be integrated into an organization‘s 
overall management plan (Perry, 1982; Lane, 1985, Smith, 1989).  
Perry (1982) argues that computer security and control strategy establishes a climate and 
need for control. Since strategy is such an integral part of control design, it must be 
understood and formulated prior to designing the controls. Organizational strategy 
establishes the managements‘ intent, concern and means to achieve the control objectives 
(Perry, 1982). Management needs to convey the expectations about the controls to the 
employees. Thompson and von Solms (2008) argue that it is a part of the governance 
duties of the executive management to encourage employees to adhere to the behavior 
expected to contribute towards the successful protection of information assets. The 
executive leadership should espouse that controls are important and be consistent in 
behavior to convey what is espoused is real (Drennan, 1992). This should ultimately lead 
to the shared tacit assumptions of employees becoming aligned with these espoused values 
of the organization, thus progressing towards an Information Security Obedient Culture 
(Thomson and von Solms, 2008). The management has to be proactive and work towards 
changing the corporate culture, and the resulting employee behavior (Drennan, 1992). This 
leads to establishing punitive structures which allow policing and safeguarding 
organizational resources within the organization. 
5.4.2 The middle management perspective on ISG objectives 
Establishing process integrity through efficient auditing practices, standardization efforts 
and superior technical competencies come together as key aspects of information security 
governance for the middle level managers at CCIT.  The middle management perspective 
is in emphasizing the due process in achieving process integrity for information security 
governance. The objectives that emerged as the important ones to the middle level 
managers at CCIT are Ensure Efficacy of Audit Processes, Ensure data criticality and 
clarity in control development process. The middle level managers believe that audit 
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should be done frequently. The control development process should have clarity and data 
criticality should be strived for through adequate access controls and authorization 
mechanisms. As senior audit manager explained: 
 If you don‘t understand that HR may be the one place you go. I [an employee] 
 don‘t understand what it [polices and procedures] means, ask this upfront.  Having 
 to own the policies, it [the management] should be responsible for the procedure 
 for this procedure, be responsible for answering those questions. Clarifying the 
 concepts helps people in believe in the governance program in the management. 
 
Also, the objectives Encourage Standardization of Controls and Maximize trust building 
mechanisms were deemed significantly important by this group of people. The middle 
level managers strived for developing benchmarking standards in controls development. 
The managers also believed that trust within the organization and with the stakeholders 
outside the organization is crucial for the success of the security governance program. 
Research literature acknowledges the importance of the objectives identified by the middle 
level mangers at CCIT. Data criticality is important and if organizations do not ensure that 
all employees understand their information security roles and responsibilities, it may 
become difficult to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
assets (NIST Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 12). For governance purposes, it is 
crucial to understand the business system and dynamics of business processes within the 
systems for good security (Savola et al., 2007). Especially it is important to recognize 
linkages of information security with business processes and have abilities to create and 
distribute new knowledge horizontally and vertically in organizations by using normal 
business interactions (Savola et al., 2007). This perspective of ISG acknowledges 
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importance of developing and maintaining process integrity for security governance. 
Management should be concerned about creation, protection and distribution of knowledge 
in the organization as it is a sources of competitive advantage (von Krogh, 1998). This 
allows a controls strategy to fit into the overall organizational strategy for business growth 
and security is viewed as a strategic governance issue (Lane, 1985, Smith, 1989). All the 
above measures require trusting people in organization to do the right thing at the right 
time in the right way. Trust measures work within the organization to coordinate and 
improves the controls initiatives and outside the organization to enhance the perception 
about security governance efforts of the management.   
 5.4.3 The operational management perspectives on ISG objectives 
The operational management respondents comprise security officers, auditing officers and 
help desk people. The operational people are the ones who are actually responsible for the 
operational efficiency of the business. The staff works with the controls on daily basis, yet 
their representation in the development process of the control is minimal. This group of 
respondents identified themselves with the objectives that emphasized the importance of 
individual user involvement in the success of security governance. There was a unanimous 
agreement in the group about the importance of having a control conscious culture in the 
organization. The operational people felt that the culture would guide them in times of 
confusion.  
The objective Maximize clarity in business processes was considered very important by 
this group. This is because the objective directly impacts their domain knowledge expertise 
and work. Clarity in business processes is crucial to develop controls that do not allow 
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vulnerabilities to seep in the business. Ensure Communication about Controls objective 
advocates well established communication policies about open discussions on controls 
between the management and the employees. Communicating was considered crucial by 
the operational people since it is really important for them to clearly understand the scope 
and intent of the controls. Maximize monitoring and feedback objective is also crucial for 
this group as it provides an opportunity to actually change the controls that hinder the work 
process. The objective Maximize Group Cohesiveness was rated as very important by this 
group. The respondents felt that peer pressure and behavior of other group members played 
an important role in the acceptance of the controls. Ensure Alignment of Individual and 
Organizational Values signifies the importance of individuals‘ value system aligned with 
the management‘s philosophy and organizational values. The respondents felt it is really 
important to understand if the organizational values are in line with their personal value 
system. The objective Maximize Training and Education implies continuous training and 
education of the end users and members of the operational group felt that unless adequate 
training is provided to them about the controls, no governance initiative will sustain in the 
long run. As mentioned by a security officer: 
 They [users] need to be educated about the initial controls as well as the reasons for 
 change. Communicate clearly and effectively about the changes in controls because 
 things change, business needs change and so do controls. Business processes 
 should be well understood for this.  
 
The operational management people could identify more with the objectives that represent 
an underlying theme of the importance of individual participation for the success of 
security governance. This conjecture is supported by the research in information security 
  223 
governance area. Conscientious and diligent employees can become the strongest link in an 
organization‘s information security infrastructure (Henry, 2004). Pointing out the 
importance of individual participation in governance efforts, Thomson and von Solms 
(2008) argue that the environment within the organization has the most influence on 
employees‘ beliefs and attitudes. If there is a misalignment between individual and 
organizational values, the employees might move in the wrong direction and against the 
expectation of the management (Kilmann et al, 1985). Such an environment can be 
detrimental to security governance in the organization and may lead to miscommunication, 
lack of cooperation from the employees and complacency in performance (Sathe, 1983).  
5.4.4 What do the perspectives mean for information security governance?  
The three perspectives at CCIT suggest three emergent dimensions of information security 
governance: user involvement, process integrity and resource allocation. A synthesis of the 
three perspectives suggests the relevance of all the proposed objectives for CCIT. The 
emergent perspectives are the conceptualizations about security governance that is 
reflective of the nature of the work an individual does and the kind of organization she 
belongs to. The perspectives from three levels of management are not something unique to 
CCIT. Research literature in management and information systems suggest three 
dimensions of managerial decision making. Weill and Ross (2004) and Peterson (2004) 
suggest similar dimensions or perspectives in organizational governance for information 
technology. The authors claim that actions of decision makers across business units in the 
organization requires three coordination mechanisms namely process based, structural and 
relational. Process-based mechanisms are the formalization and institutionalization of 
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strategic IT decision making or IT monitoring procedures (Peterson, 2004). This dimension 
is similar to the middle level managers‘ perspective about the importance of process 
integrity for security governance at CCIT.   
The structural mechanisms are formal positions, roles, teams, and committees established 
to coordinate decision making in business and IT (Peterson, 2004). This dimension is 
similar to the top level management perspective about strategy and resources at CCIT. It is 
not surprising that the development of controls strategy and allocating resources for 
controls emerged as most important objectives for the top management. The relational 
mechanisms foster voluntary and collaborative relationships among corporate executives, 
IT management, and business management (Peterson, 2004) to help in clarifying 
differences and find creative solutions to problems. Self-control can be helpful in this 
environment (Kirsch, 1996). IT staffers often demonstrate a sense of ―belonging to the IT 
team‖ because of their common expertise and training. If the managers implement clan 
controls (Ouchi, 1979) self-interested behaviors can be reduced. This dimension is similar 
to the operational level managers‘ perspective about importance of individual in the 
success of controls.  
The dimensions proposed by Weil and Ross (2004) are in the context of effective IT 
governance in an organization. Being a subset of the overall IT governance in the 
organization, information security governance domain can theoretically extend the 
concepts. All of the three perspectives need to be integrated for designing comprehensive 
security governance at CCIT. All the objectives fall into one or more of these perspectives 
and are extremely relevant for the organization. A security governance program needs to 
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be designed along the lines of these underlying objectives such that the benefits from such 
a program are maximized. Based on the discussion about the emergent themes from the 
three perspectives, the relationship between the dimensions is shown in the figure 5.2 
below.  
 
Figure 5.2 The User-Process-Resource (UPR) matrix for information security governance 
The proposed User-Resource-Process (UPR) matrix shows the interdependence of the three 
dimensions of ISG. In the above matrix, the intersection of the two dimensions, user 
involvement and process integrity results in four stages of ISG, dependent on the resource 
allocation dimension. The lower quadrant on left side represents low process integrity and 
low user involvement with piecemeal resource allocation for controls. The result is poor 
ISG practices for organizations in this quadrant.  Moving away from this quadrant in the 
clockwise or anti-clockwise direction (it would be very difficult to move directly in the 
diagonally opposite quadrant) and organization can either increase process integrity or user 
involvement. The resources allocation in these quadrants would be skewed in either 
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direction (depending on which quadrant the organization is) resulting in mediocre ISG 
practices. For example, if an organization is in the top left quadrant, in here the resources 
are skewed towards more user involvement and less process integrity initiatives. Similarly, 
if an organization is in the bottom quadrant at right, the resources are skewed towards 
increasing process integrity and user involvement is neglected. To reach in the ideal state 
i.e. the quadrant at top on right, where there is high user involvement and high process 
integrity requires balanced resource allocation for both the dimensions. Organizations in 
this quadrant would have superb ISG practices and this is the desired state to be in. This 
matrix explicitly establishes the relationships between user involvement, process integrity 
and resource allocation for maximizing ISG in an organization.  
5.5 Discussion 
In phase two of the research, the data from CCIT clearly establishes the importance of all 
the information systems security governance objectives developed in phase one. The 
objectives are considered important by the organization and each and every objective, to 
some extent, is being realized by the management through various measures at different 
levels.  A list of the measures is provided in each discussion of every objective.  All of our 
objectives were supported by the data from CCIT. We had to revisit the list of sub-
objectives under each objective. After several iterations, based on our understanding of the 
objectives and CCIT, the list of sub-objectives was condensed. The following subsection 
discusses about the refining process of the objectives in details. Further exploration for 
new underlying constructs from the data was done but no new objectives emerged.  
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A careful evaluation of each objective was performed based on the evidence from the data 
to corroborate the claim of CCIT actually meeting that objective. A subjective 
understanding of various measures employed by CCIT to actually realize each and every 
objective was also developed. Combining both the evidence as well as the measures 
suggests an understanding of the objectives in the organization and the management‘s 
desire to actually meet the objectives. There were some apparent contradictions noticed in 
what the management claimed versus what it actually did. These are discussed below.  
5.5.1 Refining ISG objectives: Lessons from CCIT  
 We initially developed 23 objectives and 245 sub objectives in our fist phase of the study. 
We conducted several interviews and shared our objectives with the managers and the 
operational level employees at CCIT. We shared and discussed our objectives and sub 
objectives with two goals. First, we needed to understand if the objectives make sense to 
CCIT. To achieve the first goal, we generated discussions to understand ―how do the 
proposed objectives influence its security governance practices‖. Second, we wanted to 
develop a parsimonious set of sub objectives that could more effectively be communicated 
for security control design purposes. To achieve this goal, we showed our sub objectives to 
the respondents and got their opinion on how well the sub objectives, without redundancy, 
conveyed the essence of the objective. The first goal was achieved by triangulating various 
sources of data (interviews, manuals, memos, policies and audit directives) at CCIT and 
critically interpreting it in light of the developed objectives. The analysis was presented in 
the previous section.  All our respondents at CCIT unanimously felt that there was no 
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redundancy in our objectives. Each and every objective presented a unique and important 
dimension of information security governance.  
Table 5.24 Condensing sub objectives at CCIT 
 
Objective  Initial sub objectives  Final sub objectives  
Ensure 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
Define controls for compliance with regulations  
Encourage regulatory compliance to internal controls  
Encourage respect for laws of the society  
Ensure regulations are followed 
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and sustained 
improvement in business processes 
Ensure that the regulations are followed 
Avoid turning compliance into ―check the box exercise‖ 
Explain the importance and need for compliance to 
technical people 
Understand the impact of regulations on controls  
 
Formalize process of compliance in the organization  
Use regulations as a catalyst for better practices  
Follow regulations in entirety  
Establish a compliance culture 
Encourage development of 
controls for regulatory 
compliance  
 
Ensure that compliance is a 
substantive and sustained 
improvement in business   
processes 
 
 
Encourage diverse groups 
about importance and need for 
compliance 
 
Ensure compliance is used as a 
‗catalyst‘ for security 
governance  
 
 
For our second goal, we found that there was a lot of redundancy in the sub objectives. The 
respondents believed that many of our sub objectives were suggesting the same idea and 
could be actually condensed into one category that conveys the main theme. For example, 
table 5.24 shows the case of the objective ―ensure regulatory compliance‖. We started with 
14 sub objective in this case. Our respondents suggested that the first 4 sub objectives 
suggested the same concept, that of encouraging controls development for compliance. So 
having 4 sub objectives signifying the same thing added redundancy to the objective. In 
essence all the 4 sub objectives were clubbed or merged to develop one single sub 
objective ―Encourage development of controls for regulatory compliance‖.  
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Similarly the last four sub objectives in the middle column pointed towards the same 
theme of using compliance as means to make security governance better. Hence all the 
four sub objectives were condensed to form a single sub objective ―Ensure compliance is 
used as a ‗catalyst‘ for security governance‖. In the same way, we discussed each of the 
objectives and sub objectives with members at CCIT and condensed the sub objectives for 
a more parsimonious set of sub objectives. We condensed the initial 245 sub objectives to 
88 sub objectives. In one case, we had to change the label of our objective. We initial had 
an objective labeled ―Encourage proactive controls initiatives‖ (see table 5. 25) 
Table 5.25 Changing label of objectives and condensing the sub objectives 
 
Objective Name Sub objectives  Condensed sub objectives  
Encourage 
proactive controls 
initiatives 
 
Renamed as:  
 
 Maximize  
resource 
allocation for 
controls  
 
Establish suitable environmental and physical 
controls  
 
Ensure adequate resources allocation for 
maintenance of controls   
Discourage individuals from feeling restrained due to 
resources  
Provide resources for compliance 
 
Encourage co-ordination between MIS and 
accounting for controls 
Establish controls proactively 
Ensure enough resources for 
controls  
 
Enable appropriate  
environmental and physical 
controls  
 
 
 
Ensure cross functional group 
agreement on controls   
 
 
After analyzing the sub objectives, our respondents felt that the label did not necessarily 
convey the underlying theme of the objective. So the objective was renamed as ―Maximize 
resource allocation for controls‖ as suggested by the respondents. Again in this case, 6 sub 
objectives were condensed into three. We believe that our data at CCIT helped us better 
articulate our objectives and develop a parsimonious and coherent set of sub objectives.  
5.5.2 Emergent Issues  
Regulatory compliance issues 
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First issue that emerged is about the organization‘s stand on regulatory compliance issue. 
We talked to several people in the management and the signals were contradictory. 
Explaining the benefits of regulatory compliance, the manager of internal audit division 
said, 
 Regulations are very helpful. It gives you guidelines like there is a blueprint that 
 you are comparing with a real operation to see whether there is a match. If the 
 operation matches the blueprint, that is great. If not, where are the differences? 
 Why are those differences here to begin with? It is very important to have such 
 guidance 
 
Some of the managers agreed that regulations are a big driver for the organization to revisit 
its internal controls objectives. The regulations helped the organization to reorganize 
things for the compliance purposes which was helpful as it is something to it should have 
done anyways. Regulatory compliance efforts helped the organization to achieve the 
resources that it should have gotten to make the controls better. Compliance helped the 
organization in providing the much needed boost to improve its control efficiency. With 
the top management supportive of the compliance efforts, the organization would be able 
to utilize the opportunity to make lot of changes it wished for.  On the other hand, the 
manager, infrastructure services, when enquired about the regulations as drivers for 
changes commented: 
 No it [regulations] does not drive anything, should it? Probably, I don‘t think it 
 does because there is no mechanism or there are no means to enforce them. I mean 
 when is the last time you heard that anybody got in trouble for violating HIPAA? 
 Never! Who is enforcing it?  
 
This statement depicts the perception of some of the senior mangers in the organization 
and also the overall informal attitude of the organization about compliance. Some of the 
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members of the management felt that compliance is only reactive and take things 
backwards. Any organization that takes its internal controls program backwards or starts its 
controls development process looking at the regulations would never succeed in having 
good security governance. People felt that compliance is the job best left to the auditors. 
The employees have to participate at the minimum only providing what the auditors need 
to let them off the hook. The prevalent sentiment in the organization about regulatory 
compliance is what was shared with us by manger end user services, ―They [regulations] 
are of no help to me but to them [government] it is the right thing to do‖. Most of the 
organization did not see any value for the organization in the compliance efforts. But what 
is the actual state of affairs in this regard for the organization; compliant it is and lots of 
resources are devoted by the organization in being so.  
Internal auditing issues   
The second issue that emerged is about the state of internal auditing in the organization. 
Almost all of the respondents felt that auditing is something very crucial to establish the 
importance of security governance objectives. The CIO believes that auditing adds to the 
deterrence efforts and creates a consciousness about the controls. The senior manager 
added that:  
 Auditing is no different to that [as a mechanism to inventory in the military]. They 
 [auditors] come in and they check and look at best practices. We add time to this so 
 that we can follow up on it, so that we are compliant to the direction that we agreed 
 to move on it. They [auditors] need to follow up again based on dates that we 
 customers told them to check if we would meet their recommendations.  
 
The management feels that there are several benefits of performing regular audits within 
the organization. The auditors, who have industry experience, are in a good position to 
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assess the performance of the management on security governance issues and provide an 
independent their party perspective about the state of affairs. The independent assessment 
assures other stakeholders such as regulators and investors and helps in building the 
organization‘s goodwill. Also, the auditors provide a benchmark assessment about the 
controls and provide a direction for the future governance initiatives. The manager, 
security, seemed really optimistic about the auditing of the organization and commented: 
 I think that if I took over, if I became the CIO, I would be looking at every one of 
 my teams and I would tell them to ―prepare yourself‖ for an audit. I would 
 bring an auditor here and each one of my teams will get audited. That would give 
 me a base line, for me as a new boss to work on. I can only  improve, if it got any 
 worse, my job should be gone that‘s what I would do. Economy improves if the 
 government works well.  
 
Considering the fervor and the emotion attached to auditing by the management, it 
appeared that the organization was frequently audited and took the feedback from the 
auditors to improve the security governance process. On the contrary, there are very few 
audits in the organization and the perception about auditing is not very favorable in the 
employees. Commenting about the frequency of the internal auditing, manager () shared;  
 We have had so far 3 audits. One desktop support, one licensing and helpdesk and I 
 think one was administration. I believe that is all it is. I have been here 9 years. 
 It‘s [auditing]  not frequent. We are pretty much organized and we are not too bad 
 to get it. 
 
Through our observations and informal conversations to the employees and managers, the 
reason for this apparent contradiction was, to some degrees, clear. It seems that at a typical 
state agency, auditing, over the years, has been used as a tool to punish agencies that create 
trouble for the top management. Thus, if a particular department is not following the orders 
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or doing things in a manner which is not appreciated by the bosses higher up, that 
department or agency is subjected to an immediate audit. This way the trouble making 
department is answerable to the bosses ‗higher up‘ for the findings by the audit team. Now, 
this might not be the case at CCIT. It is possible though that the bosses higher up are happy 
with CCIT and hence a lack of audit. Whatever the reason might be, it is apparent that 
perception about auditing in the organization is not a constructive one.  
Segregation of duties issues 
The third issue that emerged from our data alludes to the organization‘s position on 
segregation of duties. The interview data suggests that, for the most part, management 
feels that segregation of duties as a control is very important for the organization. As 
shared by the manager, infrastructure services: 
 How do you deal with this [internal fraud or security breaches]? Design proper 
 controls. Ensure responsibility and accountability, have multiple layers of  controls, 
 segregate duties, have auditing. Segregation of work is important,  make sure 
 people in a group just keep doing what they are doing and never cross the line. 
 They should not know about how others do their work.  
 
The security team felt that segregation of roles is a very important control for security 
governance. It is as important as designing correct access controls and authorization 
mechanism for the systems because an inadequate segregation of role would provide 
unauthorized access to people who have no reason to get access to certain things. For 
example, the developer who writes the code for the application that is used for the meter 
reading purposes in the City, should not have administrative access to the system. There 
are chances that if he can misuse the administrative access and get into the production 
environment and make changes which no one can notice or know. An inappropriate 
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segregation can be devastating to the integrity of the business processes. The management 
at CCIT understands this and claims to follow this practice of segregating the roles to the 
core. As shared by manager administration;  
 You have to have internal controls to have separate roles for people so that you 
 know employees are never put in a position that looks like compromising. If you 
 are writing the checks, you are never going to be the one balancing the budget 
 and showing in the checks or something like that. If you are writing the checks, 
 there is someone else to find what you are doing, who tells u how to write the 
 checks, so that if you are absent my business continues to move. In my 
 administration staff, I have done all of it.  
 
But we did get evidence to believe that segregation of the roles are not done all the times. 
There have been instances where people have had inadequate accesses in the name of cross 
training in the organization. The manager of administration seemed to understand and 
know this but was unapologetic nonetheless. Sometimes, in name of cross training, the 
staff at helpdesk performs the job of assessing the adequacy of their own work. There is a 
helpdesk team (say primary) that takes request from the city users and there is a team (say 
secondary) that supports their functions as back up. There is another team (say 
surveillance) that performs frequent and random checks on the work requests to ensure that 
all work orders are being addressed adequately. There have been times when the person 
doing the primary work of support checks his own work the next day in the surveillance 
team. The manger justifies this in name of cross training. She shares; 
 Cross training is your safest bet. You can‘t have one person with all the 
 institutional knowledge, you will die. You have the take the risk, it‘s worth it.  
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This situation can create a major vulnerability for the organization where the primary team 
members do a fraud and approve the fraud next day from the surveillance team. Many of 
such issues are overlooked by the management in name of resource crunch and 
understaffing. It appears that there could be a potential fraud lying somewhere in this 
organization which in matter of time would be detected. Since nothing has gone wrong so 
far and all the employees are old and trusted by the manager does not guarantee that things 
would remain as they are in the future.  
In summary, the contradictions proposed in this section remain unresolved. We have 
suggested, based on our understanding of the organization and its culture, some line of 
reasoning to make some sense of the anomalies. Currently, a theoretical analysis to explain 
the anomalies observed at CCIT is beyond this scope of this research. However resolving 
these anomalies call for a fresh investigation into the matter with new set of research 
objectives and scope. We intend to work along those lines in the future.  
To summarize, the case study at CCIT allows us to empirically reexamine the objectives 
proposed in phase one of the study. This research, for the first time in information security 
governance research, proposed theoretically and empirically developed security 
governance objectives and then validated the objectives through case study data. Some 
issues emerged from the data which have been documented. The issues explained in this 
section remain unresolved. We have suggested, based on our understanding of the 
organization and its culture, some line of reasoning to make some sense of the problems. 
Currently, a theoretical analysis to explain the reasons for the issues observed at CCIT is 
beyond this scope of this research. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
In conclusion, the case study at CCIT provided interesting insights into security 
governance objectives and practices in a real organization. The management in the 
organization is dedicated to the cause of developing robust security governance practices 
and thinks proactively about all the aspects of a good controls program. All the objectives 
developed in the phase one of this study are reexamined in this case study. Most of the 
objectives are being used in this organization and the remaining the objectives are 
appreciated by the management and are being considered for their security governance 
program. We have presented a list of measures that CCIT takes to achieve the proposed 
objectives and the evidences from the case study in support of the objectives. This chapter 
presents a list of 6 fundamental and 17 means objectives for maximizing information 
systems security governance in organizations. These proposed objectives are based on 
theory, grounded in the values of organizational stakeholders and empirically examined 
through a case study. The next chapter presents a synthesis of the entire research and 
answers the ―so what‖ question about this research, both phase one and two.   
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CHAPTER 6 Interpreting ISG Objectives: A synthesis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the all-important learning for successful development of ISG 
objectives in an organization, which has emerged from both the phases of our study, 
Interpreting the meanings and implications of the developed objectives, the principles for 
good ISG are proposed. The emergent principles are the basic propositions for achieving 
adequate ISG in organizations. The goal of the chapter is to synthesize our findings and 
establish its significance by articulating the new insights from the study. In order to 
articulate the findings, two questions would be answered. First, how can organizations 
achieve adequate ISG? Second, what are the contributions of this research which go 
beyond current thinking? The entire chapter aims at answering these questions.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Following the introduction, the second 
section presents the principles of ISG which are proposed and establishes their 
significance. A means-end framework for maximizing ISG is presented. In section three, 
the developed objectives are positioned in context with other leading governance 
objectives in literature. A discussion is then generated about the relevance of the objectives 
in the light of other established ISG objectives. Finally, a concluding section is presented 
with implications of the research.  
 6.2 ISG principles for organizations   
The objectives developed in this research help in increasing the importance of information 
security governance in organizations. A critical analysis of the data from the study 
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suggests interrelationships between the objectives and emergent ISG principles. By 
definition, fundamental objectives help directly in achieving the strategic objectives of the 
decision context and means objectives lead to the fundamental objectives. Organizations 
can maximize ISG by achieving the six fundamental objectives. In this section, we present 
a discussion about how organizations can achieve the fundamental objectives and the 
principles of ISG.  Based on the relationships, a means-end framework is presented.  
6.2.1 Defining a Corporate Controls Strategy   
Security presents several governance challenges, which require new policies, technologies 
and organizational capabilities (Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Karyda et al., 2005). These 
challenges could be in the form of: new unwanted costs for protection of assets, the 
diversion of resources for controls purposes creating new vulnerabilities; temporary nature 
of solutions. A controls strategy helps in planning and coordinating in advance to meet 
these challenges. The strategy for security governance defines the business context in 
which information security will be managed and prioritizes the resources allocation for the 
objectives. The real benefits from the information would not be achieved if the information 
systems and technologies are applied in an unfocussed and piecemeal way (Doherty and 
Fulford, 2006). The process of formulating an information systems plan helps to explicitly 
focus the planners‘ attention on available opportunities for exploiting information (Ward 
and Peppard, 2002). 
There is evidence in research literature pertaining to information security governance 
which corroborates the relationship between strategy, leadership and management 
commitment. For instance, Lane (1985) suggests the integration of security into overall 
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enterprise strategy. Security governance would get its due in an organization only as an 
enterprise strategy issue. Shupe and Bheling (2006) argue that successful deployment of 
any IT plan requires management commitment, a structured decision making process and a 
strategy based on an understanding of the vision and architecture of the organization. The 
awareness for the need for control strategy is increasing (Shedden et al, 2006). Effective 
control strategies require efficient risks management processes. Management needs to be 
committed to implementing an effective risk assessment procedure where vulnerabilities 
and threats are identified. These can then guide the implementation and monitoring of 
control strategies and measures (Whitman and Mattord, 2005). Therefore, a structured 
methodology for developing a strategy will increase the likelihood of success of the 
corporate initiatives (Shupe and Behling, 2006). Any strategy would fail without consistent 
support of the management (Wright, 2007). Regular meetings and briefings with the top 
management keeps the focus on the ongoing nature of security governance for the 
management and establishes the importance of the controls. This leads to our first principle 
of information security governance:  
P1: Security governance activities shall be planned, coordinated and executed by 
developing a strategy for controls by the leadership to encourage management 
commitment for allocating resources. 
 
Security controls planning and resource allocation needs strategic attention. The problem 
with the existing security guidelines, prescriptions and best practices is that all of these 
take an operational view of risks. Research literature suggests forward planning for 
likelihood of attacks and argues that plans, programs and actions that reduce the frequency 
and seriousness of incidents, reduce risks. More often, organizations take a standard 
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approach, based on best practices, to controls formulation and deployment. Standard 
frameworks assume that controls are applied universally, have no strategic influence and 
are not context dependent.  
The strategic management of security controls focuses on the competing demands for 
enterprise resources and their opportunity costs, and seeks to identify security benefits that 
justify related costs (Anderson and Choobineh, 2008). At the strategic level of an 
organization, the benefits of information security (considerable reduction in damages and 
losses), must be balanced against security costs (Sklovos and Souros, 2006). Expenditures 
for security that exceed this balance may further reduce expected losses, but may be 
excessive given their opportunity costs (Gordon and Loeb, 2006). The role of leadership 
and management commitment is crucial in achieving the controls strategy. Also, resource 
allocation for security governance is a part of the strategy and can not be optimized 
without the management‘s total commitment to the governance program.  
Our data suggests that visible executive leadership influences the management to become 
more committed towards the security governance initiatives. If the leader is committed to 
governance program, he ―draws in‖ the management and ensures that management 
provides all the right inputs for controls. For instance, the CIO at CCIT is really committed 
to the security controls initiatives and it is due to his dedication that the security 
governance program is effective. As shared by the security manager: 
 He [CIO] is supportive of our actions. The hard part is getting to his colleagues, 
 the other directors, who need to approve it but have no clue about it. But we 
 depend on the CIO to get the things done. He helps in getting them [other directors 
 in the city council] on board. 
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 Management commitment is also required for maximizing resources for allocation of 
controls. The management has to be committed to security governance initiatives for the 
controls to work as intended. Controls require resources in the form of finance, people and 
technology. Resources are imperative to be able to develop a dynamic control structure. As 
we found at CCIT, managers at CCIT rely on their bosses to provide such resources. As 
explained by the security manager; 
 I would recommend going to the top and finding out what the management really 
 wants and then working with those supervisors to find out what it takes to serve 
 that operation everyday. Make things available. You have to have the top on 
 board with the work. Find out what you can do with these resources. 
 
Involving the management in day-to-day activities is the first step in getting their attention 
and eventually the resources. At CCIT, employees keep the management in the loop about 
all initiatives and discussions about controls. For example, when the organization needed 
new resources in reference to the security policies development, the security manager 
presented all the available resources to his boss. This way the money was made available 
for the subscription to some firm‘s website. Research literature also suggests a relationship 
between management commitment and resources allocated for any initiative. It is 
managements‘ responsibility to articulate security risks in a way that resources are not 
compromised (Wright, 2007). Managers influence the top management about priorities for 
security governance that includes the induction of adequate skilled and knowledgeable 
personnel or security specialists. Shupe and Behling (2006) suggest appointing a team to 
conduct strategic planning for resources to carry forward the control program.  Leadership 
should understand the tradeoffs between high security, usability and cost (Savola, 2007). 
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These tradeoffs are strategic decisions and should be taken in the planning stage of the 
security governance program. It is important to involve the managers as well the users in 
strategic planning about resources. The success of the decisions depend on the operational 
level management (Savola, 2007).   
6.2.2 Developing regulatory compliance within organizations 
Regulatory compliance is a crucial aspect of an enterprise security governance program. 
Emergent from our study, and supported by the research literature, there is a tangible 
relationship between audit efficacy, business process clarity, deterrence practices and 
regulatory compliance preparedness. Measuring the compliance preparedness and 
enforcement has become pivotal to good Information Security Governance in general (von 
Solms, 2005). In preparing for regulatory compliance, an in depth knowledge of business 
processes is required. Leading regulations describe specific requirements for various IT 
related business processes which require comprehensive documentation to demonstrate 
how personnel decisions implement standards and regulations. Clear business processes 
help the auditing function fish for anomalies in the systems. Frequent audits can help 
organization maintain the clarity in processes and also the fear of non compliance. This 
helps in increasing the probability of being caught in case of deviant behavior. 
Management needs to evaluate compliance with the regulations to estimate effectiveness 
and possible shortcomings (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). Auditing can help to determine 
areas for improvement (Myler and Broadbent, 2006). Given the regulatory environment in 
IS domain, the importance of security audit functionality is exponentially increasing. An 
audit process is a strong tool to contrast the policies versus practices of an organization. 
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Based on the discourse above, our second principle of information security governance is 
proposed: 
P2: Business process clarity should be encouraged through efficient audit processes and 
punitive structures to achieve compliance. 
 
Auditing deters the creation of anomalies in organizations. By virtue of the fact that they 
are watched, employees tend to behave in accordance with rules. As suggested by the CIO 
at CCIT: 
  They [auditors] make people honest. If you know someone is watching and will 
 look at what you are doing, you know it makes a difference. Even if you don‘t 
 look, 90% of the time just the threat that you are going to be looked at, and you 
 don‘t know when, makes a big difference on compliance. I would like to put this 
 down to human nature. 
 
The clarity of business processes improves efficacy of audit practices in the organization. It 
is crucial to understand the work flow in an organization such that the controls can be 
integrated into the business processes in a manner integral to the functionality of the 
system. Auditors require well understood and established business processes to examine 
the flow and suggest ways to enhance the integrity of the process. Management should 
ensure that there are established acceptance criteria for the performance of systems which 
helps the auditors to check the actual performance of the systems versus the expectations 
from the system. An assessment of actual versus expected performance of the system helps 
in testing the accuracy of the data that is provided to the customers in the organization.  
The verification of the anomalies in the business process requires external intervention in 
the form of auditing. Auditors can be efficient only if they are able to understand the 
intricacies of the process and can then suggest how integrity can be restored in the system.   
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Security governance requires an end to end view of the operations in an organization which 
can be achieve through clarity in business process. Savola et al. (2007) argue that 
understanding the dynamics of business processes is crucial for governance purposes. The 
linkages of security with business process helps in creating knowledge horizontally and 
vertically in organizations. The vulnerabilities in business processes can lead to breakdown 
of compromise of the systems, intentionally or otherwise. In such cases, preventive 
security mechanisms and active deterrence measures protects the organization. Darcy and 
Hovav (2007) argue that combined proactive and preventive approach to security deters 
users from IS misuse. Frequent audits are one of these preventive tools. Auditing helps in 
achieving good security governance providing traceability of user action and a chain of 
evidence that can be reconstructed to actually understand when and how the system broke 
down (Swanson, 1996). Audit controls track the operations on file and in-built audit trail 
capabilities in the software. This helps in accessing logs for pattern of usage. One of the 
most important usage of audits is to help the organization in meeting regulatory 
compliance (Goel et al, 2006). Security countermeasures include deterrent administrative 
procedures (such as frequent audit) and preventive security software, lead to lower 
computer abuse (Straub, 1990).   
This study also shows that regulatory compliance requires standardization of the controls 
such that the stakeholders of the organization are able to trust the management with critical 
information. Clarity of controls development is a must for actually standardizing controls 
and establishing trust within and outside the organization. Regulations are basically 
intended to protect the interest of external stakeholders, such as the investors and the 
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business partners. Standardization of the controls is one of the best strategies to proactively 
establish respect for the organizations security program (May 2005). Loss of trust and 
confidence which results from an organization‘s inability to meet the expectations of users 
and to protect their identity and privacy would compromise business objectives. This leads 
to our third principle of ISG: 
P3: Standardization and clarity in controls should be developed to enhance trust within 
and outside the organizations and to achieve regulatory compliance.   
 
Regulatory compliance helps organizations do things in a manner that is consistent, 
transparent and open for review. Clarity in controls development process assures an 
expected pattern of behavior which leads to enhancing intra-organizational trust for 
security measures (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). Trust is an indicator of a series of direct 
relationship with people and not with a series of organizational entities or polices 
(Fleming, 2007). If there is lack of trust in the organization, regulatory compliance would 
be compromised and would be not entirely in the spirit of the legislation.    
Standardization of controls helps in trust building both within and outside the organization. 
The standardized control and established procedure for security governance facilitates the 
communication process within the organization and outside it, with other agencies. The 
management should encourage standard protocols for controls development as it makes it 
easier to find the deviations in the systems and help in covering any vulnerabilities. As 
shared by an internal auditor from energy industry: 
 An organization should regularly compare and analyse its security state, 
 investments, and actions in relation to others in its market sector and community of 
 practice. 
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Standardized controls help in ensuring that expectations on the stakeholders‘ part are being 
met. In case of non compliance with agreed procedures, the standardized controls structure 
also communicates the need to be compliant and consequences of non compliance. 
Research literature suggests that one of the main purposes of having standards is to ensure 
effective trust with stakeholders.   
Clarity in control development process leads to trust building mechanisms as well. Clarity 
and transparency in control development process helps end users in understanding the need 
for the controls for security governance and their individual roles in fulfilling the need. At 
CCIT, through clear controls development, the management conveys that it wants to 
protect the employees from committing avoidable errors through sheer ignorance. The 
management also provides support in clarifying the doubts of the end users about the 
controls. As shared by the security manager, 
 If you don‘t understand anything, then HR may be the one place you go. I [an 
 employee] don‘t understand what it  means, I ask this upfront. Having to own the 
 policies, it [the management] should be responsible for the  procedure, be 
 responsible for answering those questions. Clarifying the concepts helps people to 
 believe in the governance program in the management. 
 
The practice of supporting employees‘ efforts to understand controls establishes an 
environment of trust in the organization. Top management should ensure that there is a 
formalized route available when employees have doubts about controls and they should be 
able to get the confusion cleared. This also assures the employees that the management 
wants to protect them from causing unintentional harm and getting into trouble, and that it 
is actually protecting the employees. Also clarity in controls helps other business partners 
to identify with the controls and trust the management to take due care of the critical data.  
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6.2.3 Defining continuous improvements for controls   
In this research, continuous improvement of controls has emerged as a key requirement for 
adequate ISG efforts. One of the important aspects of information security governance is 
testing and validating controls against business requirements. Business needs are dynamic 
and change with time and so should the controls which are designed to protect this 
information and processes. A change in the business needs should be reflected in the 
corresponding controls. This can be achieved by regular monitoring and feedback on the 
controls, by providing adequate training and education to the users and by communicating 
the changes clearly inside the organization. The monitoring and review of controls post 
implementation is a critical phase for success of the overall controls program (Shedden et 
al, 2006). End users should be able to understand the changes in controls so as to be able to 
use the systems properly. This can be achieved through developing open communication 
policies where discourse about controls is encouraged. The employees should be willing to 
comply with the use of the controls. A monitoring technique can be effective only if the 
employees understand and are willing to use the controls and provide feedback (Booker 
and Kitchesn, 2006). This willingness can be increased through training about controls and 
communicating the uses and needs for the controls. Straub and Welke (1998) suggest 
feedback leads to develop better communication channels through departmental meetings 
and informal chatting. The results in this study suggest a healthy relationship between 
frequent communications, regular monitoring and feedback and training and education 
with continuous improvement in controls. This leads to our fourth principle of ISG: 
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P4: Frequent communication should be encouraged through regular monitoring and 
extensive training for iterative development of controls 
 
Monitoring and feedback channels in the organization add to the effectiveness of 
communications about controls. Management needs to constantly revisit the controls based 
on the feedback from the employees. The feedback needs to be communicated in a way 
that it is actually incorporated in the next iteration. The security officer at CCIT articulated 
this best when he said:  
 We need to constantly monitor and develop an evolving environment which is 
 changing continuously. I mean this can be done through talking to people, by 
 communicating properly and then actually going and constantly modifying it based 
 on what they say. 
 
Training and education improves communications about controls. Training, specifically 
about controls, emphasizes using knowledge about the relevance of controls in daily 
practice. The end users should be adequately trained and educated about usage of controls. 
The knowledge thus imparted leads to more enquires and frequent communications about 
the controls. As the security director said: 
 Make things very clear to the employees, these are our policies, these are our 
 procedures and controls and these are our expectations. It is essential to 
 communicate this. Education and communication are absolutely vital.  
 
Training in security controls create effective communication channels and facilitate open 
discussions and debates of important issues about controls. Regular training helps in 
surfacing the lack of knowledge about the security and control issues and effective 
communications help in resolving those issues.   
This study also suggests a relationship with resource allocation, clarity in control 
development and formal controls assessment functionality in achieving continuous 
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improvements in controls. Resources are required to institute changes in the governance 
structure. The acceptance of the changed and improved controls would be enhanced when 
the process of control development is open and transparent. This clarity in controls 
development process facilitates quicker adoption of the changes being introduced in the 
governance program. Instituting controls assessment functionality ensures that all the 
control initiatives are centralized and adequate budgetary allocations are appropriated for 
security governance purposes. One of the major drawbacks for controls program has been 
the lack of resources. The centralized functionality ensures a cost benefit estimate of the 
controls for long term benefits. This leads to our fifth principle of ISG: 
P5: Controls development shall be clear, transparent and easily understandable to the 
organizational members’ and adequate resources need to be allocated to institute formal 
controls assessment functionality.  
 
At the strategic level of an organization- the benefits of information security (reduced 
damages and losses) must be balanced against security costs. The strategic management of 
security focuses on the competing demands for enterprise resources and their opportunity 
costs, and seeks to identify security benefits that justify related costs (Anderson and 
Choobineh, 2008).   
Resource allocation for controls is required for developing formal controls assessment 
functionality in an organization. Resources for controls are always an issue as controls 
assessment is not a separate functionality and no department owns up this cost. As 
explained by the security manager CCIT: 
 The biggest problem is that controls have limited resources. We want to do so 
 many things but can‘t do it.  Like it [controls] needs to be constantly modified and 
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 monitored but that [modification and monitoring]  needs investment. Do we have 
 separate money for this as a department?  No-we are always facing a cash crunch. 
 
Adequate controls always require good resources to protect business integrity. However 
good the security governance plan is, if there are no resources to support that plan, not 
much can be done. As explained by the security manager in a healthcare industry: 
 Everything comes down to the cost of the risk. How do you balance cost of the 
 control versus the risk? Risk is great; and cost of control may be worth it. How do 
 you balance cost of the risk to the control? 
 
Resources would be available if there is separate controls assessment functionality with 
individual controls budgets. Developing control assessment functionality is a new concept 
introduced by this research and currently does not have any support from research 
literature.    
Clarity in controls development also helps the cause of creating formal control assessment 
functionality. Our data suggests that if there is clarity in how controls are being defined, it 
would be easier to have a formal controls assessment entity that could validate the 
requirement of the controls and provide adequate support for it. As explained by a senior 
manager, software development, in financial services industry: 
 Clearly define the requirements and then you get everybody who is involved to 
 agree on those [requirements] and then from there, you build out your processes. 
 You need to formally integrate the requirements into the controls and do periodic 
 assessment of these [controls]. 
 
Lack of clarity in controls can lead to vulnerabilities endangering systems. Formal controls 
assessment functionality looks into the possible vulnerabilities and seeks solutions to deal 
with the threats. As explained by a manager, purchase department, electronics industry:  
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 If you suspect what is generated is not right, then you should investigate instead of 
 giving a blanket approval to all transactions. This is where assessment of controls is 
 required, does it work? 
 
There exists a pressing need for developing a formal control assessment functionality 
which can centrally manage the information security governance activities. 
6.2.4 Establishing a controls conscious culture in organizations 
Control conscious culture is achieved when the implicit knowledge about the security 
controls starts guiding the day-to-day activities of the employees in the organization. This 
entails that controls have to become the part of the corporate culture (Thomson and von 
Solms, 2008). Controls have been internalized by the employees and have been accepted at 
an informal level of management as well. This state of security governance can be 
achieved if the individuals are able to align their values about controls with those of the 
organization. The controls culture is crucial for security governance as it can act as a 
powerful, underlying set of forces which establishes individual and group behavior within 
an organization (Schein, 1999). Encouraging group cohesiveness helps in propagating the 
right values for security controls. Our study suggests that controls conscious culture is 
facilitated by strong communications, cohesive groups and alignment of individual and 
organizational values about controls. This leads to our sixth principle of ISG. 
P6: Controls consciousness shall be developed through regular communications and 
forming cohesive groups which leads to alignment of individual and organizational values. 
 
Management should espouse similar values  to those it practices in order to help employees 
identify with the organizational values about controls. If the beliefs and attitudes of the 
employees are addressed by the management, it leads to changed actions and behaviors of 
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the employees and synchronizes with the overall corporate security culture in the 
organization (Thomson and von Solms, 2008). If there is alack of alignment several 
problems occur such as miscommunications and lack of cooperation from employees 
(Sathe, 1993). Hence communication channels should be established and debating the 
controls in the open should be encouraged. Normative controls would always be required 
to hold together the security governance initiatives and these controls comprise values, 
belief systems and culture for the individuals (Dhillon, 2001). Communication activities 
with the stakeholders are critical for controls (AS/NZS 4360, 1999; Bandyopadhyay et al, 
1999). Fuller et al (2007) suggest that there exists a positive relationship between 
interactivity and knowledge retention about information assurance in an organization. The 
interactivity is best facilitated by open communication. Establishing controls culture 
requires enhancing group cohesiveness in the security teams. This allows a coherent 
interaction channel with the management. A team approach to information security is 
absolutely necessary if an adequate level of information security is going to be achieved 
(Wood, 2006).  
Establishing open communication polices about controls helps in individual and 
organizational alignment of values and maximizes group cohesiveness. Effective 
communication practices help in explaining management values and ideology in a way 
such that users can identify with the organizational values for controls. To ensure an 
alignment of end user values and organizational  values, it is critical to communicate 
about the policies, procedures, controls, strategies and controls. As explained by a security 
manager at CCIT: 
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 Communication is important but the hard part is to ensure that users continue to 
 listen to you. Something that is going to bring the users on board ought to be 
 helpful so that the users can find it appealing.  Something they can identify with, so 
 yet again their values come in play. 
 
Communicating about controls develops clarity about their intent and scope. This clarity is 
required for individuals to understand what is expected from them and whether it is 
something that they can or want to do. At CCIT, the controls were made appealing to the 
end users by communicating something which makes their work and life easier; it‘s about 
them and not the bosses. Communication plays can important role in bridging the gap 
between individual and organizational values about controls.  
Communications also influences the group cohesiveness in the functional groups.   
Managers should encourage frequent communications with their groups as it makes the 
group ‗tight‘. At CCIT, inter group communications about controls and security related 
responsibilities make the groups more cohesive and the managers strive to protect their 
group members against all odds. Cohesive groups influence the behavior of the individuals 
in the group and there are chances that individuals will better align their values with those 
of the organization in the realm of security governance if the groups‘ values are aligned. It 
is evident at CCIT that the individual adopts the groups‘ values about security governance 
as their own. Their perception about security controls is almost the same as their groups‘ 
perception about security governance. The management should understand these needs of 
the individuals and always ―sell controls‖ to the end users as something to protect the users 
from harm due to ignorance.   
6.2.5 Establishing clarity in policies and procedures in organizations 
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Higgins (1999) argues that the information security ‗policy is the start of security 
management‘.  The strategic information systems plan is a critical prerequisite for policy 
formulation (Doherty and Fulford, 2006).  Information security policy is the basis for the 
dissemination and enforcement of sound security practices, within the organizational 
context (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002; Doherty and Fulford, 2005). David (2002) argues 
that formal policy is a prerequisite of security. Similarly, Lindup (1995) asserts that 
security policies are the foundations of information security management. Establishing 
data criticality requires clarity in policies and procedures. Efficient audit process and 
clarity in controls development help in achieving data criticality. An audit process is a 
strong tool to contrast the policies versus practices of an organization. Our results suggest 
that clarity in policies and procedures can be achieved through data criticality, frequent 
audits and clear controls development process. This leads to our seventh principle of ISG: 
P7: Data criticality shall be established by ensuring frequent audits and a transparent 
controls development process to enhance clarity in polices and procedures.  
 
Audit provides traceability of user action and chain of evidence that can be reconstructed 
to actually understand when and how the system broke down.  Real time auditing can also 
help in detecting other problems in the system other than break downs, thus ensuring the 
data integrity, confidentiality and availability. Controls, where possible, should be 
transparent or viewed as positive contributions to job performance. Complex controls that 
increase constraints on people should be minimized (Parker, 1996). Clarity in controls 
development process and incorporating controls in systems development would lead to 
better technical controls and thus enhance data criticality (Dhillon, 2001). Separation of 
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duties between developers, testers and administrators in operational facilities reduce risks 
of unauthorized actions (Myler and Broadbent, 2006).  This separation is ensured by audit 
functionality. Thus frequent audit provides users with confidence in the integrity of data. 
The end result is trust in the IT infrastructure which is really valuable in today‘s business 
world (Tickle, 2006).  
Audit efficacy leads to ensuring data criticality. It is essential that these controls and access 
are constantly revalidated and checked from an independent perspective. This is where the 
important role of auditors comes into play. Segregation of duties, right access and adequate 
authorization mechanisms are required for data criticality. Auditors ensure that these 
mechanisms are sound and work for the organization. As the internal auditor at CCIT 
suggests: 
 Is it possible for developer to go into production data base and goes to his or her 
 own household and reduce consumption by 50% every month? If that‘s possible 
 and then you get audit break down, you have a controls breakdown. So whenever 
 you have people that have unwarranted access such as developer has access to 
 production, we [auditors] need to come in.  
 
The efficacy of audit practices depends on how well the auditors are able to protect the 
data in the system. Auditing ensures that during changes in roles, access to information is 
changed as well. Auditors bring in a lot of experience and knowledge about best practices, 
suggest changes which are important and follow up on the implementation of those 
changes. Clarity in controls development process also helps in establishing data criticality 
in an organization. To maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data, it 
essential to develop clear controls for access, authorization, classification and segregation 
of duties in data usage. Also, change management controls are crucial in ensuring 
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criticality, which can be a potential source of threat to an organization. At CCIT, the 
management makes sure that people follow the controls or else they would be kicked off 
from the systems. This requires that everyone be clear about the controls and the business 
process, which help in establishing data criticality.  
6.2.6 Establishing responsibility and accountability structures in organizations   
It is important that organizational members own up the responsibility of their actions and 
are accountable for their decision for the success of any security governance program. 
Responsibility and accountability in structures requires visible leadership that motivates 
people to be responsible in their jobs and take the blame for their actions. Leadership can 
set an exemplary ethical and moral environment which allows the members to trust the 
management about its intentions. Increased awareness and individual accountability can 
greatly affect how security practices are implemented in an organization (Mellor and 
Noyes, 2006). This study suggests that responsibility and accountability structures is 
established in an organization with the help of leadership guidance, ethical and moral tone, 
punitive structure and trust building measures. The research literature supports this 
relationship.  This leads to our eighth ISG principle: 
P8:Trust building measures shall be appropriated through executive leadership and 
punitive structures to establish the right ethical tone for the organization for the assigning 
of responsibility and accountability in its structures. 
 
Corporate boards, that undertake the challenge of IT oversight, show that they understand 
the scope of their corporate accountability and responsibility, and are proactive in their 
leadership duties (Myler and Broadbent, 2006).  To establish trust and ethical conduct, 
leadership should be able to ―walk the talk‖ and espouse controls that are important and 
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then follow these personally (Drennan, 1992). It is the part of executive duty to set an 
exemplary ethical and moral conduct for the employees to follow (Thompson and von 
Solms, 2008). Senior managers can communicate policies and codes of ethics to guide 
employees (Krull, 1996). It is the responsibility of management to serve as a role model for 
the behavior it wishes to promote (Krull, 1996).  
Information Systems professionals generally demonstrate a solid understanding of 
information security ethics as they apply to organizational goals (Pearson et al. 1997). 
Normative controls aimed at guiding the ethics and morality in the organization are 
important. The security technology design often neglects the moral or ethical element of 
the governance process which is one of the most important aspects of security management 
(Gupta and Sharman, 2008). Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) suggest that instilling value 
based work ethics would help in ensuring an ethical environment which will lead to 
employees abstaining from unacceptable behavior and a secure organization. Mutual trust 
between employees and management is important to ensure that responsibilities are 
internalized by the employees. Lack of trust in policies and procedures can make the 
employees alter systems and simply not comply with controls such as not sharing 
passwords or taking confidential data out of the office on laptops (Booker and kitchens, 
2008). Punitive structure also helps in acceptance of ethical codes in the organization. For 
maximizing deviant behavior, it is best to reinforce positive beliefs and attitudes. In other 
words first clarify what behavior is acceptable through clearly establishing the ethics and 
morality valued in the organization.  
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Ensuring ethical and moral values helps in establishing the punitive structures in an 
organization. The ethical environment in the organization creates normative pressure on 
the people to do the right thing and not break the law. Personal values and morality shapes 
an individual‘s tendency to conform to the laws and rules. As explained by the manager 
infrastructure manger at CCIT: 
 So we can make a rule, we can make a law that you have to be honest. I mean, in 
 reality, our personal values, our own values should define that we are going to do 
 the best we can, do the right thing at  any point of time. If my personal values 
 allow, then only will I follow the rules. My personal belief is that you can‘t 
 legislate that, you can‘t provide enough legislation to do that. 
 
Visible executive leadership helps in propagating ethical and moral values in 
organizations. Executives in visible leadership positions should lead by example. This is 
exactly what the administration manager at CCIT does.  Leadership also leads to trust 
building mechanisms in an organization. The executive leaders, who build the controls, 
need to be trusted by the employees who actually use the controls. As security manager 
CCIT explained:   
 It‘s very complex [developing controls]. Reach out to HR, legal people; get all 
 resources to learn from them. Draft things that can actually work for everyone. You 
 need to take all stakeholders in confidence, win their trust, and ensure that you are 
 working for them [individuals] not against them. It is what they need.  
 
Leaders have to win the confidence and trust of the stakeholders to successfully implement 
the security program. Thus we postulate that visible leadership leads to trust building in the 
organization. Research literature in this area supports this claim.  
Our study suggests that establishing punitive structures helps in trust building mechanisms 
in an organization. Clear punitive structures in an organization establish the fear of 
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consequences of non compliance with the rules. This environment leads to the formation of 
more trusting relationships between employees and the management. The employees need 
to clearly know what‘s acceptable and that it‘s their personal responsibility to make sure 
things do not deviate from normal behavior. It provides a fallback plan for the employees 
where they know they can trust the management to be fair and just, in cases of beaches 
which are not their fault.   
Management should ensure that all the policies and procedures are easily accessible to 
employees leading to clear deterrence criteria. Having established the boundaries for the 
employees, management facilitates an environment of trust by relying on the individuals‘ 
sense of responsibility to do the right thing every time. It is important to establish the 
framework within which individuals can be flexible with work responsibilities. There are 
equipments lying around at CCIT without any extra precaution or surveillance to protect 
them from theft but nothing has gone missing ever. This is because people trust each other 
and know what happens if they get caught. Deterrence leads to trust not only within the 
organization but also for the outside stakeholders such as investors, regulators, partners, 
possible clients and employees.   
In summary, based on data from phase 1 and phase 2 of this study, we developed a means-
end framework (Figure 6.1) for maximizing information security governance objectives in 
organizations. The paths in the diagram show a directional preference. The relationships 
are postulated based on our understanding of the data, observations at CCIT and the extant 
research literature in information systems security governance area.  
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Figure 6.1 Means-end framework for maximizing information security governance 
The framework contains six fundamental objectives integral to maximizing information 
security governance in an organization. There are seventeen means objectives that add to 
these fundamental objectives and play a subsidiary role in attainment of the final strategic 
objective of maximizing information security governance. A detailed discussion on the 
implications of the fundamental objectives and ways to achieve these objectives is 
presented earlier.  
6.3 Discussions  
The key to setting the right controls is defining the correct control objectives. In order to 
know if a control is effective or not, the first questions that the management should pose is, 
―Do we have the right objectives?‖ (Galloway, 1994) Considering the importance of 
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having the right objectives, this research suggests a set of control objectives that have not 
been articulated, emphasized or used in information security research. All the objectives 
developed in this research are rooted in the research literature for information systems 
security, information systems security governance and related disciplines such as strategy, 
management, psychology and sociology. The cross functional nature of security 
governance needs to justify the inputs from other disciplines. While most of our objectives 
have been acknowledged in the extant literature, some of them have not been emphasized 
enough. Objectives such as ―establish control strategy‖, ―establish deterrence criteria‖, 
―establish clear control development process‖, ―establish formal control assessment 
functionality‖, ―ensure efficacy of audit processes‖ and ―enhance group cohesiveness‖ call 
for special attention. Our analysis suggests a crucial role of the above objectives in 
information systems security governance. Neither the commonly used security 
management standards nor the available security governance models highlight any of these 
above objectives. These objectives seem like anomalies in the commonly used governance 
frameworks. A search for the word anomaly in dicitonary.com shows ―a deviation from the 
common rule, type, arrangement, or form‖. There is little support for the above objectives 
in security governance area. Hence, we propose these objectives as ―theoretical anomalies‖ 
since the governance models have not mentioned these objectives. It should be noted 
though that some of the sub objectives of the above mentioned governance objectives do 
get mentioned in the research literature (see chapter 4 for discussion of above objectives). 
But none of the available frameworks argues for the above objectives specifically. We feel 
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these objectives are important on their own and need to be considered for comprehensive 
governance programs. Each of these five objectives is briefly discussed below:  
Issues and concerns with a corporate control strategy: Control strategy is required to 
understand the security governance environment and how it fits with the overall 
organization‘s business strategy. Organization‘s security requirements should be driven by 
enterprise requirements and the solution should fit enterprise processes such that strategic 
benefits are realized (Anderson, 2001). Control strategy helps in aligning security 
investment with enterprise strategy and agreed upon risk profile. There should be an 
alignment between the organization and its control environment. The alignment process 
involves arranging internal structures and processes in a way that people can come up with 
creative strategic alternatives and develop new competencies to meet the challenges of the 
future (Jemison, 1981). We have seen that organizations are increasingly using 
management control systems to enhance their strategy process (Simons, 1995) as controls 
may be used as agents to secure strategy implementation (Marginson, 2002). Simons 
(1994) posits that control systems are used by management to overcome organizational 
inertia, communicate new strategic directions, establish implementation timetables and 
ensure continuing attention to new strategic initiatives. 
Realizing the importance of controls in the overall strategy of organizations, it seems 
logical that developing controls strategy goes a long way in establishing effective security 
governance.  At least out data suggests that it will. But there has been no clear call in 
information security research for establishing a control strategy or in practice.  
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Issues with creating punitive structures: To enforce the controls effectively, it is indeed 
important to establish two things upfront; what non conformity with controls could mean 
and what are the consequences of non conformity? As observed by a respondent:  
 None of these control measures will work if key individuals and the 
 organizationlack the fortitude to enforce the rules and the remedial solutions 
 [internal audit director, federal agency]. 
 
 In situations of strategic change, control systems are used by managers to formalize 
beliefs, set boundaries on acceptable strategic behavior. Deterrence criteria shape the 
perception of the workforce about ―what is expected‖ from it. Clearly establishing the 
expectations of the organizational members reduces the pressure from the management in 
explaining right from wrong. Establishing deterrence criteria should also include    
defining and measuring critical performance variables and motivating discussion and 
debate about strategic uncertainties that help organizations pass through changes (Simons, 
1994). Research in security of information systems has acknowledged the importance of 
establishing deterrence criteria for enhanced enterprise security. Dhillon and Torkzadeh 
(2006) argue that deterrence is an important objective for maximizing security in 
organization. Straub and Welke (1996) have used general deterrence theory for 
establishing the need for deterrence activities in the organization. But there has been a lack 
of effort in information systems security governance research to establish deterrence as an 
important objective for governance. This research puts a stake in the ground and argues for 
the establishment of deterrence criteria for effective security governance. This study 
suggests that rewarding conformity and punishing non conformity with controls can 
actually help the organizations in managing security. This is identified as a theoretical 
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anomaly since most of the information security governance frameworks do not include this 
objective.   
Issues with establishing clarity in control development process:There should be 
transparency in control development process. Clarity in control development process 
increases the probability of all stakeholders having a clear understating of the intent and 
scope of the controls. Simon (1994) argue that clear controls and procedures and 
designated liaison roles along with a strong, comprehensive code of conduct and more 
contingent pay for more employees are associated with fewer occurrences of crime. As 
voiced by one of the respondents: 
 First and foremost information systems are, or contain, property that is a group 
 asset.  It is important to establish how individuals charged with its security (often 
 everyone in an organization) value and take care of property that is not their 
 own. The designed controls convey the message, ―do your job properly and 
 protect your asset‖. Controls should be clear in this [Chief executive officer, 
 financial services industry] 
 
To our knowledge, there has not been a single information security governance framework 
that emphasizes clarity of controls development as an objective. Control development 
process should be integrated with the business processes such that each and every control 
developed answers a clearly established need in the business process and the cost of not 
complying is obvious to the users. This is an important finding of this research and calls 
for acknowledgment from researchers and sincere efforts to establish it in common 
practice.  
Issues with establishing formal control assessment functionality:Anthony (1965) defines 
management controls as the process ―by which managers assure that resources are obtained 
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and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization‘s objectives 
(p. 17)‖. As suggested by our data, in order to realize this role of controls, formal control 
assessment functionality should be established. As a separate department, controls 
functionality would be in a better position to attract enterprise resources, develop better 
oversight capabilities, assess the needs for controls, monitor investments, get the requisite 
attention of top management and influence the corporate security culture. To our best 
knowledge, no information security governance framework has suggested a separate 
controls department.  This study found that establishing formal controls functionality 
would exponentially boost security governance efforts and a step of this proportion is long 
over due. As one respondent opined by a respondent 
 What makes a car run? what makes it fast? Brakes!  you are never growing to drive 
 a car fast if you do not have breaks. Lot of people use security controls just like 
 brakes. In  fact, the security controls itself means  that the business can run faster, 
 you do not have to worry. That‘s light ball for a lot of people, security controls  
 agency, Virginia].  
 
Controls should be integrated with the business processes. Considering the impact that 
controls have in managing business, a call for formalizing a separate entity for controls is 
warranted.    
Issues with enhancing group cohesiveness: Cohesive groups implementing and using 
security controls can be more effective than groups which are dominated by rivalry, 
politics and favoritism. Security initiatives call for cross functional collaboration and it is 
important that the members on the group view the group favorably. As Anthony (1988, pp. 
10) mentions, management control can be considered as 'the process by which managers 
influence other members of the organization to implement the organization's strategies' 
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(Anthony 1988: 10). Such influences are perceived positively in a cohesive group. This 
aspect of security governance has not been highlighted in research literature and increasing 
―group cohesiveness‖ as a governance objective has not been proposed so far.  As 
observed by a respondent:  
 Again sharing comes into play. We all must be able and capable of trusting 
 everyone in the organization  that comes into contact with our shared assets. 
 The ability to maintain confidence is a good measure [Director of  integrated 
 systems security in public safety industry]. 
 
Many of the security initiatives fail due to lack of coordination between various 
functionalities (Wood, 2006; Fleming, 2007). Organizations tend to repeat mistakes and do 
not learn from their experiences as there is a lack of alignment between various 
occupational communities within itself (Schein, 1996). The operational and midlevel 
managers have different shared assumptions and objectives which are not aligned with the 
objectives preached and practiced by senior managers. Taylor (2006) argues that it is 
management‘s misperception of risk causing behavior and its technology based approach 
that ignores human factors that must be addressed for increasing security. Considering the 
importance of group behavior in success of security initiatives, it seems fair to raise a voice 
for group building efforts and incentives.  
All the five objectives discussed here are important for security governance. Though some 
of these objectives have been alluded to by the researchers but there has not been enough 
emphasis to any of these objectives in information security governance research. These 
objectives clearly, play crucial roles in holistic information systems security governance. 
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More research is required to understand the incorporation of these objectives into 
organizational security governance frameworks.  
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter synthesized the results of both the phases in this study and the implications 
drawn from this research. The emergent principles of information security governance 
from the proposed objectives were identified and its implications for research and practice 
were discussed. A means-end framework was constructed based on the data from the study 
and research literature available in this domain.  This study presents some information 
security governance objectives that have not been identified in the research literature. 
These ―theoretical anomalies‖ are listed and implications are drawn. 
The following chapter will summarize the findings and review the entire thesis. The 
theoretical contributions, methodological contributions and practical contributions shall be 
discussed. A discussion on possible criticisms of the research approach and design will be 
raised and conducted. Potential future research directions stemming from this research 
would also be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Overview of the research 
This research argued that information security governance objectives in information 
systems need to be grounded in the values of the organizational stakeholders.  This 
argument is based on the premise that if the values of the employees in the organization are 
reflected in the security governance objectives; then there are better chances that the 
objectives would produce the intended result i.e. better security. The motivation of the 
research lies in the fact that there is hardly any work in information security governance 
area that presents security governance objectives which are theoretically grounded and 
empirically validated. This research is the first serious attempt to develop security 
governance objectives that are theoretically established and empirically validated in an 
organizational context.  
On the practical side, this research is motivated by the lack of sound ISG objectives in 
organizations, leading to catastrophic losses due to misuse of information. Security 
breaches cost billions of dollars in direct losses, downtime, stolen identities and intellectual 
property thefts. Fiascos such as demise of the Barings Bank, Kidder Peabody‘s inability to 
institute adequate internal controls and Enron‘s failure to ensure integrity of business 
processes points to the increasing importance of governance structures. At a high level, 
governance structures created specifically for ensuring information security are called 
information security governance (ISG) practices.  
There are several models such as COBIT, COSO and ISO 2700 available in the industry to 
guide organizations towards sound internal control structure. These models are popular and 
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widely used. But the cases of security breaches due to inadequate controls being unable to 
prevent these breaches are increasing. This situation calls for a serious revisit of these 
models, with respect to organizational objectives for providing adequate information 
security governance to protect assets. An assessment of the contemporary frameworks for 
internal controls suggests two problems with the use of these models. First, all the existing 
frameworks reviewed are atheoretical, based on experiences of the originators of the 
models themselves and derived from best practices in the industry. Second, none of the 
above frameworks provide guidelines specific to the creation of objectives of internal 
controls for information systems security. Either the focus is too broad covering much 
more than security or the guidance is not enough about using specific controls. Review of 
the research literature in internal controls for organizations does not shed much light on the 
process of creation of internal control objectives for information systems security. Internal 
controls for information systems security literature lack the rigor of a theory to guide 
research in this area. Research in information systems security area does not provide an 
appropriate theoretical basis to design internal controls for security. In conclusion, a review 
of internal control objectives, both in research and practioner worlds, suggests a need for a 
theoretical basis for internal controls. This will help to develop sound ISG objectives for 
dealing with security vulnerabilities. This research fills the gap by developing value based, 
theoretically grounded and empirically validated ISG objectives.  
This research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, a value focused assessment 
was performed to develop information security governance objectives. Value Theory was 
used as theoretical basis and value focused approach was used as the methodology to 
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develop 23 value based governance objectives. For this phase of the study, 52 semi-
structured interviews were conduced across 9 industries to elicit the values of people about 
security governance. These objectives which were well grounded in theory, were first of 
their kind to be developed in information systems security governance research. The 
developed objectives were clustered in two groups as suggested by Keeney (1992), namely 
fundamental and means. The objectives that directly help in achieving the main objective 
for the decision context are fundamental whereas the objectives that help in achieving 
other objectives leading to the fundamental objectives are called means objectives.  
In the second phase of the research, an interpretive case study was conducted to validate 
the proposed objectives in an organizational context. The single case study was conducted 
at the department of IT for a major city in central east coast of the United States. The study 
was completed over a six month period time from October 2007 to March 2008. The data 
collection methods primarily used in this phase were semi structured interviews, forms, 
reports, manuals in the department and through informal interaction and observations. 
Each objective proposed in the phase one of the studies was used to describe the case 
situations.  Some apparent contradictions were observed between what the management 
said should be done versus what was actually going on in the organization. These 
contradictions are documented.   
The findings indicated that all the objectives developed in phase one are important to the 
organization. All the objectives were supported by the data and the organizational 
measures to achieve these objectives were noted. Based on the data from the case study 
and the conceptual understanding of the researchers, a means-end framework was 
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developed. The data also suggested eight emergent information security governance 
principles. These principles are more like directives for organizations and can be used to 
design control related activities and tasks which will result in maximizing ISG.  
The remainder of the chapter discuses the contributions of this research, the evaluation 
criteria to establish the rigor of the study, the research design limitations and finally the 
future research directions stemming from this work. Each of the above mentioned topics 
are presented in a separate section.  
7.2 Contributions  
Any research endeavor should add to the body of knowledge in the subject area, to be 
deemed as legitimate. This research adds to the research literature in theoretical, 
methodological and practitioner streams. A discussion on each category of contribution is 
presented below.  
7.2.1 Theoretical  
This research makes a unique contribution to the information security governance field. It 
is a serious attempt aimed at formulating theoretically grounded and empirically developed 
and tested information security governance objectives. In this research, the objectives 
developed are grounded in the values of the organizational stakeholder and empirically 
validated through a case study. Since most of the models used for security governance are 
atheoretical and lack scientific support, the objectives developed in this research would be 
a significant addition to the body of knowledge in this domain. Also, there has been almost 
negligible research in the area of development of security governance objectives. The 
developed here should fuel further inquiry in this area.  
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Second, the means-end framework presented in this research postulates relationships 
between the objectives and is a theory development exercise. The suggested theoretical 
framework, based on data from the case study, is exploratory in nature and adds to the 
theoretical knowledge in information security governance area.  
Third, this research brings into light some subtle nuances of security governance that have 
not been emphasized in the research literature currently. For instance objectives such as: 
ensure clarity in controls development processes, ensure corporate control strategy, ensure 
punitive structures, ensure formal control assessment functionality, and maximize group 
cohesiveness. The above listed objectives have not been proposed as important ISG 
dimensions in most of the ISG frameworks available, both in theory and in practice. There 
have been passing references in literature about these objectives but most of the research in 
this area has ignored the importance of these objectives for overall success of the security 
program. We believe that these objectives are important in their own right and contribute 
greatly towards maximizing information security governance in the organization. These 
should be considered with other controls objectives for overall security governance 
maximization.  
Fourth, Value Theory provides an appropriate ontological and epistemological basis to 
elicit, interpret and structure individual values for better information security governance 
research. Using a theoretical lens such as Value Theory from the field of sociology to 
investigate information security governance issues has provided a rigorous platform for 
further research in this area. Bringing theories from other disciplines and applying them to 
information systems domain is a theoretical contribution to the field (Weber, 2006).  
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7.2.2 Practical 
This research has contributions to offer organizations working on security governance 
issues, mainly in four areas. First, it provides a sound list of security governance objectives 
that are comprehensive and ready to use. Even though, there are other available security 
governance frameworks such as COBIT that can be used by corporations, this framework 
is exclusively targeted at security governance purposes.   
Second, this approach allows the end users to participate in security governance programs. 
This allows a better alignment on user and organizational values. For practitioners in the 
real world, this framework provides guidelines about the importance of incorporating 
employee‘s perspective into control design to ensure better results of security governance 
initiatives.  
Third, a security governance assessment tool can be generated using these objectives and 
values. An artefact or a tool that can check the current level of security governance in 
organization vis a vis where the level should be is based on the values of the employees in 
the particular organization.  
Fourth, the ISG principles proposed in this research are like directives which can be used 
to achieve the objectives proposed in this study. Organizations can use the principles as a 
high level plan for ISG and develop specific activities to meet the objectives.  
7.2.3 Methodological  
This study also provides methodological contribution. Value focused approach provides an 
adequate methodology for empirical investigation of values. This approach is suitable for 
qualitative as well as quantitative techniques of research. Using this methodology in the 
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context of information security governance is a contribution to the body of knowledge in 
information systems security research. Using this approach to develop decision objectives 
allows better communication between stakeholders and facilitates a ―bottom-up‖ approach 
to management.  
 7.3 Evaluation of the research  
This research was evaluated using Klein and Myers‘ (1999) principles for evaluating 
interpretive field studies. Klein and Myers‘ suggest providing a summary of the research 
method, site, theory and key findings before actually assessing the work. This research was 
conducted as an interpretive field study in the IT department of a state agency. The theory 
behind the work is Value Theory, which is widely used in Sociology.  The findings are 23 
information security governance objectives and 8 principles of ISG. In this study, the 
principle of the hermeneutic circle was implied but explicit recognition was not given to it.  
As Klein and Myers (1999) found in the examination of the three sample articles that they 
evaluated, this lack of explicit recognition is due to the implication of the principle in the 
adherence to the other six principles. 
The principle of contextualization was achieved through a clear and descriptive case study 
write-up. The history and context of the study was established upfront. The lack of security 
governance objectives was acknowledged and the organization‘s transition from current to 
new policies and controls was shared. The third principle, interaction between the 
researchers and the subjects, has been alluded to but not explicitly. One of the researchers 
spent more than six months with the organization. The level of trust between the researcher 
and the subjects increased during this period. The informal relationship with the 
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respondents helped in getting insights that contradicted what was being said by the 
participants. So the interaction of the researcher and subjects was such that good informal 
communication sessions were frequent. This relationship influenced the data collection and 
hence the findings of the study.  
The principle of abstraction and generalization demands that idiographic details revealed 
by the data interpretation through the application of the principles one and two to 
theoretical concepts describe the nature of human understanding and social actions (Klein 
and Myers‘, 1999). This study was based on or guided by Value Theory. The guiding 
theory helped in understanding the importance of individual values in decision-making. 
Based on this premise, individual values about information security governance were 
elicited and converted into decision objectives.   
The last three principles are about researcher‘s sensitivity in data analysis. The principle of 
dialogical reasoning indicates the researchers‘ sensitivity towards vetting possible 
contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions and the actual findings. In this study, 
Value theory is the intellectual basis. Some of the objectives were claimed to be important 
in interviews but were actually not being followed. These contradictions were noted and 
apparent reasons for these were discussed. Hence dialogical reasoning was performed and 
discussed. The principle of multiple interpretations demonstrates how the researcher shows 
sensitivity to differences in interpretations among the participants to the same event. The 
multiple perspectives of the top management, the middle management and the operational 
management on the same objectives actually led to better synthesis of the results and the 
ISG principles were created. Hence, this principle of multiple interpretations was used in 
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this research. Lastly principle of suspicion, recommends that the researcher should be 
sensitive to possible biases and distortions by the participants. In this research, the 
operational level people inserted distortions about the role of other agencies into the 
success of the security program.  The top management believed that other agencies had 
minimal role to play in the success whereas others believed that due to politics, every step 
of the security policies and controls program would suffer delay.  
7.4 Limitations  
In this research or for interpretive field studies in general, there are two major areas of 
criticism- namely generalizability and researcher bias. A discussion on the generalizibility 
of the results is presented in chapter 3. In an interpretive field research, many of the 
findings do not hold true in other organizations. It is not the intention of this research to do 
so. The results are not generalizable in statistical sense but are generalizable to theory. The 
contributions in theoretical sense are presented in the previous section. Yin (2003) calls 
this analytic generalization which means theories used in other studies can be used as a 
template to compare the results.  
Another criticism could be that the researcher as the research instrument allows several 
confounding variables to creep in, which bias the results. The objectivity of the case study 
was maintained by the researchers by restricting themselves to the objectives developed 
during phase 1. The researchers maintained distance from the data and remained focused 
on interpreting the case situation in the light of developed objectives. By consciously 
stating the historical and intellectual basis of this research and involving what the 
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interviewees said in critical reflections, we refrained from falling prey to bias and showed 
how the various interpretations emerged in this research (Klein and Myers 1999).  
For data collection phase, we ensured that only individuals with substantial experience in 
using information technology with more than 5 years of managerial experience in relevant 
area were interviewed. Even though the interviewees appeared knowledgeable and 
concerned about governance issues, it is possible that their understanding about security 
governance is not a true representation of the actual state of affairs.   
7.5 Future research directions 
There are several streams of work that can arise from this research. Some of these are 
discussed below. 
The list of objectives developed in this research can be subjected to psychometric analysis 
with separate large samples. Development of a model for measuring information security 
governance could result from such an exercise. This research is more exploratory in nature 
and uses qualitative data to test the validity of the objectives and establishing the relations 
for means-end framework. But the next obvious step would be test the model using 
quantitative data and perform confirmatory factor analysis. The models thus developed 
could be tested using structure equation modeling techniques.  
Second, further investigation to establish relationships between means and fundamental 
objectives is required.  Statistical tests could be performed for each of the paths suggested 
in the means-end framework developed, rather than basing the relationships merely on 
arguments.  
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Third, more investigation is required to assess the correlations of the means objectives 
within a fundamental objective and also correlations of the fundamental objectives 
themselves. This stream of work requires quantitative data and multivariate analytical 
techniques for analyzing the data.  
Fourth, using multi objective decision analysis techniques, decision models can be created 
for organizations. These models can help prioritize resources invested for the objectives 
based on aggregate weights of the objectives and by ranking them in order.  
Fifth, the objectives proposed in this research needs to be operationalized in order to be 
achievable and useful in day-to-day activities. Further research is required to develop 
activities and tasks for every objective so that the controls can be optimally designed.  
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APPENDIX  
Interview Template for the study 
 
The interview will start with a discussion on informed consent. The researcher will read 
the attached consent form and explain in length about the consent form before the 
interview begins. The interviewee will sign the consent form before being interviewed.  
 
 List of guiding Questions  
 
1. What are your values about internal controls for information systems security?  By 
values we mean things that you feel are important and should be reflected in the 
controls.  
 
2. Please elaborate what things are important to you for control design with 
examples/stories/experience.  
 
3. Why are these things important to you in context of internal control design? Do you 
think these things make more secure information systems? How so? Elaborate. 
 
4. In an ideal situation, when you have to design internal controls for information 
systems security in an organization from scratch, what are the things you will like 
to include and why?  
 
5. Why do you think some of the controls work or do not work? Elaborate. 
 
6. How important is it, in your opinion, to incorporate the feedback of employees 
about such controls and why? Elaborate.  
 
7. There are many regulatory compliance issues forcing organizations to make 
changes in their control structure. Does compliance drive internal control design in 
your organization? How much? Explain.  
 
8. How important is it, in your opinion, to communicate the intent of such controls to 
employees? Does it make any difference in your opinion? How so? Explain. 
 
 
 
 
Interview Template for the second phase of the study 
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The interview will start with a discussion on informed consent. The researcher will read 
the attached consent form and explain in length about the consent form before the 
interview begins. The interviewee will sign the consent form before being interviewed.  
 
 List of guiding Questions  
1. What are your values about internal controls for information systems security?  By 
values we mean things that you feel are important and should be reflected in the 
controls.  
 
2. Please elaborate what things are important to you for control design with 
examples/stories/experience.  
 
3. Why are these things important to you in context of internal control design? Do you 
think these things make more secure information systems? How so? Elaborate. 
 
4. How important is regulatory compliance plan in your organization? Does is help 
the internal control structure in organization? Explain  
 
5. How can you improve the control implementation process? Elaborate. 
 
6. How important is it, in your opinion, to incorporate the feedback of employees 
about such controls and why? Elaborate.  
 
7.  How important is it to establish deterrence criteria for the employees? Can you 
share any experience where lack of deterrence proved to be harmful for the 
organization?  
 
8. How important is it, in your opinion, to communicate the intent of such controls to 
employees? Does it make any difference in your opinion? How so? Explain. 
 
9. What proactive controls initiatives are important to assure successful control 
development and implementation? Explain with examples 
 
10. In your opinion, is it helpful to have visible leadership for effective security 
controls? Why or why not?  
 
11. Does clear responsibility and accountability in structures help in implementing 
security controls effectively? Explain   
 
12. How does clarity in processes help in instituting controls? Explain 
 
13. Do you think audit helps in developing better control structure? Explain with 
examples 
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14. Do you think clarity in controls can be achieved through effective communications 
and training about the subject? Why or why not?  
 
15. Is it important to have a control strategy? Does separate control assessment 
functionality help in control implementation? Explain 
 
16. Is the culture in your organization help in understanding the importance of security 
controls? How so?  
 
17. Is the management involved in the controls development process? Is it helpful to 
get the management involved? Why or why not? 
 
18. Does your organization attempts to standardize the controls? Does it help? Explain  
 
 
 
Interview Log for Phase1 of the study 
Respondent Industry Role Duration 
(minutes) 
1.  Healthcare  IT Director  35 
2.  Credit card services  Security Manager 50 
3.  Insurance Security Officer 40 
4.  Telecommunications IT Director 60 
5.  Telecommunications Helpdesk IT specialist 30 (P) 
6.  Telecommunications Manager-HR 55 
7.  Credit card services IT Director 20 
8.  Telecommunications Manager-Accounts 70 
9.  Insurance Security Manager 25 
10.  Energy Helpdesk IT specialist 60 
11.  Energy IT Director 47 
12.  Insurance Helpdesk IT specialist 20 
13.  Credit card services Security Officer 25 
14.  Credit card services Manager-Accounts 10 
15.  Insurance Security Officer 80 
16.  Telecommunications Security Manager 90 
17.  Credit card services Systems Auditor 80 
18.  Healthcare  System Administrator 80 
19.  Internet service providers Systems Auditor 25 
20.  Credit card services Manager-Finance  15 
21.  State agency  IT Director 40 
22.  State agency  CIO 60 
23.  Insurance  Systems Auditor 60 
24.  Insurance  Manager-Administration 25 
25.  Insurance  Manager-HR 45 (P) 
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Respondent Industry Role Duration 
(minutes) 
26.  Health services  IT Director 50 
27.  Health services  CEO 15 
28.  Health services  Systems Auditor 30 
29.  Internet service providers Manager-HR 35 
30.  Internet service providers Security Manager 50 
31.  Financial investment Manager-Accounts 25 
32.  Credit card services  Systems Auditor 30 
33.  Internet service providers System Administrator 40 
34.  Credit card services  Systems Auditor 50 
35.  Internet service providers Helpdesk IT specialist 20 
36.  Banks System Administrator 45 
37.  Banks Manager-Administration 30 
38.  Real estate development Security Manager 15 
39.  Financial investment Security Officer 30 
40.  Financial investment Security Officer 45 
41.  Real estate development System Administrator 60 
 
 
Interview log for phase 2: CCIT 
 
Respondents  Roles Duration (minutes) 
1.  Chief Information Officer  60  
60 (repeat) 
2.  Security Director  45  
30 (repeat) 
3.  Security Manager  45 
40 (repeat) 
4.  Security Officer  40 
5.  IT Development-Manager  50 
6.  IT infrastructure-Manager 50 
7.  Administration-Manager 60 
8.  Help desk IT staff 1 30 
9.  Help desk IT staff 2 30 
10.  Internal Audit Director  60 
11.  Internal Audit Officer 50 
40 (repeat) 
12.  Project Management-Manager 45  
 
 
 
 
 
Table: Raw Values-Common Form Values-041008 
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   Maximize Information Security Governance  
 
No. Raw Values Common Form Values 
1.  Problems you come across are usually lack of 
awareness about controls  
Lack of awareness is a source of 
problems for controls.  
2.  With media hype and everything with respect to 
governance failure .. security is becoming very  
important for business. 
Responsiveness to media hype  
3.  Awareness and  responsibility for your action 
..know what you are doing 
Clarity of responsibility in organizations 
Accountability for actions 
4.  using some of your knowledge in daily 
practices and in dealing with organizational 
issues 
Leverage individual knowledge for 
ensuring internal controls  
5.  pretty much be aware of what people should do 
and should  not do 
Ensure awareness of organizational 
actions and practices 
 
6.   training implemented in such a way that .. you 
not only develop the principle of security or 
privacy  but also let them know what are the 
common uses of it …here you should be using 
them... 
Training should reflect principles of 
internal controls rather than means of 
ensuring security 
 
7.  social engineering, you have to watch out  
before you say any thing make sure they 
identify them self correctly. 
Increase awareness of internal control 
breaches through social engineering  
8.  contract employee are asked to reset password 
every month 
Define policies for access to information 
resources  
9.  making sure no single point if failure , 
unfortunately you have to remember more than 
one password for this 
Define multiple layers of controls  
 
10.  we do have some feedback from various people 
... not everything is convenient but people  are 
getting used to it.. There is no other option   
Define a system for incorporating 
feedback to improve controls 
Balance convenience with usability 
11.  controls are in the policy in order to impose the 
policy (meaning - ensure compliance – as 
interpreted by the researcher via probes) 
Ensure compliance with internal 
controls defined in the policy document 
12.  We all tend to bring along.. some of the 
experiences… it may not be… the way we put it 
one the table 
Individuals differences in managing 
internal controls  
13.  designed our audit program  overtime we 
changed .. so we are still undergoing additional 
tuning.. 
Internal audit control practices need to 
evolve with time and changing contexts  
 
14.  Certainly we take input from auditees. It‘s the 
part of the process  
Take input from various individuals 
dealing with controls on a day to day 
basis 
15.  Usually there couple of points of contact … 
who help coordinate our efforts and help in 
audit.. and those POC provides us with other 
point of contact 
Auditing and compliance with controls 
is also based on informal feedback from 
trusted informants 
16.  we sit down with these people we have this one 
on one with them… 
Sit with people individually and take 
their perspective on the process 
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17.  we might go back to the procedure and .. tell 
them what Joe told me… so they may fail on 
their own procedure… 
Internal control audit involves cross 
checking procedures with people 
18.  people who are really knowledgeable and know 
what they are doing ….-but hey haven‘t be able 
to push what they have been doing … because 
of the resources tie 
Individuals have ability to improve 
internal controls. 
Individuals constrained because of 
resource allocations 
19.  Generally speaking auditors think of themselves 
as…. I think they are somewhat of 
consultants… 
Internal control auditors are indeed 
consultants who ensure effectiveness of 
controls  
20.  some times controls fall through the crack.. they 
might be initially good controls but fail with 
change  
Internal control structures are not static.  
Proper change management needed for 
efficacy of controls 
21.  he has right access.. and the role changes and all 
changes TASK 
Controls should consider change of roles 
22.  we do not create controls.. we only test them.. 
we consult about them … TASK 
Controls need to be tested appropriately 
 
Controls are created by the management 
and employees 
23.  the appropriateness of access…and that‘s very 
high level generic controls… the specific which 
show appropriateness of access… the specific 
tool you may use very different. TASK 
High level controls are needed for 
direction 
 
Specific controls use different 
approaches by organizations 
24.  the organization restructure… what controls do 
you have to make sure you changes your 
procedure accordingly.. or do the procedures 
need to be changed 
Change management controls are 
important 
 
25.  The application should not be a black box 
(interpretation – clarity of processes). We 
should understand the processes. 
Clarity of business processes for internal 
controls 
26.  if you just even go to policies… and try to 
implement the control so that you can answers 
some of the question, you will be far ahead…. 
Encourage discussion on internal 
controls as identified in the policies 
 
27.  COBIT… gets some experts on COBIT.. It is 
pretty big model very generic. It teaches you to 
think about what you have to think about… 
Be aware of industry frameworks and 
models.  
They guide proper internal control 
formulation. 
28.  Look at COBIT and try to follow COBIT… you 
may need lot of interpretation…it going to be a 
long process…. Companies have separate 
COBIT implementation project.. 
Generic frameworks need interpretation 
 
Following industry frameworks requires 
preparations 
29.  They have taken over all the localized controls 
and centralized access controls… 
Balancing centralization vs 
decentralization (move to 9) 
30.  You can‘t say it‘s not our fault because it‘s your 
yard…. If you feel that you should have way of 
knowing that.. 
Consequences of internal control 
breaches should be communicated. 
(move to under 3 above) 
31.  regulatory compliance drives a lot what we do Encourage regulatory compliance to 
internal controls  
32.  Control consciousness came because of 
regulatory compliance. 
Establish a control consciousness culture  
Establish a compliance culture 
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33.  Auditing became more important Auditing has gained importance as a 
functionality 
34.  SOX is way too strong we might have to step 
down 
Regulations may be too strong to be 
followed in entirety – define appropriate 
internal controls in response to 
regulations 
35.  We have everything SOX talks about already 
build in just matter of depth. SOX helps get us 
there quicker… 
Regulations help in following the 
controls better  
36.  It helped a lot in a popularity of controls.. 
people are scared of SOX 
Failure to comply with internal control 
regulations scares people  
37.  Repeat compliance is a bigger pain. Repeat compliance with regulations is 
difficult  
38.  Resources should be classified…. Regarding its 
sensitivity whether it is a proprietary 
information 
Internal control structures should reflect 
sensitivity of data  
39.  Access to those data resources…. should be 
restricted 
Access to data resources should be 
restricted  
40.  Authorization which should come from data 
owner 
Identify data owners for sensitive data   
Authorizations should be linked to data 
owners  
41.  access controls needs to be self protected   Encourage individual responsibility for 
ensuring proper access to data 
resources.  
42.  Security controls needs to be driven from top of 
the organization to the bottom 
Top management involvement in 
defining internal controls for security  
43.  They set the tone for the entire organization… Top management should lead by 
example when dealing with internal 
controls  
44.  Executive should be aware in compliance era  Awareness of compliance issues is 
important 
45.  most important thing is the direction from 
above.. management supports security 
incentives 
Direction should be provided from the 
top management  
46.  proper design of security.. ownership.. 
Authority.. privileges and roles… are clearly 
defined…. as well as the data resources…. With 
their sensitivity 
Role and privileges need to be properly 
defined and documented 
 
Data resources should be clearly 
classified according to sensitivity level  
47.  most important thing is communicating that… 
to the individuals… an explanation to the 
individual about why 
Communication about the nature and 
scope of controls is important  
 
48.  Education is extremely important…  
 
Education of employees regarding 
internal controls is needed  
49.  the biggest impact from the facts that executive 
level…  are being held accountable… for what 
there organizations are doing… if the rules were 
not followed 
Executives should be accountable for the 
actions 
 
Rules should be followed  
50.  when you change executive level change 
towards security .. you will absolutely change 
Change attitude of executives about 
security controls  
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organization attitude for security….  
Executives impact the organization’s 
attitude towards security  
51.  Security is one key internal control… Security requirements define internal 
controls 
52.  Everybody got a security policy…and how well 
you keep them update. Communicate them.. 
maintain them or central to your security effort. 
Continuously update internal control 
requirements in security policies  
53.  Education as a control is probably…. is second 
most important thing in security. 
Education is an important control for 
security  
54.  controls over what people think are good.. 
usually starts with people… it need not be 
technology side. 
Controls need to be people oriented. 
Need to understand feelings, attitudes 
and belief of people.  
55.  security awareness training is good for 
control… 
Security awareness training is important 
for good controls  
56.  call security architecture review.. for anything 
goes into the production. 
Engage in an IT architecture review, 
which helps in correctness of design  
 
All program codes should be adequately 
reviewed  
57.  Part of our change management process is 
security.. architecture review..  which 
application developers.. …purchasing officials.. 
this meets security guidelines… and its another 
example of controls 
Change management process is 
important  
 
All guidelines for governance need to be 
defined by consensus 
58.  Other controls ,in term of change management 
that we do. 
Change management should be 
adequately emphasized  
59.  The perspective is to ask questions about 
controls.. ask questions  
Relevance of all controls needs to be 
adequately discussed 
60.  Security controls are built along the way… such 
that the business can run smoothly.. 
 
Controls in business processes are not an 
after-thought, they are designed and 
built as part of a change initiative 
61.  Nothing can derail a security initiative and 
change management quicker than agitating 
employees .. 
Do not agitate employees  
62.  for taking control away from people.. trying to 
impose…make people jump there hoops…  
 
Sudden changes in responsibility 
structures are not good for security 
governance 
 
Do not impose new rules on employees 
without careful consideration and 
proper buy-in  
63.  making sure people understand the priority 
understand roles , responsibility .. if you can 
demonstrate you can get the level of service 
Demonstrate clearly roles and 
responsibilities 
 
Organizational members need to 
understand that certain tasks, controls 
and actions have a priority 
64.  some of the technology that support us .. such 
as audit tools.. should be run by separate 
groups…. Not run by security administrators… 
Auditing functions and actions need to 
be separated 
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65.  having the control built in the low level are 
important.. Identity management… set of 
technology.. very important for controls for 
security management program 
Controls need to be at all levels of the 
organization – higher levels as well as 
lower levels 
 
Identity management is perhaps the 
most important control in organizations 
66.  external audit is another good stuff … 
 
Controls need to be periodically 
evaluated by external auditors  
67.  it becomes issue of internal policies…. it has to 
be related to  IT architecture… client side you 
have to incorporate controls as part of system 
design… 
Controls should be related to the IT 
architecture 
 
Controls need to be instituted as part of 
organizational design 
68.  so for control point you need few people 
dedicated to doing this thing….. program 
management office .. project management…. 
Set of a separate office looking of security only 
There needs to be a management 
function that ensures efficacy of controls 
 
Separate office is required for 
maintenance   
69.  it is a huge undertaking that goes back to 
identity management… we have so  many 
environment to maintain.. we need tools for 
that.. .. the tools are very expensive 
The nature of controls determines that 
kind of tools necessary for management 
 
Resources need to be allocated for 
maintaining controls 
70.  .controlling people from inside is more of 
accountability and responsibility  you have to 
make very clear the consequences of the 
action…. 
Accountability and responsibility is 
required 
 
Consequences of non compliance to 
controls needs to be communicated to 
the employees 
71.  But what is the criminal action… people are 
held responsible as the induction process begin 
in the company… but it‘s not clear if this 
happens.. what action would be taken …  
Explain the meaning of criminal action 
to the employees 
 
Explain the consequences of action  
 
72.  security has to be a part of functional 
requirements…  
Security governance has to be a 
functional requirement  
73.  I believe we must make sure companies do the 
right thing.  One way to accomplish this is 
through training. 
Ensure that companies do the right 
thing 
 
Training is required to help 
organizations do the right thing 
74.  Bridge the gap. MIS and Accounting have to 
play in the same sandbox. 
Bridge the gap between different 
functionalities in the organization 
 
MIS and accounting have to coordinate 
for better controls  
75.  Provide more training to MIS people. They 
need to understand the need for compliance. 
 
Provide training to technology oriented 
people such that they are responsive for 
compliance purposes 
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Explain the importance and need for 
compliance to technical people  
76.  Changes in the corporate culture have to be 
managed in a better way.   
Better change management practices in 
the organization 
 
Appreciation for cultural aspects needs 
to be central in organizing security 
governance controls  
77.  Suddenly people are reviewing everything that 
you do…such changes have to be 
managed properly.  
Review of controls should be in light of 
the organizational objectives 
78.  Security governance should be a way to move 
forward to, build the new program into existing 
business processes. 
Ensure that security governance is an 
antecedent to complete security and 
process integrity 
79.  It is a continuous process, not just a list of 
things to complete in order to ensure security 
governance. 
Control assessment and implementation 
should be undertaken in a continuous 
iterative manner 
 
Control implementation should not be 
an after-thought  
80.  We have to build around the existing processes. 
Building up from nothing would be more 
difficult, it is better to have something to begin 
with. 
Once needs to understand the 
organizational context for control 
implementation. 
 
Controls cannot be implemented using a 
“clean slate approach” 
81.  Cleanliness, orderliness 
 
Security governance controls need to be 
simple and easy to use 
82.  Continuous improvement 
 
Make sure to have continuous 
improvement  
83.  Standardization 
 
Establish standardization in the control 
process  
84.  Systemization Create systemization in control 
development process 
85.  Trust  Establish trust in the organization  
86.  Timeliness Controls should reflect timeliness  
87.  Results-oriented Have a result oriented attitude   
88.  Power 
 
One needs to appreciate the impact of 
organizational power structures while 
establishing controls  
89.  respecting the rights of others, including their 
confidences and personal information 
 
Respect the rights of others  
 
Respect other people’s  confidence 
 
Respect other people’s personal 
information   
90.  Accountability for one‘s actions. People should have accountability for 
their action  
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91.  positive reinforcement for doing the right thing 
and doing things right;  
 
Establish positive reinforcement for 
doing the right thing 
 
 Establish positive reinforcement for 
doing the things right  
92.  negative consequences for failure to do so Establish clear negative consequences 
for failure to do the right things   
93.  Living in a security conscious culture as 
reflected in individuals watching out for each 
other. 
Establish a security conscious culture  
 
Establish a culture where individuals 
watch out for each other  
94.  Senior executives ―walk the talk,‖ holding 
themselves visibly accountable to the same 
policies and procedures that apply to everyone 
else 
 
Top management should “walk the talk” 
 
Top management should be visibly 
accountable for actions  
 
Visibility in ensuring the policies and 
procedures are same for all  
95.  Holding all outside parties (customers, 
suppliers, vendors, partners, contractors, etc.) to 
the same standard of care as required of 
employees, and as appropriate to their roles 
Hold all stakeholders to same standard 
of care appropriate to their roles  
 
 
96.  Using regulation as a catalyst for information 
security governance 
  
Use regulations as a catalyst for better 
security governance practices  
97.  When a culture of security is absent, it turns 
compliance into a ―check the box‖ exercise 
instead of substantive, sustained improvement. 
 
Ensure that compliance is a substantive 
and sustained improvement in business 
processes 
Lack of security governance culture 
turns compliance into check the box 
exercise  
98.  Security is considered a cost of doing business, 
not a discretionary or negotiable budget-line 
item that needs to be regularly defended. 
View security governance as cost of 
doing business  
Security governance is not a negotiable 
budget-line item  
99.  Security controls has achievable, measurable 
objectives that directly align with enterprise 
objectives. 
Security controls should have achievable 
objectives  
Security controls should have 
measurable objectives 
Governance control objectives should 
align with enterprise objectives  
100 Communication on controls topics is 
encouraged. 
Encourage communication amongst 
employees about control issues  
100. Discussion on controls topics is encouraged. Encourage discussion  amongst 
employees about control issues 
101. Debate on controls topics is encouraged. Encourage debate amongst employees 
about control issues 
102. An organization should regularly compare and 
benchmarks its security control state, 
investments, and actions with others in its 
market sector and community of practice. 
Compare regularly the security 
governance state across the industry  
Benchmark security governance  
practices with industry standards 
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 Benchmark security governance  
investments against industry standards    
103. Security leaders/general auditors/treasurer are 
well respected in the enterprise culture 
 
 
Security leaders should be well 
respected in the organizational culture  
104. Security leaders are perceived as valued 
contributors whose opinions and expertise are 
sought 
Perceive security leaders/auditors as 
valued contributors  
105. General auditors navigate freely across the 
organization 
Auditors should be able to navigate 
freely across the organization  
106. Security leaders regularly collaborate with peers Peer collaboration in security 
governance is important  
107. Rewards, for security-policy compliance are 
consistently applied and reinforced. 
 
Rewards for compliance with policies 
should be ensured  
108. Recognition for security-policy compliance are 
consistently applied and reinforced. 
 
Apply and reinforce recognition for 
complying with policies  
109. Consequences for security-policy non 
compliance are applied and reinforced. 
 
Explain the consequences of non 
compliance with policies  
110. We grant access to people not positions. Grant access to people not positions    
111. Be aware of morality of your staff. Allow them 
small things and don‘t wait for things like 
notices.    
 
 
Be aware of the morality of the staff 
 
Do not delay small things for 
bureaucratic reasons   
112. Keep the ownership of the information. Focus on ownership of the information  
113. Internal satisfaction from what I am doing is 
very important to me. 
Ensure employee satisfaction  
114. There has to be proper ways to maintain and 
integrate the information.  
 
Maintain and integrate the information 
properly  
115. Need to create an environment and a leadership 
style, culture, values where we encourage 
internal competition to stay within groups. 
Encourage internal competition to stay 
within groups  
 
Create an environment of leadership 
style and culture to minimize intergroup 
rivalry   
116. Systematically structure and level information 
needs.  
Structure your information needs   
117. Management should be available when people 
need assistance. 
Make management/leadership available 
when the need arises  
118. Give examples to employees about how 
something has to be done.  
Training with examples 
119. Give specific details of what you want and how 
you want it. 
Provide specific examples of how work 
should be done 
120. Information can be improperly integrated. Audit 
process helps in this. 
Develop audit process to integrate the 
information rules 
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121. personal integrity influences individual and 
group behavior towards information security 
controls  
Personal integrity influences individual 
behavior towards controls  
 
Personal integrity influences group 
behavior towards controls  
122. Honor: It is important to go beyond disciplinary 
records to establish whether or not the truth was 
told even when it would result in a negative 
outcome for the individual. 
Ensure honor of the employees  
Ensure that truth is being told  
 
Go beyond the norms to protect honor 
of individuals  
123. We all must be able and capable of trusting 
everyone in the organization that comes into 
contact with our shared assets. 
Enhance an environment of trust in the 
organization  
124. Politics, favoritism, and self-interest typically 
trump these values and may undermine the 
security of information systems 
Politics undermines the security 
governance  
 
Avoid favoritism in groups  
 
Avoid self interest in group   
125. Only individuals with strong moral values are 
allowed to access, audit, and sustain our 
information systems. 
 
Ensure individuals with strong moral 
values to access data  
 
Ensure individuals with strong values to 
audit the systems  
126. Continuous monitoring is of no use if corrective 
measures are not instituted and carried out.   
 
Ensure continuous monitoring of 
controls  
 
Institute corrective measures for 
continuous monitoring    
127. None of these control measures will work if key 
individuals and the organization lack the 
fortitude to enforce the rules and the remedial 
solutions. 
Ensure that key individuals enforce 
rules and remedial solutions   
128. whatever you do.. you should not impede 
people or hinder people doing their job. 
Do not create barriers to people doing 
their job 
129. You should be flexible enough but strong 
enough to protect  companies assets… 
Be flexible and strong to protect 
company assets  
130. so you have to put those kinds for things which 
are acceptable.. and respected by people 
Do things that are acceptable and 
respected by people  
131. You have to educate people …why are we 
doing what we are doing 
Educate people  
Explain to people why they are doing 
what they are doing  
132. change management for any kinds of 
changes….to any production systems ..should 
go thru proper security channels to make those 
changes 
Manage changes in the organization 
properly  
Changes in production systems should 
be managed  
133. The ability to share: work, responsibility, and 
credit, is a fundamental measure of integrity.   
 
Encourage the ability to share the work 
Ability to share responsibility is 
important 
Credit about a good work should be 
shared properly  
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Ability to share is a fundamental 
measure of integrity  
134. You have to have enough 
firewalls….routers…software…so that you can 
protect external threats… 
Have enough technical protections in the 
organization  
135. internally people are as bad as they are 
outside….disgruntled employee can share any 
access with outside 
Have protection against disgruntled 
employees  
136. trust goes so far….there have to be 
controls…some procedures in place… 
Trust is important in the organization 
 
Create controls in work process to 
ensure procedures are followed  
137. You have to do a risk assessment…for every 
kind of information.. 
Perform a risk assessment to develop 
controls  
138. most of the information gets collected from the 
garbage.. as a part of your security you have to 
worry about physical security … 
Physical security is important part of 
security  
 
Create controls for accessing 
information from garbage  
139. You have to worry from both 
perspective…what‘s the damage to the 
organization and what‘s the damage to the 
individual… 
Assess the damage to the organization 
from lack of control 
 
Assess damage to the individual from 
lack of controls 
140. internal control within IT should be such that no 
person has all the rights 
No single person should have all the 
rights or access  
141. If you intend to do something which is different 
from our standard process you have to be 
accountable….the manager has to know the 
process… 
Know the business process properly 
 
Own up the responsibility for any 
deviation in the normal business process  
142. since SOX has come things have 
changed…companies are spending lot of time 
in this . 
Regulations have changed the way 
companies look at controls  
 
Organizations are spending resources on 
compliance  
143. if I were the CIO..I follow through and make 
sure that we are we have to prove that what we 
say is what we do 
Ensure what is being claimed is being 
done   
144. people do not see any value in those 
controls…..if you do not see in value some 
thing …it will not move forward….. 
Ensure that people see value in controls  
145. all will go lose .. if there is no disciplinary 
action… if  there are no policy published in HR 
handbook that if you do this thing …. The 
consequences are such so why would I do that 
Explain clearly the disciplinary actions  
146. at the beginning if the controls are too 
complex...people will find  a way around it… 
they do not want to do it… 
Do not make complex controls 
147. complexity definitely derives adherence ….if 
they are flexible .. they are good.. people 
understand ..and they will work… it‘s not tying 
Explain the purpose of control to people. 
The complexity derive adherence of 
controls. 
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my hands.. but helping me to do the work .. I 
will follow it 
148. Ease of use… Ensure that controls are easy to use 
149. importance of controls… if I do not see it is 
important … I will not do it…..why should I do 
it…… 
Communicate importance of controls 
150. whether it IT function or HR function it has to 
be function that has to be properly 
defined…positioned by organization .. funded 
by the  organization.. and respected by the 
organization where you put ownership of 
controls does not matter 
Ownership of control should reside in 
functionality  
151. Management has to be committed no matter 
where you put it… 
Management should be committed to 
controls. 
152. chances of success of security in being in IT are 
higher because it is a discipline which brings 
The ownership of control should lies 
with IT department. 
153. I think it was a shame not to follow regulations. Ensure that the regulations are followed. 
154. Regulations should be followed in their entirety. Follow regulations in entirety  
155. Certain line of business should be more strict 
with the following through of such regulations.  
 
Differentiate between lines of business. 
156. Prevention Mentality Create prevention mentality 
157. open-mindedness  
 
 Encourage open mindedness to provide 
inputs. 
158. biggest influence to individual and group 
behavior towards IS governance is peer 
pressure. 
Group behavior is governed by peer 
pressure.  
 
Peer pressure influences individual 
behavior. 
159. If everyone else is following or not following 
the policies and also ease of use. 
Ensure ease of use of controls. 
160. ideally each employee job functions and needs 
should be looked at and IS designed around that 
IS needs. 
Ensure job design around IS needs.  
161. biggest factor for whether a person observes the 
security policy is if it is convenient or not. 
Create convenient policy  
162. How much people invest in it if the company 
makes it their priority so will the people. 
Management  should make controls its 
priority 
163. Some of these practices work only because they 
are required through law. 
Ensure regulations are followed  
164. These laws were created for the good of the 
company and the investor. 
Regulations protect the organization and 
the investors  
165.  Discipline Encourage discipline in the organization  
166. Whether one‘s personal values/norms are the 
same with the company‘ or not. If it‘s not they 
most like his behaviors would negatively affect 
the security governance. 
 
Align personal and organizational values  
 
 
167. if one feels his effort/performance is being 
reward satisfactory, he would voluntary follow 
Reward good performance  
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the controls.  
168. If the company has a good environment, where 
everyone willing to follow the security 
governance, it will affect one‘s behaviors 
towards it. 
Encourage an environment of 
conformity  
 
Environment of conformity affects 
individual behavior  
169. This risk has been instilled in all of our 
employees. Each department has IT security 
liaison that is responsible for the IT security 
plan is implemented. 
Instill risk consciousness in the 
employees  
 
Each department should take care of its 
controls plan  
170. I feel the responsibility is very important. 
 
Encourage a sense of responsibility  
171. There always needs to be balancing point where 
the practices that are followed / not followed 
can be sustained by the losses. 
Balance between gains and losses from 
the controls  
172. Practices or governance of one kind will depend 
on the type of industry it is followed 
Differentiate between type of industry  
173. there has to be strong leadership, reinforcement 
a tie between what‘s being done why and its 
value and risks and regular user education. 
Provide strong leadership  
 
Explain the reasons behind 
organizational actions  
 
Explain the risks and values of controls 
to users 
 
Educate users regularly   
174. It helps to have IT personnel in visible positions 
with good commitment from top executives. 
Encourage committed IT personnel to 
be in visible positions  
175. individuals should also be honest and 
determined for security. 
Encourage honesty  
 
Encourage determination about 
following controls   
176. Personal integrity influences information 
security governance practices 
Encourage personal integrity   
177. Values of the organization 
 
Instill good values in the organization  
178. Culture in the organization 
 
Create controls culture in the 
organization  
179. Attitude of supervisors 
 
Encourage control conscious attitude of 
supervisors  
180. Actions (disciplinary) taken against unethical 
behavior in general influence individual 
behavior. 
 
Take disciplinary action against 
unethical behavior  
 
Action against unethical actions 
influences individual behavior  
181. Relevance /level of confidentiality of 
information involved influences behavior. 
 
Behavior is influenced by level of 
confidentiality of the information  
182. Secrecy creates fear, which ultimately leads to 
someone making a mistake by letting information 
Do not create an environment of fear  
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out 
183. A value of mistrust by not developing close 
relationships with business stakeholders has led 
to this value of secrecy. 
Discourage secrecy amongst employees  
 
Discourage an environment of mistrust  
184. Data integrity is critical for many reasons. Assess the criticality of data integrity  
185. Confidentiality: Ensure confidentiality  
186. How important is the info to the firm? 
 
Assess the sensitivity of the information  
187. Firm wide policies should be readily available 
accessible. 
 
Make the polices readily accessible  
188. Some practices (For SOX, HIPPA) work 
because the company is faced with strict 
punishment if they don‘t do it. 
 
Create a fear of punishment for 
organizations  
 
Establish clear consequences for not 
complying with laws   
189. Respect for company‘s rule 
 
Respect company’s rules  
190. Respect for society‘s laws 
 
Encourage respect for laws of the society  
191. Dedicated to the company 
 
Encourage dedication to the company 
192. My pride in myself doing my job to the best of 
my ability drives me the most. 
Encourage self pride in the job 
193. Relationship with my supervisor and /or those 
that own the data I manage is important. 
Nurture the relationship with employees  
194. If a person does not come to follow the policies, 
everyone is exposed. 
 
Ensure everyone follows the policies 
195. Does it hold to correct people responsible for 
and failure of protecting this privacy 
Make the correct people accountable for 
their actions  
196. Does the policy make everyone responsible to 
protecting the information? 
 
Make people responsible for protecting 
the information  
197. free expression 
 
Encourage free expression  
198. Desire to conform 
 
Instill the desire to conform  
199. Desire to meet expectations 
 
Instill the desire into the employees to 
meet the expectations about controls   
200. Have good changeability Encourage flexibility in controls  
201. Communication policy 
 
Encourage efficient communication 
policy within the organization  
202. Corporate security control strategy 
 
Develop corporate security control 
strategy   
203. Improper business process 
 
Avoid improper business processes  
204. Risk Management Strategy Establish a risk management strategy  
205. This is where the proactive approach of putting Establish controls proactively  
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in internal controls (just like burglar bars – 
against burglars) to ensure that ―burglars‖ are 
taken care of where there is a breach.  
 
 
Ensure that action is taken against 
people who break the law 
206. the psychology of the perpetrators should be 
analyzed from this perspective and strategies 
put in place for counter measures.    
 
Analyze the psychology of the 
perpetrators  
 
Create counter measures to deal with 
destructive actions  
207. The best way to stop this internally is to instill 
good principals into employees (control from 
source) 
Instill good principles into employees  
 
Manage controls from the source of 
problems i.e. employees  
208. a big stick for those who break the rules – 
―whack‖ them hard so that it be lesson not only 
for the rule breaker but for anyone who will try 
to follow suite. 
Establish clear punishments for rule 
breakers  
 
Set deterrence criteria to be followed    
209. IT manages and facilities by installing suitable 
environmental and physical controls which are 
regularly reviewed for their proper functioning 
Establish suitable environmental and 
physical controls  
 
Regularly review the controls for proper 
functioning  
210. Organizational responsibilities and formal 
processes for ensuring compliance with 
external requirements are clearly defined. 
 
Centralize controls functionality 
Create organizational responsibilities 
for compliance  
 
Formalize process of compliance in the 
organization  
 
Develop a central control functionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table: Common Form Values to Objectives 
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Maximize Internal Controls for IS Security 
 
No.  Common Form Values Objectives 
1.  Lack of awareness is a source of problems.  Increase awareness of security governance 
2.  Responsiveness to media hype  Ensure responsiveness media hyped issues 
3.  Clarity of responsibility in organizations 
Accountability for actions 
 
Define responsibility and accountability of 
controls for security governance 
4.  Leverage individual knowledge for 
ensuring internal controls  
Ensure learning about internal control 
issues 
5.  Ensure awareness of organizational actions 
and practices 
 
Increase awareness of business activities 
and processes 
6.  Training should reflect principles of 
internal controls rather than means of 
ensuring security 
 
Define training programs to reflect details 
of internal controls 
7.  Increase awareness of internal control 
breaches through social engineering  
Increase awareness of breaches because of 
social engineering 
8.  Define policies for access to information 
resources  
Define control policies for access to 
information resources 
9.  Define multiple layers of controls  
 
Define multiple layers of controls 
10.  Define a system for incorporating feedback 
to improve controls 
Balance convenience with usability 
Institute feedback channels for security 
governance 
Balance convenience with usability 
11.  Ensure compliance with internal controls 
defined in the policy document 
Ensure compliance with policy document  
12.  Individuals differences in managing 
internal controls  
Manage individual differences about 
controls 
13.  Internal audit control practices need to 
evolve with time and changing contexts  
 
Develop audit practices for changing 
contexts of governance 
14.  Take input from various individuals 
dealing with controls on a day to day basis 
 
Incorporate feedbacks from people on 
daily basis 
15.  Auditing and compliance with controls is 
also based on informal feedback from 
trusted informants 
Encourage informal feedback from people 
about controls  
16.  Sit with people individually and take their 
perspective on the process 
 
17.  Internal control audit involves cross 
checking procedures with people 
Develop cross checking mechanisms for 
audit function 
18.  Individuals have ability to improve internal 
controls. 
Individuals constrained because of 
resource allocations 
Encourage individual to improve controls  
Discourage individuals from feeling 
restrained due to resources   
19.  Internal control auditors are indeed 
consultants who ensure effectiveness of 
controls  
Treat internal auditors as consultants to 
ensure effectiveness of controls  
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20.  Internal control structures are not static.  
Proper change management needed for 
efficacy of controls 
Develop dynamic internal control 
structures  
Develop effective change management 
practices   
21.  Controls should consider change of roles  
22.  Controls need to be tested appropriately 
 
Controls are created by the management 
and employees 
  
 
23.  High level controls are needed for direction 
 
Specific controls use different approaches 
by organizations 
 
 
24.  Change management controls are 
important 
 
 
25.  Clarity of business processes for internal 
controls 
Establish clarity in business processes  
26.  Encourage discussion on internal controls 
as identified in the policies 
 
 
Encourage discussion on internal controls 
as identified in the policies 
 
27.  Be aware of industry frameworks and 
models.  
They guide proper internal control 
formulation. 
Refer to industry models and frameworks 
for control formulation 
28.  Generic frameworks need interpretation 
 
Following industry frameworks requires 
preparations 
 
29.  Balancing centralization vs 
decentralization (move to 9) 
Balance centralization with 
decentralizations 
30.  Consequences of internal control breaches 
should be communicated. (move to under 3 
above) 
Communicate the consequences of internal 
controls breaches  
31.  Encourage regulatory compliance to 
internal controls  
Encourage regulatory compliance to 
internal controls  
32.  Establish a control consciousness culture  
Establish a compliance culture 
Establish a control consciousness culture  
Establish a compliance culture 
33.  Auditing has gained importance as a 
functionality 
 
34.  Regulations may be too strong to be 
followed in entirety – define appropriate 
internal controls in response to regulations 
Define controls for compliance with 
regulations  
35.  Regulations help in following the controls 
better  
 
36.  Failure to comply with internal control 
regulations scares people  
Explain the consequences of failure to 
comply with regulations   
37.  Repeat compliance with regulations is  
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difficult  
38.  Internal control structures should reflect 
sensitivity of data  
Establish control structure to reflect 
sensitivity in data  
39.  Access to data resources should be 
restricted  
 
40.  Identify data owners for sensitive data   
Authorizations should be linked to data 
owners  
Identify data owners for sensitive data   
Link data owners with authorizations  
41.  Encourage individual responsibility for 
ensuring proper access to data resources.  
Encourage individual responsibility for 
ensuring proper access to data resources. 
42.  Top management involvement in defining 
internal controls for security  
Involve top management to defined 
internal controls  
43.  Top management should lead by example 
when dealing with internal controls  
Encourage top management to lead by 
example  
44.  Awareness of compliance issues is 
important 
 
45.  Direction should be provided from the top 
management  
 
46.  Role and privileges need to be properly 
defined and documented 
 
Data resources should be clearly classified 
according to sensitivity level  
Define and document roles and privileges 
properly 
47.  Communication about the nature and scope 
of controls is important  
 
Communicate about nature and scope of 
controls  
48.  Education of employees regarding internal 
controls is needed  
Encourage education about internal 
controls  
49.  Executives should be accountable for the 
actions 
 
Rules should be followed  
 
50.  Change attitude of executives about 
security controls  
 
Executives impact the organization‘s 
attitude towards security  
Change attitude of executives about 
security controls  
 
Not sure 
51.  Security requirements define internal 
controls 
Ensure internal controls meet security 
requirements  
52.  Continuously update internal control 
requirements in security policies  
Reflect control requirements in security 
policies  
53.  Education is an important control for 
security  
 
 
54.  Controls need to be people oriented. Need 
to understand feelings, attitudes and belief 
of people.  
Develop people oriented controls  
Understand people‘s attitudes and beliefs 
about controls   
 
55.  Security awareness training is important 
for good controls  
 
56.  Engage in an IT architecture review, which Ensure IT architecture review for 
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helps in correctness of design  
 
All program codes should be adequately 
reviewed  
correctness of design 
 
Ensure adequate review of programs  
57.  Change management process is important  
 
All guidelines for governance need to be 
defined by consensus 
 
 
 
develop guidelines using consensus 
58.  Change management should be adequately 
emphasized  
 
59.  Relevance of all controls needs to be 
adequately discussed 
 
Discuss adequately the relevance f controls  
60.  Controls in business processes are not an 
after-thought, they are designed and built 
as part of a change initiative 
Develop controls as a part of change 
initiative  
61.  Do not agitate employees  Discourage employee agitation 
62.  Sudden changes in responsibility structures 
are not good for security governance 
 
Do not impose new rules on employees 
without careful consideration and proper 
buy-in  
 
Discourage sudden changes responsibility 
structures  
 
 
Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules  
63.  Demonstrate clearly roles and 
responsibilities 
 
Organizational members need to 
understand that certain tasks, controls and 
actions have a priority 
 
 
 
 
Explain priotization of tasks and actions 
for controls to members 
 
64.  Auditing functions and actions need to be 
separated 
 
 
Establish difference between audit 
functionality and actions  
65.  Controls need to be at all levels of the 
organization – higher levels as well as 
lower levels 
 
Identity management is perhaps the most 
important control in organizations 
Develop controls for all the levels in the 
organization 
 
 
Develop identity management control 
66.  Controls need to be periodically evaluated 
by external auditors  
Ensure periodic review of controls from 
external auditors  
67.  Controls should be related to the IT 
architecture 
 
Controls need to be instituted as part of 
organizational design 
Establish the relation between controls and 
IT architecture 
 
Institute controls as part of organizational 
design 
68.  There needs to be a management function 
that ensures efficacy of controls 
 
Ensure efficacy of controls through the 
management  
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Separate office is required for maintenance   
69.  The nature of controls determines that kind 
of tools necessary for management 
 
Resources need to be allocated for 
maintaining controls 
Develop flexibility in tools for controls  
 
 
Ensure adequate resources allocation for 
maintenance of controls   
70.  Accountability and responsibility is 
required 
 
Consequences of non compliance to 
controls needs to be communicated to the 
employees 
 
 
 
Communicate the consequences of non 
compliance of ontrols  
71.  Explain the meaning of criminal action to 
the employees 
 
Explain the consequences of action  
 
Explain the meaning of criminal action to 
the employees 
 
 
72.  Security governance has to be a functional 
requirement  
Develop security governance as a 
functional requirement  
73.  Ensure that companies do the right thing 
 
Training is required to help organizations 
do the right thing 
 
74.  Bridge the gap between different 
functionalities in the organization 
 
MIS and accounting have to coordinate for 
better controls  
Bridge the gap between different 
functionalities in the organization 
 
Encourage co-ordination between MIS and 
accounting for controls 
75.  Provide training to technology oriented 
people such that they are responsive for 
compliance purposes 
 
Explain the importance and need for 
compliance to technical people  
 
 
 
 
Explain the importance and need for 
compliance to technical people 
76.  Better change management practices in the 
organization 
 
Appreciation for cultural aspects needs to 
be central in organizing security 
governance controls  
 
 
 
Encourage appreciation for security 
governance culture  
77.  Review of controls should be in light of the 
organizational objectives 
Review controls with respect to 
organizational objectives  
78.  Ensure that security governance is an 
antecedent to complete security and 
process integrity 
Ensure that security governance is an 
antecedent to complete security and 
process integrity 
79.  Control assessment and implementation 
should be undertaken in a continuous 
iterative manner 
 
Control implementation should not be an 
after-thought  
Ensure continuously iterative control 
assessment and implementation  
 
 
Discourage planning about control 
implement ion as after thought  
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80.  One needs to understand the organizational 
context for control implementation. 
 
Controls cannot be implemented using a 
―clean slate approach‖ 
Understand the organizational context of 
controls implementation  
 
 
Use clean slate approach for controls 
implementation   
81.  Security governance controls need to be 
simple and easy to use 
Develop simple and easy to use controls  
82.  Make sure to have continuous 
improvement  
 
83.  Establish standardization in the control 
process  
Establish standardization in the control 
process  
84.  Create systemization in control 
development process 
Create systemization in control 
development process 
85.  Establish trust in the organization  Establish trust in the organization  
86.  Controls should reflect timeliness  Ensure timeliness in controls  
87.  Have a result oriented attitude   Develop a result oriented attitude  
88.  One needs to appreciate the impact of 
organizational power structures while 
establishing controls  
Understand organizational power 
structures in developing controls  
89.  Respect the rights of others  
 
Respect other people‘s  confidence 
 
Respect other people‘s personal 
information   
Respect the rights of others  
 
Respect other people‘s  confidence 
 
Respect other people‘s personal 
information   
90.  People should have accountability for their 
action  
 
91.  Establish positive reinforcement for doing 
the right thing 
 
 Establish positive reinforcement for doing 
the things right  
Establish positive reinforcement for doing 
the right thing 
 
 Establish positive reinforcement for doing 
the things right 
92.  Establish clear negative consequences for 
failure to do the right things   
 
93.  Establish a security conscious culture  
 
Establish a culture where individuals watch 
out for each other  
Establish a security conscious culture  
 
Establish a culture where individuals watch 
out for each other 
94.  Top management should ―walk the talk‖ 
 
Top management should be visibly 
accountable for actions  
 
Visibility in ensuring the policies and 
procedures are same for all  
Encourage the management to ―walk the 
talk‖  
 
Encourage transparency about 
accountability for actions  
 
Enhance  visibility about fairness of 
policies and procedures   
95.  Hold all stakeholders to same standard of 
care appropriate to their roles  
 
 
Ensure appropriate care to all stakeholders   
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96.  Use regulations as a catalyst for better 
security governance practices  
Use regulations as a catalyst for better 
practices  
97.  Ensure that compliance is a substantive and 
sustained improvement in business 
processes 
 
Lack of security governance culture turns 
compliance into check the box exercise  
Ensure that compliance is a substantive and 
sustained improvement in business 
processes 
 
Avoid turning compliance into check the 
box exercise 
98.  View security governance as cost of doing 
business  
 
Security governance is not a negotiable 
budget-line item  
View security governance as cost of doing 
business  
 
Ensure that security governace is a non-
negotiable budget line item 
99.  Security controls should be achievable   
 
Security controls should have measurable 
objectives 
 
Governance control objectives should align 
with enterprise objectives  
Develop achievable objectives  
 
 
Develop measurable security control 
objectives  
 
Align security control objectives with 
enterprise objectives 
100 Encourage communication amongst 
employees about control issues  
Encourage communication amongst 
employees about control issues 
100. Encourage discussion  amongst employees 
about control issues 
Encourage discussion  amongst employees 
about control issues 
101. Encourage debate amongst employees 
about control issues 
Encourage debate amongst employees 
about control issues 
102. Compare regularly the security governance 
state across the industry  
 
Benchmark security governance  practices 
with industry standards 
 
Benchmark security governance  
investments against industry standards    
 
Compare the state of controls with 
standards across industry  
 
Benchmark security governance  practices 
with industry standards 
 
Benchmark security governance  
investments against industry standards    
 
103. Security leaders should be well respected 
in the organizational culture  
Ensure respect for security leaders 
104. Perceive security leaders/auditors as valued 
contributors  
 
105. Auditors should be able to navigate freely 
across the organization  
Ensure adequate access to auditors across 
the organization  
106. Peer collaboration in security governance 
is important  
Encourage collaboration with peers 
107. Rewards for compliance with policies 
should be ensured  
Ensure rewarding for conformity with 
policies 
108. Apply and reinforce recognition for 
complying with policies  
Provide recognition for complying with 
policies 
109. Explain the consequences of non 
compliance with policies  
 
110. Grant access to people not positions     
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111. Be aware of the morality of the staff 
 
Do not delay small things for bureaucratic 
reasons   
Understand the morality of the staff  
 
Avoid bureaucratic delays 
112. Focus on ownership of the information  Ensure ownership of information 
113. it is helpful though to have a separate 
controls department…that would get the 
money required… 
 
Develop a central controls department  
114. Ensure employee satisfaction  Ensure employee satisfaction  
115. Maintain and integrate the information 
properly  
 
Maintain and integrate the information 
properly  
 
116. Encourage internal competition to stay 
within groups  
 
Create an environment of leadership style 
and culture to minimize intergroup rivalry   
Encourage internal competition to stay 
within groups  
 
Create an environment of leadership style 
and culture to minimize intergroup rivalry   
117. Structure your information needs   Ensure structuring the information needs  
118. Make management/leadership available 
when the need arises  
Ensure availability of the management  
119. Training with examples Ensure training with examples 
120. Provide specific examples of how work 
should be done 
Illustrate with specific work related 
examples 
121. Develop audit process to integrate the 
information rules 
Develop audit process to integrate the 
information rules 
122. Personal integrity influences individual 
behavior towards controls  
 
Personal integrity influences group 
behavior towards controls  
Encourage personal integrity 
 
 
Respect personal integrity in a group 
123. Ensure honor of the employees  
Ensure that truth is being told  
 
Go beyond the norms to protect honor of 
individuals  
 
Ensure honor of the employees  
Ensure that truth is being told  
 
Protect honor of the individuals  
124. Enhance an environment of trust in the 
organization  
Enhance an environment of trust in the 
organization 
125. Politics undermines the security 
governance  
 
Avoid favoritism in groups  
 
Avoid self interest in group   
Discourage politics in the organization  
 
Discourage favoritism in groups  
 
Discourage self interest in groups  
126. Ensure individuals with strong moral 
values to access data  
 
Ensure individuals with strong values to 
audit the systems  
Encourage access to individuals with 
strong moral values  
 
Ensure strong moral values in auditors 
127. Ensure continuous monitoring of controls  Ensure continuous monitoring of controls  
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Institute corrective measures for 
continuous monitoring    
 
Institute corrective measures for 
continuous monitoring    
128. Ensure that key individuals enforce rules 
and remedial solutions   
Ensure that key individuals enforce rules 
and remedial solutions   
129. Do not create barriers to people doing their 
job 
Discourage impeding people from their job 
130. Be flexible and strong to protect company 
assets  
Protect company assets  
131. Do things that are acceptable and respected 
by people  
Encourage acceptable and respectable 
actions  
132. Educate people  
 
Explain to people why they are doing what 
they are doing  
Educate people  
 
Explain the rationale behind controls  
133. Manage changes in the organization 
properly  
 
Changes in production systems should be 
managed  
  
Manage changes efficiently  
 
Manage changes in production systems   
134. Encourage the ability to share the work 
 
Ability to share responsibility is important 
 
Credit about a good work should be shared 
properly  
 
Ability to share is a fundamental measure 
of integrity  
Encourage the ability to share the work 
 
Encourage responsibility charing  
 
Encourage sharing the credit for good work  
 
 
135. Have enough technical protections in the 
organization  
Ensure adequate technical controls   
136. Have protection against disgruntled 
employees  
Ensure protection against disgruntled 
employees  
137. Trust is important in the organization 
 
Create controls in work process to ensure 
procedures are followed  
Encourage trust 
 
 
Create controls to follow the procedures  
138. Perform a risk assessment to develop 
controls  
Ensure risks assessment to develop 
controls  
139. Physical security is important part of 
security  
 
Create controls for accessing information 
from garbage  
 
140. Assess the damage to the organization 
from lack of control 
 
Assess damage to the individual from lack 
of controls 
Ensure damage assessment to the 
organization  from lack of controls  
 
Ensure damage assessment for individuals 
from lack of controls  
141. No single person should have all the rights Discourage providing all rights to an 
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or access  individual  
142. Own up the responsibility for any deviation 
in the normal business process  
 
Understand the business processes 
 
-  
143. Regulations have changed the way 
companies look at controls  
 
Organizations are spending resources on 
compliance  
Understand the impact of regulations on 
controls  
 
Provide resources for compliance 
144. Ensure what is being claimed is being done   Ensure what is being claimed is being done   
145. Ensure that people see value in controls  Ensure that people see value in controls  
146. Explain clearly the disciplinary actions  Explain clearly the disciplinary actions  
147. Do not make complex controls Discourage complex controls  
148. Explain the purpose of control to people. 
The complexity derive adherence of 
controls. 
Explain the purpose of controls  
149. Ensure that controls are easy to use Ensure that controls are easy to use 
150. Communicate importance of controls Communicate importance of controls 
151. Ownership of control should reside in 
functionality   
 
152. Management should be committed to 
controls. 
Ensure management commitment to 
controls 
153. The ownership of control should not lie 
with IT department 
Ensure that IT department does not have 
the ownership of controls  
154. Ensure that the regulations are followed. Ensure that the regulations are followed. 
155. Follow regulations in entirety  Follow regulations in entirety  
156. Differentiate between lines of business. Differentiate between lines of business. 
157. Create prevention mentality Create prevention mentality 
158.  Encourage open mindedness to provide 
inputs. 
 Encourage open mindedness to provide 
inputs. 
159. Group behavior is governed by peer 
pressure.  
 
Peer pressure influences individual 
behavior. 
Understand the group behavior due to peer 
pressure  
 
Understand the influence of peer pressure 
on individual behavior  
160. Ensure ease of use of controls. Ensure ease of use of controls. 
161. Ensure job design around IS needs.  Ensure job design around IS needs.  
162. Create convenient policy  Create convenient policy  
163. Management  should make controls its 
priority 
Ensure controls are a priority for the 
management  
164. Ensure regulations are followed  Ensure regulations are followed 
165. Regulations protect the organization and 
the investors  
Ensure regulations protect stakeholders 
166. Encourage discipline in the organization  Encourage discipline in the organization  
167. Align personal and organizational values  Align personal and organizational values  
168. Reward good performance  
 
Reward good performance  
169. Encourage an environment of conformity  
 
Environment of conformity affects 
individual behavior  
Encourage an environment of conformity  
 
Environment of conformity affects 
individual behavior  
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170. Instill risk consciousness in the employees  
 
Each department should take care of its 
controls plan  
Develop risk consciousness in the 
employees  
 
Ensure departments have control plan  
171. Encourage a sense of responsibility  Encourage a sense of responsibility 
172. Balance between gains and losses from the 
controls  
Balance between gains and losses from the 
controls  
173. Differentiate between type of industry  Differentiate between type of industry  
174. Provide strong leadership  
 
Explain the reasons behind organizational 
actions  
 
Explain the risks and values of controls to 
users 
 
Educate users regularly   
Provide strong leadership  
 
Explain the reasons behind organizational 
actions  
 
Explain the risks and values of controls to 
users 
 
Educate users regularly   
175. Encourage committed IT personnel to be in 
visible positions  
Encourage committed IT personnel to be in 
visible positions  
176. Encourage honesty  
 
Encourage determination about following 
controls   
Encourage honesty  
 
Encourage determination about following 
controls   
177. Encourage personal integrity   Encourage personal integrity   
178. Instill good values in the organization  Ensure good values about security 
governance  
179. Create controls culture in the organization  Create controls culture in the organization  
180. Encourage control conscious attitude of 
supervisors  
Encourage control conscious attitude of 
supervisors  
181. Take disciplinary action against unethical 
behavior  
 
Action against unethical actions influences 
individual behavior  
Ensure disciplinary action against unethical 
behavior  
 
Ensure action against unethical behavior    
182. Behavior is influenced by level of 
confidentiality of the information  
Define responsibilities according to level 
of confidentiality of information 
183. Do not create an environment of fear  Discourage an environment of fear 
184. Discourage secrecy amongst employees  
 
Discourage an environment of mistrust  
Discourage secrecy amongst employees  
 
Discourage an environment of mistrust  
185. Assess the criticality of data integrity  Assess the criticality of data integrity  
186. Ensure confidentiality  Ensure confidentiality  
187. Assess the sensitivity of the information  Assess the sensitivity of the information  
188. Make the polices readily accessible  Ensure policies are readily available  
189. Create a fear of punishment for 
organizations  
 
Establish clear consequences for not 
Create a fear of punishment for 
organizations  
 
Establish clear consequences for not 
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complying with laws   complying with laws   
190. Respect company‘s rules  Respect company‘s rules  
191. Encourage respect for laws of the society  Encourage respect for laws of the society  
192. Encourage dedication to the company Encourage dedication to the company 
193. Encourage self pride in the job Encourage self pride in the job 
194. Nurture the relationship with employees  Nurture the relationship with employees  
195. Ensure everyone follows the policies Ensure everyone follows the policies 
196. Make the correct people accountable for 
their actions  
Ensure accountability  
197. Make people responsible for protecting the 
information  
Ensure responsibility for protecting 
information  
198. Encourage free expression  Encourage free expression  
199. Instill the desire to conform  Instill the desire to conform  
200. Instill the desire into the employees to 
meet the expectations about controls   
Instill the desire into the employees to 
meet the expectations about controls   
201. Encourage flexibility in controls  Encourage flexibility in controls  
202. Encourage efficient communication policy 
within the organization  
Encourage efficient communication policy 
within the organization  
203. Develop corporate security control strategy   Develop corporate security control strategy   
204. Avoid improper business processes  Avoid improper business processes  
205. Establish a risk management strategy  Establish a risk management strategy  
206. Establish controls proactively  
 
Ensure that action is taken against people 
who break the law 
Establish controls proactively  
 
Ensure that action is taken against people 
who break the law 
207. Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators  
 
Create counter measures to deal with 
destructive actions  
Analyze the psychology of the perpetrators  
 
Create counter measures to deal with 
destructive actions  
208. Instill good principles into employees  
 
Manage controls from the source of 
problems i.e. employees  
Instill good principles into employees  
 
Manage controls from the source of 
problems i.e. employees  
209. Establish clear punishments for rule 
breakers  
 
Set deterrence criteria to be followed    
Establish clear punishments for rule 
breakers  
 
Set deterrence criteria to be followed    
210. Establish suitable environmental and 
physical controls  
 
Regularly review the controls for proper 
functioning  
Establish suitable environmental and 
physical controls  
 
Regularly review the controls for proper 
functioning  
211. Create organizational responsibilities for 
compliance  
 
Formalize process of compliance in the 
organization  
 
Centralize your controls functionality. It is 
important to have all the controls work 
under the same umbrella. 
Create organizational responsibilities for 
compliance  
 
Formalize process of compliance in the 
organization  
 
Centralize controls functionality  
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Objectives for Maximizing Information Systems Security Governance   
 
 1 Fundamental Objectives (condensed after completion of Phase 1) 
 Objective Name  Condensed objectives 
F1 Ensure corporate controls 
strategy 
  
Establish security controls as non-negotiable budgetary item   
Encourage planning about power structures in developing 
controls  
 
Establish security governance as n antecedent to complete 
security  
  
Establish security as cost of doing business  
 
Ensure departments have control plan and tools 
F2 Encourage a controls conscious 
culture 
 
 Encourage appreciation for prevention mentality  
 
Encourage a culture where individuals watch out for each other   
 
Ensure an obedient culture  
F3 Maximize Clarity in Policies and 
Procedures 
 
Enhance visibility about fairness of policies and procedures   
 
Ensure reflecting control requirements in policies  
 
Improve the accessibility of the policies in the organization  
 
Encourage discussion on internal controls as identified in the 
policies 
F4 Maximize Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
Encourage development of controls for regulatory compliance  
 
Improve security governance practices using compliance as a 
‗catalyst‘   
 
Establish  a compliance culture  
 
Follow compliance in its entirety  
F5 Ensure continuous iterative 
control assessment  
 
Improve controls implementation practices continuously  
 
Encourage validation of controls with changing contexts 
 
Establish organizational context  for control implementation 
 
Enable  effective change management practices  
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Means objectives (Condensed after completion of Phase 1 of the study)  
 Objectives Condensed Sub-Objectives  
M1 Ensure Efficacy of 
Audit Processes 
 
Encourage audit processes to integrate information rules 
 
Ensure audit practices for changing contexts of governance task 
 
Ensure adequate access to auditors across the organization  
 
Encourage  internal auditors as consultants to ensure effectiveness of 
controls  
M2 Maximize  clarity in 
business processes  
 
Enable clarity in business related activities  
 
Ensure  sound understanding of business processes  
M3 Ensure 
Communication 
about Controls  
 
Encourage communicating scope and intent of the controls  
 
Improve  inter and intra group employee communications about controls  
 
Encourage frequent debates about risks and values of controls  
 
Explain  the damages from lack of controls  
 
Enable efficient communications policy  
M4 Ensure Alignment of 
Individual and 
Organizational 
Values 
 
Encourage aligning personal and organizational values  
 
Encourage respect for individuals’ privacy  
 
Increase individual  loyalty to the organization  
 
Improve individual’s attitudes and beliefs about controls  
M5 Ensure data criticality  
 
Ensure data classification according to sensitivity  
 
Enable data ownership 
 
Ensure data is linked to authorizations  
 
Ensure identity management  
M6 Ensure punitive 
structures 
 
Ensure action against unacceptable behavior 
 
Ensure clear consequences for non conformity  
 
Encourage defining criminal behavior clearly   
 
Improve  discipline in the organization  
M7 Ensure clarity in 
control development 
process 
 
Encourage development of simple and easy to use controls  
 
Ensure timely and flexible controls  
 
Ensure multi layered nested controls  
 
Ensure risks assessment to develop controls  
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M8  Ensure formal 
controls assessment 
functionality  
 
Ensure a centralized controls assessment functionality   
 
Improve  controls as part of organizational design 
 
Encourage integration of controls into IT architecture  
 
Encourage usability assessment of controls  
 
Encourage stakeholder participation in controls  
 
Minimize  bureaucratic delays  
 
Discourage planning about control implementation as “after thought”  
 
Ensure balance between gains and losses from the controls  
M9  Maximize 
monitoring and 
feedback channels  
 
Ensure continuous monitoring of controls 
 
Ensure periodic review of controls by external auditors  
 
Encourage development of feedback channels for security goervancne  
 
Encourage review of controls with respect to organizational objectives  
M10 Ensure Visible 
Executive leadership 
Encourage the management to “walk the talk”  
 
Encourage top management to lead by example  
 
Encourage committed IT personnel to be in visible positions  
 
Encourage control conscious attitude of supervisors 
M11 Maximize  Group 
Cohesiveness  
 
Encourage sharing the credit for good work 
 
Minimize favoritism in groups 
M12 Maximize 
management 
commitment   
 
 
Ensure management commitment to controls efficiency  
 
Encourage rewarding conformance with controls  
 
Increase positive reinforcement for doing the right thing 
 
Ensure open environment  
 
Discourage impeding people from their job 
 
Discourage imposing ad hoc new rules  
M13 Maximize resource 
allocation for 
controls 
Ensure resources for controls  
 
Enable appropriate  environmental and physical controls  
 
Ensure cross functional group agreement on controls   
M14 Encourage 
Standardization of 
Encourage benchmarking controls against industry standards  
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Controls 
 
Encourage comparison of controls in same line of business  
M15 Maximize Training 
and Education  
 
Maximize  regular training  with work related examples 
 
Improve  knowledge about relevance of controls  
 
Encourage awareness about control breaches  
M16 Ensure ethical and 
moral values 
 
Encourage individual ethical and moral values 
 
Encourage individual self pride in job 
 
Encourage morality of the staff 
M17 Maximize  trust 
building mechanisms  
 
Increase trust in the organization  
 
Reduce fear in the organization 
 
Decrease politics in the organization   
 
 
 
